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Causing civilian casualties during military operations has become a much politicised 
topic in international relations since the Second World War. Since the last decade of the 20th 
century, different scholars and political analysts have claimed that human life is valued more 
and more among the general international community. This argument has led many researchers 
to assume that democratic culture and traditions, modern ethical and moral issues have created 
a desire for a world without war or, at least, a demand that contemporary armed conflicts, if 
unavoidable, at least have to be far less lethal forcing the military to seek new technologies that 
can minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage.  
Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) – weapons that are intended to minimise civilian 
casualties and collateral damage – are based on the technology that, during the 1990s, was 
expected to revolutionise the conduct of warfare making it significantly less deadly. The rapid 
rise of interest in NLW, ignited by the American military twenty five years ago, sparked off an 
entirely new military, as well as an academic, discourse concerning their potential contribution 
to military success on the 21st century battlefields. It seems, however, that except for this 
debate, very little has been done within the military forces themselves. 
This research suggests that the roots of this situation are much deeper than the simple 
professional misconduct of the military establishment, or the poor political behaviour of 
political leaders, who had sent them to fight. Following the story of NLW in the U.S., Russia 
and Israel this research focuses on the political and cultural aspects that have been supposed to 
force the military organisations of these countries to adopt new technologies and operational 
and organisational concepts regarding NLW in an attempt to minimise enemy civilian 
casualties during their military operations.     
This research finds that while American, Russian and Israeli national characters are, 
undoubtedly, products of the unique historical experience of each one of these nations, all of 
three pay very little regard to foreigners’ lives. Moreover, while it is generally argued that the 
international political pressure is a crucial factor that leads to the significant reduction of 
harmed civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure, the findings of this research suggest that 
the American, Russian and Israeli governments are well prepared and politically equipped to 
fend off international criticism.  
As the analyses of the American, Russian and Israeli cases reveal, the political-military 
leaderships of these countries have very little external or domestic reasons to minimise enemy 
civilian casualties through fundamental-revolutionary change in their conduct of war. In other 
words, this research finds that employment of NLW have failed because the political leadership 
asks the militaries to reduce the enemy civilian casualties to a politically acceptable level, rather 
than to the technologically possible minimum; as in the socio-cultural-political context of each 
country, support for the former appears to be significantly higher than for the latter.   
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The purpose of this research is threefold. First, this research offers a more 
comprehensive understanding of the relations between society and its military in the 21st 
century. Civilian casualties and collateral damage have long been considered as an undesired 
outcome of military activity that has to be reduced. While most of the contemporary discourse 
on this topic has primarily concentrated on three main factors: the legal aspects of causing 
civilian casualties, the impact of war on local population, and different factors of military 
professionalism required to avoid disproportional harm to civilians; this research answers an 
entirely different question. As the subject of civilian casualties during military operations 
seems to be highly politicised, this research takes this discourse out of its usual niches and 
suggests that the indirect responsibility rests with the politicians and the public, which they 
represent. When a society, at the beginning of the 21st century, sends its troops to war, does it 
really care about the enemy civilian casualties? This work intersects with a growing body of 
work on the relationship of warfare and violence, while filling in an important gap in the 
available literature. One of the most fundamental works, recently written on this subject, is 
Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature: A History of Violence and Humanity, which 
suggests that violence as a phenomenon of social behaviour, in general, and in making war, in 
particular, is in decline.1 Another good example is Christopher Coker, in his Humane Warfare 
he discusses the idea that in the 21st century “Western Societies can only now fight wars which 
minimise human suffering”2 and in his The Future Way of War he proposes that “developed 
societies are likely to continue with war but in a form that is more rational and optimal … [and 
that] we may be able to huminize war, or make it more humane.”3 This research would make 
an attempt to provide an alternative, though, not necessarily a contradicting, interpretation and 
approach to Pinker’s  and Coker’s books, discussing political and cultural aspects that have 
sustained the level of violence in 21st century military operations at significantly higher level 
than it could possibly be. 
                                                          
1 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: A History of Violence and Humanity, (London: Penguin Group, 
2011). 
2 Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare, (London: Routledge, 2002), p.2. 
3 Christopher Coker, The Future War: The Re-Enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century, (Oxford: 
BlackWell, 2004), p.141. 
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Secondly, this research seeks to contribute to the conceptual understanding of the causal 
chain between changes within a society and military innovations and vice versa.  The idea of 
the interdependence between social-political changes and the military is not novel. This 
phenomenon was suggested by military historian Michael Roberts, who analysed the 
transformation of warfare in the context of social changes in the Early Modern Europe offering 
the term “Military Revolution” (MR).4 Almost simultaneous to Robert’s idea, another 
theoretical concept about military innovations was developed – the concept of “Revolution in 
Military Affairs” (RMA). RMA, the fruit of the Soviet military thought that was later picked 
up by American strategists, is more technology oriented and it emphasises internal military 
process that integrates new military technologies, novel doctrines and organizational structures 
that all together change the conduct of warfare.5  Current literature on RMA focuses mainly on 
the question of “How does it happen?” establishing different models to describe its occurrence,6 
or by analysing historical examples.7 This research, however, will try to deal with the still 
unanswered question of “Why does it happen?”, creating a conceptual basis that increases our 
understanding of the interconnection between social, cultural, political and military changes, 
but also allows to examine failed RMA pointing out the reasons behind their failures. 
Thirdly, this research deals with an issue that is much more practical and relevant to the 
current political-military debate. Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) – weapons that are intended to 
minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage – are based on the technology that, during 
the 1990s, was expected to revolutionise the conduct of warfare. As Alvin and Heidi Toffler 
suggested in 1993: 
Non-lethality emerges not as a simple replacement for war, or an extension of 
peace, but as something different. It is something radically different in global 
affairs – an intermediate phenomenon, a pausing place, an arena for contests where 
more outcomes are decided bloodlessly.8  
                                                          
4 Clifford Rogers, ‘The Military Revolution in History’, in Clifford Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate: 
Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 2-3. 
5  Andrew Krepinevich, ‘Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions’, National Interest, No. 37, 
1994, pp. 30-42. 
6 See Colin Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and The Evidence of History, (London: 
Frank Cass Publishers, 2002); Richard Hundley, Past Revolutions Future Transformation: What Can History of 
Revolutions in Military Affairs Tell Us about Transforming the US Military?, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999); 
Steven Metz, James Kievit, Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: from Theory to Policy, (Carlyle: US 
Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1995). 
7 See Colin Gray, Strategy for Chaos...; Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare and the Course of 
History, 1500 to Today, (New York: Gotham Books, 2006); Tim Benbow, The Magic Bullet? Understanding 
the Revolution in Military Affairs, (London: Chrysalis Book Group, 2004); Williamson Murray, Macgregor 
Knox, (ed.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
8 Alvin Toffler, Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1993), p. 134. 
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 The rapid rise of interest in NLW sparked off an entirely new military, as well as an 
academic, discourse concerning their potential contribution to military success on the 21st 
century battlefields. It seems, however, that except for this debate, very little has been done 
within the military forces themselves.  This research aims to address this problem analysing 
three different cases – the U.S., Russia and Israel – that were chosen not only because of their 
differences, but also due to their similarities. In the last decades all three were involved in 
armed conflicts: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza, the USA in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia in 
Chechnya and Georgia. All three have armed forces with a track record as organisations 
capable of revolutionary changes.9 All three have strong defence industries that are able to 
support military demands for NLW.10 And, finally, all three seek to be military powers 
(whether regional or global), and therefore invest significant efforts (political and economic) 
to produce as effective armed forces as possible. Given this last similarity between the 
American, the Russian, and the Israeli military forces, it seems vital to understand the social-
political rationale that prevents them from employing NLW that “may provide more effective 
power”.11 Due to the combination of these characteristics, each one of these three cases 
represents political, military and technological prowess, and, therefore, is expected to 
implement revolutionary changes in military affairs ahead of any other country. Investigating 
the reasons behind the absence of the RMA of NLW in these three particular cases, this research 
addresses the political, social and cultural factors, which affect each other, preventing the 
employment of NLW on the battlefield. It presents the way that has led three completely 
different militaries, from completely different societies and political realms, to the same 
outcome: rejection of the technologies that intended to minimise civilian casualties during 
military operations.   
 
The Argument 
The argument of the research is twofold. Firstly, it rethinks the validity of the claim that 
harming civilian populations during military operations has high significance in international 
relations. Indeed, this claim is frequently used to criticise political adversaries in the 
                                                          
9 Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in 
Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
10 See Homeland Security Research Cooperation (HSRC), Non-Lethal Weapons: Technologies and Global Market 
– 2012-2020, 2011, http://www.homelandsecurityresearch.com/2011/10/non-lethal-weapons-technologies-
global-market-2012-2020/, [accessed: 27 November 2015]. 
11 David Koplow, Death by moderation: The U.S. Military’s Quest for Useable Weapons, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), pp. IX-X. 
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international arena. Moreover, different non-state international institutions, such as the Red 
Cross, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and others, repeatedly use this argument 
to criticise countries for the civilian casualties caused by their militaries.  This research, 
however, offers a rethinking of the effectiveness of this criticism, arguing that countries, which 
are involved in military operations, have developed political mechanisms to fend it off. While 
it is generally argued that the international political pressure is a crucial factor that leads to the 
significant reduction of harmed civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure, the relevant 
foreign policies have already been crafted in the context of international criticism, allowing the 
fending off any criticism related to military activity, including the one related to civilian 
casualties. 
Each one of the analysed countries has developed its own foreign policy mechanisms 
that allow them to resist the international criticism raised before, during and after military 
operations.  Using very effective political-cultural narratives, political decision-makers can be 
relatively relaxed about their military performance regarding civilian casualties and they feel 
no need to press their military to apply fundamental changes that would be required to make 
operations less lethal than it is politically required (i.e., to employ NLW on a large scale). 
This leads to the second main argument of the research that challenges to rethink the 
weight that is given to the value of human life in the 21st century and its universality. Each 
nation has its own “way of war”, its “strategic culture”, influenced by its geography, society, 
history, religion, and other factors, and, therefore, it is assumed that different societies will 
value the life of the enemy civilian population differently. Yet in all three analysed cases, the 
societies showed very similar high levels of tolerance toward enemy civilian casualties during 
military operations. Indeed, each culture has gone its own way shaping its unique attitude 
towards the enemy. With regard to enemy civilian casualties, however, it seems that the 
outcome is surprisingly similar. 
In the 21st century people, indeed, value human life significantly more highly than 
before. This appreciation, however, has been translated largely into general unwillingness to 
sacrifice one’s own life and the lives of one’s relatives, rather than a universal value. In other 
words, in the 21st century, societies do not send their sons and husbands to war as easily as they 
did in the past; and if they do, they demand that their leadership (and therefore their military) 
minimises the casualties of their own military personnel to the operationally possible and 
politically defendable minimum. However, when it comes to enemy civilian casualties, this 
narrow appreciation of human life has contributed to a general apathy among public opinion 
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towards enemy civilian population in conflict zones, due to the fact that society’s relatives 
(military personnel) sacrifice their lives there, and by this justifying enemy civilian casualties. 
In the last decade, all three countries analysed in this research were involved in armed 
conflicts, i.e., Israel in Lebanon and Gaza, the USA in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia in 
Chechnya and Georgia. In all three of them, the military paid relatively little respect for the 
enemy’s population. This research suggests that the roots of this situation are much deeper than 
the simple professional misconduct of the military establishment, or the poor political 
behaviour of political leaders, who had sent them to fight. While the technology that allows the 
maximum possible minimisation of civilian casualties, rather than just politically acceptable 
reduction (i.e., NLW), has been around for several decades, without extensive political 
pressure, the required RMA just cannot occur. Therefore, despite the seemingly bloodless 
images of contemporary warfare produced by precision-guided munitions, drones and selective 
strikes, war remains to be a very lethal affair, especially for enemy civilian population.  
The history of previous RMAs shows that facing unmet challenges, the military knows 
how to perform fundamental revolutionary changes to confront them. This research argues that 
the RMA of NLW did not occur because the challenge of minimising civilian casualties has 
never been realy put to the military.  
 
Military Revolutions, Revolutions in Military Affairs and Political-Military System 
During the last several decades, different scholars have suggested different ways to 
explain the phenomenon of MR or, in other words, a concept of the interconnection between 
technology, military, and society.12 Each scholar, collecting and analysing historical data, has 
come to a slightly different result. For example, Alvin and Heidi Toffler developed their three-
wave theory – Agriculture, Industry, Knowledge;13 Max Boot suggested four revolutions: 
Gunpowder, First Industrial, Second Industrial, and Information;14 and Williamson Murray 
and MacGregor Knox defined five main MRs while the second and the third overlap each other: 
(1) The 17th Century Creation of the Modern State and Modern Military Institutions, (2) The 
                                                          
12  See Alvin Toffler, Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War…; Max Boot, War Made New...; Williamson Murray, 
Macgregor Knox, (ed.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution ... 
13 Alvin Toffler, Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War…, pp. 33-85. 
14  Max Boot, War Made New..., pp. 13-15. 
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French Revolution, (3) The Industrial Revolution, (4) The WWI, and (5) Nuclear Weapons and 
Ballistic Missiles Delivery Systems.15  
The concept of RMA was developed independently, however, almost simultaneously 
with the historical patterns that try to portray the phenomenon of MR. And while MR includes 
society and considers social-political influences on and from military innovations, the concept 
of RMA is limited to the relations between military and technology only. Regardless of this 
narrower nature of RMA, the debate about it has created even more variable theories and 
models. For example, Steven Metz and James Kievit suggested a five-phase model: (1) stasis, 
(2) initiation, (3) critical mass, (4) response, and (5) consolidation;16 Richard Hundley 
proposed a model that includes 4 phases: (1) preparatory, (2) breakthrough, (3) exploitation 
and selling, and (4) payoff;17 and Colin Gray went further in details arguing for a nine-step 
RMA's life-cycle: (1)preparation, (2)recognition of challenge, (3)parentage, (4)enabling 
spark, (5)strategic moment, (6)institutional agency, (7)instrument, (8)execution and evolving 
maturity; and (9)feedback and adjustment.18 
On the one hand, despite the traceable similarities and differences in these main works 
on MR and RMA, there is no feasible way to point at the most accurate ones, because “scholars 
can employ their imagination to read the same data in different ways, none of which is correct 
or incorrect.”19 On the other hand, this research has to be based on a certain theoretical 
framework established from one of these models and therefore a pivotal choice must be taken 
carefully. 
Regarding the RMA models, the decision is relatively easy. Instead of choosing one of 
the theories, this research will adopt a comprehensive model that integrates all of them. This 
model is based on the meta-analysis of the existing literature and advocates four major steps in 
the RMA’s life: (1) preparations, (2) embodying, (3) implementation on the battlefield, and (4) 
losing initiative.20 
The choosing of the broad theoretical framework that includes social, political and all 
other types of changes seems to be a more difficult decision to explain. This research will adopt 
                                                          
15 Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox, ‘Thinking about Revolution in Warfare’, in Williamson Murray, 
Macgregor Knox, (ed.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution..., pp. 6-11. 
16 Steven Metz, James Kievit, Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs… ,  p. 19. 
17 Richard Hundley, Past Revolutions Future Transformation…, pp. 21-23. 
18 Colin Gray, Strategy for Chaos...,, pp. 67-81. 
19 Colin Gray, Strategy for Chaos..., p. 53. 
20 Ofer Fridman, ‘Are We Ready for the Revolution of Non-Lethal Weapons? – Using a Comprehensive RMA 
Model to Examine the Current Strategic Situation’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 32 No. 3, 2013, pp. 192-206. 
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the framework of MR as suggested by Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox for two main 
reasons. The first is the fact that they integrated the idea of RMA in their concept of MR. The 
main quest of this research is to find the reasons for the lack of the RMA of NLW, and MR 
theory can provide an essential broader perspective for such examination. The second reason 
is that their MR theory is more conceptualised and generalised creating a certain historical 
pattern that repeats itself, unlike Tofflers’ waves or Boot’s revolutions that examined each 
event as unique case studies. And despite the fact that MRs are “uncontrollable, unpredictable, 
and unforeseeable” the idea of interconnection between pure military RMAs and “changes in 
politics and society”21 creates a solid theoretical ground for this research about an RMA that 
did not occur. 
 While this research deals with revolutions and revolutionary changes, it is important 
to ask a question of continuity. In other words, what place these fundamental events occupy in 
the continuity of overall social, military and technological transformations and what roles they 
play in the context of evolutionary process. Since “military revolutions are major 
discontinuities in military affairs... [linked] ... with broader social, economic, and scientific 
transformations”,22 it seems right to argue that MRs are conceived as periods of instability 
within a system that incorporates all these elements. A system that generally is stable providing 
slow and controllable evolutionary development, but once imbalanced, it generates a political-
social-military “earthquake”23 with far-reaching consequences. It is not a novel idea that a 
discontinued event, one which actually manages to puncture the regular process of evolution, 
can reshape reality creating entirely new situations, in which old elements are compelled to 
adapt or suffer extinction and new ones are created. Initially, it was proposed by two 
palaeontologists Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge, who argued that species’ change can 
be explained by relatively short spurts of change that lie between long periods of slow and 
balanced evolutionary development.24 Since its first introduction, this idea of punctuated 
                                                          
21 Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox (ed.), ‘Thinking about Revolution…’, pp. 6-7. 
22 Michael Vickers, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs and Military Capabilities’, in Robert Pfaltzgraff, Richard 
Shultz, (ed.), War in the Information Age: New Challenges for US Security Policy, (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 
1997), p. 30. 
23 This geological metaphor for the MR phenomenon was introduced by Williamson Murray in ‘Thinking about 
Revolution in Military Affairs’, Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 16, 1997, pp. 70-71.   
24 Donald Prothero, ‘Punctuated Equilibrium at Twenty: A Paleontological Perspective’, Skeptic, Vol. 1, No. 3, 
1992, pp. 38-47. 
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balance, or equilibrium, has been widely adopted by different scholars from different scientific 
disciplines, including researchers of MRs and RMAs.25 
Similar to the species that exist in certain biological systems, the military is also 
“causally linked to its own environment, represented by the social, political and economical 
dimensions”,26 as well as technological developments and political-military challenges. A 
fundamental and rapid change of one or more of these dimensions will imbalance the system 
fuelling changes in other dimensions until a new balance is created. The system that 
collaborates all these dimensions will be called Political-Military System and it always exists 
in the slow process of change and development, adapting and accommodating internal changes. 
And while MR is a sudden and fundamental misbalance, or dis-equilibrium, in this system that 
creates a cluster of major changes in social, political and military dimensions; RMAs represent 
one of the possible outcomes of this historical event. 
In other words, RMAs are a result of an imbalanced Political-Military System. This 
argument creates an entirely novel perspective on the reasons behind the occurrence of an RMA 
(or its absence). And since this research tries to shed a light on the absence of the RMA of 
NLW, this failure can be explained by arguanalysing why harming enemy population did not 
imbalance the Political-Military Systems of the U.S., Russia and Israel. 
 
The Puzzle of the Revolution in Military Affairs of Non-Lethal Weapons 
Since the last decade of the 20th century, different scholars and political analysts have 
claimed that human life is valued more and more among the general international community 
and, particularly, within Western societies. This argument has led many researchers to assume 
that democratic culture and traditions, modern ethical and moral issues have created a desire 
for a world without war or, at least, a demand that contemporary armed conflicts, if 
unavoidable, at least have to be far less lethal forcing the military to seek new technologies that 
have “greater precision, shorter duration, less lethality, and reduced collateral damage... [as 
these technologies] may provide more effective power than their larger and more destructive, 
but also more inexact and crude, predecessors”.27 Consequently, NLW have been seen as a 
                                                          
25 See Steven Leonard, Inevitable Evolutions: Punctuated Equilibrium and the Revolution in Military Affairs, 
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2001); Colin Gray, Strategy for 
Chaos…; Clifford Rogers, ‘The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War’, The Journal of Military 
History, Vol. 57, No. 2, 1993, pp. 241-278. 
26 Steven Leonard, Inevitable Evolutions..., p. 39. 
27 David Koplow, Death by moderation…, pp. IX-X. 
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perfect answer within this new reality, when a greater respect for human life has become a 
crucial variable within the international community. At closer look, however, we find that this 
respect for human life indeed is not as universal, as it was claimed. Is this variable, therefore, 
politically crucial enough to pressure the military to revolutionise its practises? 
Military operations, during the last several decades, have deviated from previous wars, 
where victory was considered solely by military terms. Winning the “hearts and minds” has 
become a vital factor in achieving the political aims of military operations.28  Hence, the 
achievement of a comprehensive victory demands support from the local population;29 and 
therefore, the unlimited harming of civilians, in most cases, will increase their mobilisation 
against the military and delay the successful end of operations. Moreover, it is assumed that in 
the era of mass media and especially the Internet, harming local population significantly 
decreases domestic and international support for the continuing of military operations.30 
 While enemy civilian casualties are considered as an unnecessary and an undesirable 
outcome of warfare, an attempt to reduce the number of non-combatants’ causalities raises the 
problem of distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants. This problem has become 
more challenging due to two major changes that had occurred in the last twenty years. The first 
one has a military nature and constitutes the transformation of warfare –  from the traditional-
conventional warfare to the new concept of war, frequently called as Military-Operations-
Other-Than-War (MOOTW) (such as, asymmetrical war, hybrid warfare, war on terror, small 
war, peacekeeping operations, etc.). In this type of warfare the distinguishing between 
combatants and civilians is even more complex than it had been in the past.31 
The second major change has occurred within society. Today, there is no doubt that the 
Internet has transformed the social landscape of human life. One of the outcomes of this 
transformation is the ability of non-state actors to organize civilians to participate in conflicts 
that has risen significantly after the appearance of the Internet.32 Moreover, the development 
                                                          
28 Tracy Tafolla, David Trachtenberg, John Aho, ‘From Niche to Necessity: Integrating Non-Lethal Weapons into 
Essential Enabling Capabilities’, Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 66, 2012, p. 72. 
29 See Robert Mandel, The Meaning of Military Victory, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006); Roger 
Barnett, Asymmetric Warfare, (Dulles: Brassey’s, 2003); Michael Gross, Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: 
Torture, Assassination, and Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetrical Conflict, (New York: Cambridge Press, 2010). 
30 See Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Ivan 
Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005); Andrew Mack, ‘Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: the Politics of Asymmetric Conflict’, World 
Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1975, pp. 175-200. 
31 Eric Patterson, Just War Thinking: Morality and Pragmatism in the Struggle against Contemporary Threats, 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), p. 4-8. 
32 Peter Van Aelst, Stefaan Walgrave, ‘New Media, New Movements? The Role of the Internet in Shaping the 
‘Anti-Globalization’ Movement’, Information, Communication & Society, Vol.  5, No. 4, 2002, pp. 465—493. 
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of the new Social Media Internet platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, took these 
capabilities a few steps further providing civilians with the ability to organise themselves.33 
Civilians have always taken a part in wars and armed conflicts. Their direct participation, as 
part of an underground movement, or a partisan unit (or even as a terror organization), as well 
as their indirect involvement by providing an essential support – were always a problem for 
military activity. While it seems that social-political reality in the beginning of the 21st century 
demands from the military a significant decrease in the lethality of conflicts;34 the increase of 
civilian participation in zones of conflicts, triggered by Social Media, makes this demand even 
more challenging.35 Consequently, it seem right to assume that the creation of less-lethal 
capabilities suppose to be a military challenge that has to be met.36 
There are many different terms that describe weapons that are intended to incapacitate 
people without causing death or permanent injury – “non-lethal”, “less-lethal”, “less-than-
lethal”, etc.37 Different organisations in different countries have adopted different 
terminologies. Nevertheless, all these terms are very similar in their referring to a group of 
weapons that are  “explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel 
or material immediately, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and 
undesired damage to property, facilities, materiel and the environment."38 
During the last two decades, much literature has been written about NLW that can be 
divided into three major groups. The first group describes NLW and non-lethal technologies, 
these works discuss the technological developments of NLW and/or the history of their usage.39 
The second group advocates NLW and emphasizes the revolutionary promise of NLW and 
their potential to ignite new RMA and alter the nature of the way of conducting conflicts.40 The 
                                                          
33 Ofer Fridman, ‘Are We Ready for the Revolution of Non-Lethal Weapons?...’. 
34 Sjef Orbons, ‘Non-Lethality in Reality: a Defence Technology Assessment of its Political and Military 
Potential’, (PhD Dissertation, The University of Amsterdam, 2013) ,p.29. 
35 Ofer Fridman, ‘Are We Ready for the Revolution of Non-Lethal Weapons?...’. 
36 Tracy Tafolla, David Trachtenberg, John Aho, ‘From Niche to Necessity…’. 
37  Neil Davison, ‘Non-Lethal’ Weapons, (Eastbourne: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 1-3. 
38 US Department of Defence, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, Directive 3000.3E, Washington, 25 April 2013. 
39 See Neil Davison, ‘Non-Lethal’ Weapons; Michael Gross, Moral Dilemmas of Modern War; James Carafano, 
‘The Future of Anti-Terrorism Technologies’, Heritage Lectures, No. 885, 2005; Sjef Orbons, ‘Non-Lethality 
in Reality...’; Charlie Mesloh, Mark Henych, Ross Wolf, Less Lethal Weapon Effectiveness, Use of Force, and 
Suspect & Officer Injuries: A Five-Year Analysis. Report to the National Institute of Justice, (Florida Gulf Coast 
University, 2008).  
40 See John Alexander, Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in 21st Century Warfare, (New-York: St. Martin's Press, 
1999); Nick Lewer, Steven Schofield, Non-Lethal Weapons: a Fatal Attraction? Military Strategies and 
Technologies for 21st Century Conflict, (London: Zed Books, 1997); David Koplow, Death by moderation ...; 
Frederic Merget, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons and the Possibility of Radical New Horizons for the Laws of War: Why 
Kill, Wound and Hurt (Combatants) at All?’, 
 Social Science Research Network, 2008 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1295348, 
[accessed: 27 July 2013]. 
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third group questions the perspective of NLW, and claims that NLW have a place in the future, 
but it also cautions against bestowing any special status to the NLW and discusses the problems 
of the ethic and legal aspects of NLW.41 While all literature comes mostly from academia, there 
is also a noteworthy interest in NLW within military research publications. Interestingly, this 
attention, to the possible implementation of NLW, has appeared, almost simultaneously, in 
military organisations with completely different cultural backgrounds, such as the U.S.,42 
Russia,43 and Israel.44  And yet, despite this extensive discussion on the possible perspectives 
of NLWs, and the significant investments in technological development that has occurred in 
this area45, it seems that not much has happened in the last thirty years, as "the list of non-lethal 
weapons that are currently available does not differ greatly from similar compilations 30 years 
previously."46  
As it will be shown, current non-lethal technologies are able to provide a vast spectrum 
of non-lethal effects47 that are ready to be adopted by the military, however, the methods of 
their delivery, designed for law enforcement units, do not meet military demands entirely. 
There are no technological obstacles that can prevent efficient integration of existing effective 
                                                          
41 See David Koplow, Non-Lethal Weapons: The Law and policy of Revolutionary Technologies for the Military 
and Law Enforcement, (New-York: Cambridge Press, 2006); Nick Lewer, (ed.), The Future of Non-Lethal 
Weapons: Technologies, Operations' Ethics and Law, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002); Robert McNab, 
Richard Scott, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons and the long tail of warfare’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 20, No. 1, 
2009, pp. 141-159; David Fidler, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons and international law – Three perspectives on the 
future’, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2001, pp. 194-206. 
42 See Tracy Tafolla, David Trachtenberg, John Aho, ‘From Niche to Necessity…’; Richard Scott, ‘Nonlethal 
Weapons and the Common Operating Environment’,  Army Magazine, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2010, pp. 21-26; Frank 
Siltman, John Frisbie, ‘Fire Support Just Got Harder: Adding Nonlethal Fires as a Core Competency’, Fires 
Bulletin, July-September 2008, pp. 6-8. 
43 For example see: V. Moiseev, V. Orlyanskii, ‘Oruzhiye neletal’nogo deystviya i printsipy taktiki’, [‘Weapons 
with Non-Lethal Action and the Principles of Tactics’], Voennaia Misl’, No. 6, 2011, pp. 26-33; A.Nagovitsyn, 
A. Grudzinskii’, A. Sporykhin, ‘Oruzhiye neletal'nogo deystviya i perspektivy yego ispol'zovaniya v interesakh 
sil Organizatsii Dogovora o kollektivnoy bezopasnosti’, [‘Weapons with Non-Lethal Action and the 
Perspectives of Their Employment in the Interest of Collective Security Treaty Organization’], Voenaya Misl’, 
No.3, 2011, pp. 51-59; V. Snigur, ‘Ovladet’ gorodom bez zhertv i razrusheniy’, [‘To Capture a City without 
Casualties or Damage’], Armei’skii’ Sbornik, No. 12, 2006, pp. 50-52; A. Pronin, A. Leonov, L. Kaplyarchuk, 
‘Osnovnyye kriterii voyenno-ekonomicheskoy otsenki oruzhiya neletal’nogo deystviya’, [‘The Major Criteria 
of Military-Economic Evaluation of Weapons with Non-Lethal Action’], Voennaia Misl’,  No.10, 2012, pp. 43-
50; V. Antipov, S. Novichkov, ‘K voprosu o razrabotke i primenenii neletal'nykh sredstv porazheniya na 
khimicheskoy osnove’, [‘Regarding the Question about the Development and Employment of Non-Lethal 
Means Based on Chemicals’], Voenaya Misl’, No. 9, 2009, pp. 54-61. 
44 For example see: Uzi Ben-Shalom, ‘“Faser lematzav ham’em”: mah’shevot al neshek pahot katlani be’sde 
hakrav’ [‘”Faser switched to Shock”: Thoughts on Less Lethal Weapons on the Battlefield’], Be’yabasha, No. 
15, September 2010; Yitzhak Ben-Israel, ‘Neshel al-heger’, [‘Non Lethal Weapon’], Ma’arachot, Vol. 363, 
1999, pp. 20-24; Guy-Zahar Shtultz, ‘Haf’alat koah medureget be’imutim besviva ezrahit’ [The Employment of 
Graduate Force in Conflicts within Civilian Environment], Ma’arachot, Vol. 438, 2011, pp. 8-17. 
45 David Koplow, Death by Moderation..., 198-199. 
46 Neil Davison, 'Non-Lethal' Weapons…, p. 209. 
47 Erik Nutley, Non-Lethal Weapons: Setting Our Phasers on Stun? Potential Strategic Blessings and Curses of 
Non-Lethal Weapons on the Battlefield, Center for Strategy and Technology Occasional Paper No. 34, (Maxwell 
Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 2003), pp.13-24. 
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non-lethal agents within existing conventional military platforms. As it will be shown 
throughtout this research, different industries around the globe already have introduced 
effective NLW that can be integrated within military forces. The fact, however, that this 
integration has not occurred yet, points to the existence of other aspects that prevent the vast 
adaptation of NLW within military. 
 
On Methodology and Methodological Problems 
As shown above, MR and RMA are very complex phenomena that involve a nexus of 
relationships between different variables from political, social and military spheres. In the light 
of this multifaceted reality that does or does not produce revolutionary changes in the character 
and conduct of warfare, only a finely honed methodology would be able to ensure the analytical 
empirical nature of this research. The following discussion of the methodology of this research 
will describe several methodological steps that were performed in an attempt to produce an 
empirical examination of the absence of the RMA of NLW in the U.S., Russia and Israel. 
Considering different acknowledged research methods in the Social Sciences, it is 
important to keep in mind that “methodological choices must take into account the 
characteristics of the phenomena we seek to understand.”48 While the phenomenon that lies in 
the core of this research is the failure of RMA of NLW, it has been already shown that the 
occurrence of RMA (or its absence) could be explained by the concept of Political-Military 
System. A more comprehensive understanding of this theory will be provided in the first 
chapter of this research, nonetheless, it is enough to state that Political-Military System consists 
of a variety of independent generic interconnected variables, which can influence (by their own 
or in a configuration with several others) the dependent variable in a number of possible ways. 
This general explanatory theory of MR and RMA can be identified as a typological theory: 
A typological theory is a theory that specified independent variables, delineates 
them into the categories..., and provides not only hypothesis on how these 
variables operate individually, but also contingent generalisations on how and 
under what conditions they behave in specified conjunctions or configurations 
to produce effects on specified dependent variable.49 
The theory of Political-Military System outlines three main groups of variables: the 
political entity, the military, and the political-military challenges. Due to its nature to preserve 
                                                          
48 Andrew Bennett, Colin Elman, ‘Complex causal relations and case study methods: the example of path 
dependence’, Political Analysis, Vol. 14, No.3, 2006, p. 250. 
49 Alexander George, Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), p. 235. 
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the balance (equilibrium) between these variables, it allows to hypothesise about the influence 
of variables that are specified as independent (as well as different configurations of them) on 
a defined dependent variable. 
Once the general typological theoretical framework is established, the next step is the 
defining of the specific typology of the RMA of NLW in the context of the American, the 
Russian, and the Israeli cases. The deductive approach of this research requires specification 
of the relevant variables that define the property space of this research – “the relevant universe 
of all possible combinations of variables”.50 The fact that the examined phenomenon is 
implicitly defined, combined with the fact that three chosen cases have enough similar 
characteristics, allows to establish a specific causal chain between independent variables that 
ultimately leads to the dependent one. 
While the process of the establishing a conceptual causal chain that creates an RMA is 
discussed in the first chapter, the second chapter constructs the specific typology of the RMA 
of NLW. It produces a combination of three main independent variables: (1) foreign policy 
and its attitude towards international criticism regarding collateral damage and civilian 
casualties; (2) domestic national cultural attitudes toward enemy civilian population; (3) the 
military culture concerning novel technologies in general and NLW in particular. 
After the defining of the independent variables, it seems that the dependent variable 
has also to be more accurately clarified: “the careful characterisation of the dependent variable 
and its variance is often one of the most important and lasting contributions to research.”51  
While, previously, the dependent variable was generally described as the absence of the RMA 
of NLW, a better understanding of its nature can be provided by clarifying the nature of the 
opposite phenomenon: the RMA of NLW. The RMA of NLW, as any other RMA, means a 
vast employment of new technologies (e.g., NLW) by a military, supported by suitable novel 
operational and organisational concepts. Once, at least, one of these elements is missing, the 
RMA of these new technologies can not occur. Consequently, in the case of NLW, the 
dependant variable can have only two possible values: the occurrence of the RMA of NLW 
(all three elements exist) or lack of it (one or more are missing). 
Once the nature of all variables is clarified, it is possible to define the research design 
that reconciles the research objective. The within-case analysis of each one of the cases, under 
                                                          
50 Alexander George, Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development…, p. 248. 
51 Alexander George, Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development…, p. 248. 
14 
 
the examination, is done using the process-tracing method, which is "a procedure for 
identifying steps in a casual process leading to the outcome of a given dependent variable of a 
particular case in a particular historical context." More specifically, it adopts an analytical 
explanation, which is one type of the process-tracing method that “converts a historical 
narrative into an analytical causal explanation.”52 In other words, the analytical explanation 
allows the structuring of historical empirical evidence into a casual mechanism that explains 
the dependent variable. Regarding this research, the causal explanation of the absence of the 
RMA of NLW focuses on the different conjunctions of three specified independent variables 
that have preserved the balance of the Political-Military System of each country and, thus, 
prevented the RMA of NLW. 
This research is based on data and evidence gathered from a vast spectrum of sources. 
The general typological theory is based mostly on the theoretical works of different scholars 
and thinkers from the fields of military history, strategy and politics. The chapter that discusses 
the RMA of NLW that did not occur utilises different primary sources, such as governmental 
reports, international laws, archival documents, industry reports, etc. The case of the U.S. is 
constructed from unclassified dissertations and articles written by senior American officers, as 
well as on academic publications produced by leading scholars and documents published by 
different political establishments. The Russian case utilises declassified scientific studies 
published in leading military periodicals, different governmental documents, and products of 
scientific studies conducted in leading Russian universities. The Israeli case is based on 
combined data gathered from curricula of academics, leading research institutions in the 
military and political spheres and professional journals. Where primary sources are 
unavailable, the research relies on secondary literature utilising the indigenous languages of 
each one of the cases: English, Russian and Hebrew. This multi-linguistic approach enables 
the enhancing and accentuating of the different sources, especially in the Russian and Israeli 
cases, that have not been translated into English before. 
Concluding the discussion on methodology, it is imperative to focus on one 
methodological question: is it possible to analyse something that did not occur? To address 
this question it is important to clarify the fact that RMA is a finely defined concept, thus, this 
research analyses a finely defined scientific phenomenon. As with any scientific phenomenon, 
it is possible to establish a list of the required components, a combination of which leads to its 
                                                          
52 Alexander George, Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development…, pp. 176, 211. 
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creation. Moreover, an RMA, as a scientific phenomenon, occurred many times in the past, 
proving the fact that when the required components are there, it does occur. Consequently, it 
seems right to argue that the absence of an RMA can be explained by the analysis of the 
components that failed to create the desired result (i.e., the RMA of NLW), and this research 
does exactly that. 
 
What This Research Is Not 
While this research is formed around Non-Lethal technologies, it does not mean that it 
accepts the approach of technological determinism, as Max Boot argued: 
Technology sets the parameters of the possible; it creates the potential for a military 
revolution... No technical advance by itself made a revolution; it was how people 
responded to technology that produces seismic shifts in warfare.53 
Non-Lethal technologies have been around for many years,54 in fact, certain Non-Lethal 
chemical agents have already been widely employed during different military conflicts in the 
past hundred years, as far back as the First World War.55 While technology is vital, “a true 
revolution in the way military institutions organise, equip and train for war, and in the way war 
is itself conducted, depends on the confluence of political, social, and technological factors.”56 
Technology is not the reason behind the absence of the RMA of NLW, at least not in the U.S., 
Russia and Israel, and therefore it is not at the main focus of this research. Political and social 
factors, by contrast, seem to be able to provide a more adequate explanation for the absence of 
NLW on the modern battlefield. 
This research also does not try to predict the future of NLW. The future is a kind of a 
“black box” and an attempt to open it would ultimately fail this research by a gargantuan 
number of assumptions and tendencies that have to be considered during forecasting efforts. 
Instead, this research analyses the past, focusing on the reasons that have led to the failure of 
the RMA of NLW, so far. While the analysis of three different countries implemented by this 
research might help the reader to have glance at a possible future for Non-Lethal technologies, 
it is at the reader’s peril only. 
                                                          
53 Max Boot, War Made New..., p. 10. 
54 Neil Davison, 'Non-Lethal' Weapons, pp. 12-40. 
55 See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Problem of Chemical and Biological 
Warfare. Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons,1971. 
56 Foreword by Col. Richard H. Witherspoon to Earl Tilford, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Problems and 
Cautions (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US ArmyWar College, 1995). 
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While focusing on the problem of civilian casualties, this research does not deal with 
the definition of “civilian casualties”. It does not try to define or redefine who should, or should 
not, be defined as “an innocent” or “an undesired” casualty of war. Existent literature suggests 
two different ways to devise a definition. The first one is based on more traditional 
dichotomous distinction between combatants and non-combatants in a war zone, which is based 
on the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Two Additional Protocols of 1977. The 
second way suggests that this dichotomy is rooted in regular warfare and is no longer suitable 
when applied on contemporary counter-insurgencies, and, therefore, the distinguishing aspects 
should be, not between combatants and not-combatants, but rather between different levels of 
participation in war. One of the best examples for this type of distinction is given by the Israeli 
High Court of Justice that suggests a more general division between “direct” and “indirect” 
participation in hostilities. While “direct” participation includes: transporting militants, 
operating weapons or supervising the operations; “indirect” participation consists of: providing 
food, medicine and shelter to combatants, monetary aid, logistical support and distributing 
propaganda.57 As it will be discussed throughout this research, its focus is not on the legal 
issues regarding the harming of enemy’s population, and, therefore, the reader can adopt any 
of the existing ways to define “civilian casualties”. 
Finally, this research does not engage in the debate on the morality of harming civilians. 
This research does not try to claim that harming enemy civilian population is immoral, 
unethical or illegal, this job is preserved for philosophers and lawyers. Instead, the purpose of 
this research is a much more constructive one. As discussed previously, the main argument of 
this research is with those who assume that democratic culture and its traditions, modern ethical 
and moral issues have been restricting the level of violence during military operations in the 
21st century. Indeed, it will be unfair to claim that the American, Russian and Israeli militaries 
do not understand the consequences of disproportionally harming civilians in the political 
environment of the 21st century and try to reduce the collateral damage caused by their 
activities. It seems that the World War Two-style city bombings, as practised against Hamburg, 
Dresden or Tokyo, indeed belongs to the past. However, there is a difference between the 
politically acceptable level of civilian casualties and the minimum possible one, between the 
“reduction by avoiding” and “minimisation by preventing”. This research tries to explain why, 
                                                          
57 Public Committee against Torture in Israel and Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the 








This research consists of five chapters, not including the introduction and conclusion. They are 
as follows: 
Chapter 1: Why Revolution in Military Affairs Occur (or not) 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse different political, military and history studies 
in an attempt to define the social-political-military environment that creates an RMA, and, 
therefore, to establish a theoretical framework that will enable explaining its existence or 
absence. The problem that this chapters tries to solve is driven from the fact that the existent 
literature on RMA is generally divided between theoreticians, who discuss how it happens, and 
historians, who analyse the successful RMAs of the past, thus, again, focusing on the process 
rather than the reason. In other words, most of the research concentrates on how these changes 
occurred and not on why. To make the analysis of failed RMAs possible this chapter generally 
conceptualises RMA as an outcome of the imbalanced Political-Military System establishing 
a causal chain that triggers an RMA. To demonstrate the logic of the developed 
conceptualisation, this chapter will analyse two historical examples of failed RMAs: the RMA 
of Fortification in Early Modern England and the RMA of Armour Warfare in interwar Britain. 
In its conclusions, the chapter summarises the way in which the occurrence of an RMA can be 
explained by the concept of Political-Military System and paves a way for the analysis of 
RMAs that did not occur.   
Chapter 2: ‘Non-Lethal Weapons – The Revolution in Military Affairs that Did not Occur’ 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. The main subject of this research is the RMA 
of NLW, and as such, the first part of this chapter examines the general background of these 
weapon systems. It discusses the perplexity of the definition of NLW, what they are and what 
they are not. It provides a historical brief discussing the implementation of NLW since their 
appearance in the beginning of the 20th century and focuses on different technological aspects 
of NLW and their effects. Finally, it examines the complex, and to some degree paradoxical, 
relations between NLW and modern international law of armed conflict. The second part of 
this chapter reproduces a theoretical depiction of the potential RMA of NLW. While the main 
purpose of this research is to explain the reasons behind the fauilure of the RMA of NLW, this 
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part provides an essential understanding of what this RMA could or should have been, as a 
reference for the analysis of its absence. The third part utilises this picture of the potential 
RMA of NLW to framework the examination of the following American, Russian and Israeli 
cases. 
Chapter 3: ‘The (absence of the) American RMA of NLW’ 
This chapter examines the reasons behind the failure of the RMA of NLW in the U.S. 
military. Despite the fact that the very idea of military employment of NLW was a product of 
the American military thinking, they have hardly been ever used. American military regards 
technology as a lodestar of military success. However, without political pressure that defines 
the minimisation of civilian casualties as an integral part of the military success, non-lethal 
military technologies remain underdeveloped and idle. American political leadership has 
developed strong foreign policy mechanisms to reduce the influence of international criticism 
on their decision- making process. The rhetorical narratives, such as the protector of the free 
world against a great evil, the promoter and the defender of democracy, and the ability to 
create coalitions of willing nations, have been allowing American leadership to minimise 
international criticism in general, and regarding enemy civilian casualties during US-led 
military operations in particular. Moreover, American public opinion has been showing very 
little interest in enemy civilian casualties. The American mind-set, shaped by different 
historical and cultural predispositions to disregard of everything that is not American and 
general belief that war is a temporary unfortunate phenomenon that has to be resolved as 
quickly and aggressively as possible, leaves very little space for the appreciation of enemy 
population. Without political domestic demand to minimise civilian casualties, and with a 
foreign policy that successfully fends international criticism off, the American political 
leadership does not pressure its military to revolutionise its ways of conduct and fully integrate 
NLW in military organisational and operational concepts. Consequently, this chapter 
demonstrates how NLW remain to be a marginal and oxymoronic phenomenon in the history 
of the technological adventures of the U.S. military.  
Chapter 4: ‘The (absence of the) Russian RMA of NLW’ 
This chapter examines the reasons behind the failure of the RMA of NLW in the 
Russian military. While the growth of interest toward NLW in the Russian military has been 
directly influenced by the American military attitudes emerged in the mid-1990s, the initial 
enthusiasm has been successfully buried by the Russian bureaucracy machine. The types of 
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non-lethal technologies and the level of their employment in the Russian military basically 
does not differ from its American counterpart. Despite a very productive professional debate 
on the possible usefulness of NLW on the battlefield, the Russian political leadership has never 
felt stressed to minimise enemy civilian casualties.  Building on its status as a nuclear power 
and permanent member of the UN Security Council, its growing economy and broad domestic 
political support, the Kremlin, has been able to withstand international criticism and 
accusations of violations of international law, in general, as well as during military operations, 
in particular. Using the foreign policy narrative of double standards (i.e., the West has no right 
to criticise Russia, as it operates in the same manner), Russian leadership feels no pressure to 
make its military less lethal than its American counterpart is. Moreover, on the level of the 
unconscious cultural context, the Russian people are ready to suffer and sacrifice by fighting 
to protect their country, and by demonstrating levels of endurance that cannot be grasped by 
Western mind. If readiness for such self-victimisation is so high, it, subsequently, leaves no 
place for the concern for enemy civilian casualties. In other words, the suffering (and 
casualties) of the enemy’s population during military operation is generally approved in the 
Russian cultural context, just as the Russians are ready to suffer themselves. Without internal 
political pressure, and with a resilient foreign policy, NLW do not pass this test of political 
necessity in Russia and are, consequently, doomed to remain a thought-provoking, yet unused 
tool in the Russian military arsenal. 
Chapter 5: ‘The (absence of the) Israeli RMA of NLW’ 
This chapter examines the reasons behind the failure of the RMA of NLW in the Israeli 
military. The Israeli Defence Forces (the IDF) had been employing NLW significantly before 
the American conceptualisation of these weapons in the mid-1990s. Since the end of the Six 
Day War, the IDF has been forced to fulfil law enforcement duties in the Territories (Judea, 
Samaria and Gaza) and deal with civilian disturbances, massive riots and other forms of 
civilian violence organised by the local population. Despite this long history of NLW 
employment, which was highlighted especially during the First and Second Intifadas, the IDF 
has always thought of NLW as a tool for riot and crowd control only, and the idea of their 
employment on the battlefield has never been considered as a serious option. Facing 
international criticism, the Israeli political leadership has been insisting that international 
opinion is dominated by anti-Israeli countries, and, therefore, Israel’s performance is irrelevant 
- it does not matter what Israel does (or does not do) it will be widely criticised. Israeli political 
decision-makers have successfully played (good) few against many (bad) card, arguing that 
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the IDF is the most ethical military in the world and it does the utmost to reduce enemy civilian 
casualties, thus, fending off international criticism and tolerating the IDF’s refusal to 
fundamentally change their practices. Moreover, the Israeli social and cultural context, based 
on the long Jewish history of persecution, the Holocaust heritage and the history of the Arab-
Israeli confrontation, pays little regard to enemy population life. The Israeli siege mentality, 
the existential anxiety and the cultural narrative that Never again shall Masada fall! constitute 
the Israeli national character shaping its intolerance toward enemy population and, therefore, 
stimulating no reason to minimise enemy civilian casualties less than it is politically required. 
With successfully defied international pressure, and with no internal political demand to 
minimise civilian casualties, the employment of NLW in the IDF remains limited to riot control 





WHY REVOLUTIONS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS OCCUR (OR NOT) 
 
Introduction 
During the last several decades, different historians and strategists have suggested 
different ways to explain the interconnection between technology, military, and society that 
produces a fundamental, even revolutionary, change in the ways of war.1 Today, there is little 
doubt that these three dimensions create a symbiotic system and constantly interact with each 
other. While the slow development of one of them creates adaptive changes in the nature of the 
others (transformation or evolution); a rapid and fundamental alter produces frequently 
uncontrollable dissonance that affects all the elements, generating far-reaching changes 
(revolution). Most of the researchers, who study this phenomenon, operate with two different 
definitions: Military Revolution (MR) and Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). 
While current literature suggests many historical examples of revolutionary changes in 
military affairs,2  there is very little research, if at all, that attempts to create a conceptual 
framework, which will be able to offer a conceptual explaination of their origins and the reasons 
behind their occurrence or absence. In other words, most of the research concentrates on how 
these changes occurred and not on why. One of the most comprehensive proposed conceptual 
ideas that explains the phenomenon is an attempt to apply theory of Punctuated Equilibrium. 
Different researchers already suggested that MR or RMA seem to be the products of an 
imbalance in the complex system that encompasses the political-social-military environment. 
This imbalance has a fundamental influence on all elements within this system (such as armed 
forces, governments, states, etc.)3 However, it seems that the main lacunae of existing research, 
which promotes these ideas, is the lack of a conceptual system, the imbalance of which create 
MRs or RMAs.  Only defining this complex environmental system, will provide a conceptual 
                                                          
1 For example see: Alvin Toffler, Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993); Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare and the Course 
of History, 1500 to Today, (New York: Gotham Books, 2006); Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox, (ed.), 
The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Theo 
Farrell, Terry Terriff, (ed.), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, (London: Lynne 
Rienner, 2002). 
2 See Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox, (ed.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution ... 
3 See Steven Leonard, Inevitable Evolutions: Punctuated Equilibrium and the Revolution in Military Affairs, (Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College,2001); Colin Gray, Strategy for Chaos: 
Revolutions in Military Affairs and The Evidence of History, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002); Rogers 
Clifford, ‘The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years’ War’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 
2, April 1993. 
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base for the complete understanding of the nature of revolutionary military changes, their 
processes, and reasons for their existence. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse different political, military and historical 
studies in an attempt to define the social-political-military environment that creates RMA, and, 
therefore, to establish a theoretical framework that will enable to explain its existence or 
absence. It consists of seven main parts. The aim of the first one is to point to the misleading 
import of the term revolution from its pure political definition and understanding to its usage 
in the strategic context of MR and RMA. While the second part sheds a light on the nature of 
MR and RMA and the relation between them, the third part conceptualises this relationship in 
an attempt to establish a theoretical causal chain between social-political changes and RMAs. 
The fourth part generally conceptualises RMA as an outcome of the imbalanced Political-
Military System. The fifth analyses the different characteristics of this system, establishing the 
causal chain that triggers an RMA. The sixth part discusses two historical examples, 
demonstrating the logic of the developed conceptualisation. The last part integrates the 
previous ones summarising the way in which the occurrence of an RMA can be explained by 
the concept of a Political-Military System, paving a way for the analysis of RMAs that did not 
occur. 
 
Part One: The Five Characteristics of a Revolution 
In 1962, a famous British economist and journalist Barbara Ward started her book The 
Rich Nations and the Poor Nations with the statement that “we live in the most catastrophically 
revolutionary age that men have ever faced”. Despite the fact that this claim is more than 50 
years old, it seems to describe very accurately the realities of  the first two decades of the 21st 
century.  The strength, and the weakness, of Ward’s statement is concealed in her usage of the 
term revolution, defined by her as an event “changing our life, our ways of looking at things, 
changing everything out of recognition and changing it fast”.4 It seems, however, that while 
this broad and general definition is sufficient for forming a popular argument; it has a little use 
in the terms of academic empirical research. 
The concept of revolution in Social Sciences is very broad and flexible, in fact, “flexible 
enough to encompass [events] as diverse as the Glorious, French, Copernican, and Industrial 
                                                          
4 Barbara Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1962), p.13. 
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Revolutions”.5 There is no doubt that the term revolution is used to describe a change in some 
state of affairs, however only a definition of the characteristics of this change will enable its 
empirical examination. Existing literature in social science suggests four major ones. The first 
two characteristics were best described by the sociologist Kumar Krishan: 
There would not be any disagreement to the proposition that all these 
uses of the word ‘revolution’ turn on the notion of change. This change 
is, moreover, seen in two ways. It is in some sense fundamental … and 
it is in some sense sudden, an acceleration of the previously existing 
rates of change … Any concept of revolution then must incorporate 
somehow the notion of fundamental and accelerated change.6 
 The third and the fourth were best introduced by the historian Clifford Rogers. First, he 
argues that any revolution has to have a time-frame that “can range from a year to a century”. 
Although his claim regarding the generic length of this time-frame – “does not exceed a single 
(maximum) human life span”7 – is much debatable,8 this characteristic is vital, as it determines 
a revolution as an event, which has a visible beginning and a noticeable ending. The second of 
Clifford’s characteristic for a revolutionary change is its dichotomous nature: “… a revolution 
– however extended – must be in essence a single change, from state X to state Y, from front 
to back or top to bottom”.9 In other words, the change has to be traceable from a determinate 
status at the beginning to the completely different one at the end. 
 While these four characteristics are widely debated in literature, another, very important 
characteristic exists, though for some reason overlooked. Any revolution, whatever the nature 
of the change, occurs in a certain society in a certain place. This characteristic is obvious when 
political revolutions occur. In these cases their domestic nature is displayed within their titles: 
the English Revolution, the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, etc. It is easy to be 
misled by a more generic name, such as the Industrial Revolution; however, even this global 
phenomenon has its domestic roots – it began in Great Britain and then migrated to other 
countries, although on a different scale and at a different pace. Therefore, the number of 
industrial revolutions is as varied as the number of countries in which they have occurred: the 
British Industrial Revolution, the French, the American, the Russian, the Japanese, etc. A 
                                                          
5 Clifford Rogers, ‘The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War’, in Clifford Rogers, (ed.), The Military 
Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, (Oxford: Westview 
Press, 1995), p. 76. 
6 Krishan Kumar, (ed.), Revolution: the Theory and Practice of an European Idea, (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1971), p.10.  
7 Clifford Rogers, ‘The Military Revolutions…’, p. 76. 
8 See Geoffrey Parker, ‘In Defense of The Military Revolution’, in Clifford Rogers, (ed.), The Military Revolution 
Debate…,  p. 339-340. 
9 Clifford Rogers, “The Military Revolutions…’, p. 76. 
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determination of a revolution's occurrence within a specific place-and-society  allows a 
more accurate understanding of all previous four characteristics - fundamentality, 
rapidness, time-framing and the dichotomy of the “before” and “after” - and thus turns them 
into factors that enable an empirical research of the revolution phenomenon. In other 
words, revolution is the state of a fundamental and rapid change in a specific affair that occurs 
in a specific place, to a specific society and in a specific time. Only the defining of all 
these characteristics can exclude the undesirable influences and variables and allow 
further analysis. 
 
Part Two: Military Revolution vs. Revolution in Military Affairs 
The idea of revolutionary change in warfare is not a novel concept. Colin Gray 
rightfully claims that “the concept of qualitative change in the terms and conditions of warfare 
has been as old as its apparent existential reality” and supports this statement by pointing at the 
famous works of Jean Colin, Basil Liddel Hart, William Liscum Borden and others,10 which 
were written much before the conceptualization of the current terminology of Military 
Revolution and Revolution in Military Affairs. However, as this research deals specifically 
with revolutionary military changes, a better explanation of these two is required. 
Military Revolution 
The term Military Revolution was first introduced by historian Michael Roberts in 1956. 
He used his inaugural lecture at Queen’s University Belfast to expound an early modern 
“military revolution”. In his later publications he continued to claim in favour of this term and 
finally determined it in his prominent article “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660", first to 
appear in his Essays in Swedish History in 1967. The main idea of Roberts’s military revolution 
was “that purely military developments, of strictly technological kind, did exert a lasting 
influence upon society in large”.11 The logical explanation that fundamental changes in the 
means of warfare can lead to the dramatic changes in society and its social institutions attracted 
as many followers as critics. The main weakness of Robert’s model, however, is that it is rather 
more descriptive than conceptual, i.e., it points at the phenomenon, yet, discusses too little its 
nature and characteristics. Therefore, Roberts' determination of a revolution’s time-period, its 
                                                          
10 Colin Gray, Strategy for Chaos.., p. 19-20. 
11 Michael Roberts, ‘The Military Revolution, 1560-1660’, in Clifford Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution 
Debate…, p. 13. 
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place and even the definitions of altering military affairs became a much debatable statement,12 
with each historian rejecting the other and offering his own dates and main elements for the 
Early Modern Europe MR. The main dispute was (and still is) not on numbers, technological 
improvements, main events and their places, but rather on the interpretation of their influence 
on the fundamental change occurring within European society.13 It seems that the main reason 
for this disagreement is concealed in the erroneous definition that misled the dialogue on MR. 
As already mentioned, the fifth characteristic of the revolution phenomenon is the 
most important one. Only a very accurate definition of its place and the society in which it 
occurs can allow its further examination. European society is too broad a 
classification, comprised of different individual states and countries. Therefore, the best way 
to understand the causal chain between early modern European military innovations 
and changes in European social structure is the defining of a narrower place-and-
society characteristic. Hence, examining the general MR of an Early Modern Europe is 
incomplete, while examining the more specific MR of early modern Spain, or Sweden, or 
France, or England, etc., is required for a more complete understanding. 
Revolution in Military Affairs 
The concept of Revolution in Military Affairs appeared independently and almost at the 
same time as the concept of Military Revolution did, though at the very beginning it was called 
Military-Technical Revolution. The term was invented by Soviet military thinkers and much 
the same way as Roberts, Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, the Soviet Chief General Staff, 
concentrated on a more descriptive analysis rather than on a conceptual one. The idea of 
Military-Technical Revolution remained more as an attempt to define certain changes in the 
American armed forces at that time, rather than on the theoretic-conceptual debate on the nature 
and characteristics of this type of change in general.14 
The breakthrough in the conceptualization of this phenomenon occurred along with the 
Americanisation of the Soviet Military-Technical Revolution idea and the appearance of the 
                                                          
12 See Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution? – Military Change and 
Europian Society 1550-1880, (London: Macmillan Press, 1991); Clifford Rogers, (ed.), The Military 
Revolution Debate… 
13 Beatrice Heuser, ‘Denial of Change: The Military Revolution as Seen by Contemporaries’, International 
Bibliography of Military History, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2012, pp. 3-27. 
14 Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox, (ed.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution..., p. 1-10; Dima Adamsky, 
The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in 
Russia, the US, and Israel, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 24-58. 
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term Revolution in Military Affairs.15 U.S. strategists, such as Andrew Krepinevich and 
Andrew Marshall, pioneered the field establishing the conceptual framework of an RMA that 
included three basic dimensions:  doctrinal, organisational and technological.16 According to 
them, only a simultaneous fundamental change incorporating these three dimensions can be 
referred to as an RMA.17 Despite the fact that their definition is an axiom in the field, some 
clarification of the first dimension of “doctrinal change” is required. Their use of the term 
“doctrine” is more related to the new conceptual way of employing weapons on the battlefield, 
i.e. concepts of operation, rather than to the modern definition of the term “doctrine”, which is 
more general and includes almost all aspects of strategy. 
In fact, compared to Roberts’ Military Revolution, RMA is a much more limited 
phenomenon. While MR claims to explain the relations between military innovations and social 
structure, RMA is restricted only to the military field. In other words, RMA theory tries to 
explain the very specific chain between military innovations and military institutions.The 
concept of RMA inspired strategists and military scholars to develop this idea further. In the 
following years many books and articles were written on the subject in an attempt to explore 
the RMA phenomenon from a variety of perspectives through the use of the historical events 
of past RMAs.18 It seems that the researchers were so mesmerized by the idea of RMA and the 
traceable historical evidences of successful RMAs that they paid little attention to the fact that 
they were misled by the lack of conceptualization. Again, as it happened to military historians 
with the idea of MR, strategists did not completely connect RMAs to place and society, or, 
more precisely in this case, to a specific military. For example, Colin Gray accurately and 
flawlessly defines a Nuclear RMA;19 however, according to the fifth characteristic of 
revolution, Revolution in Military Affairs must be determined by a specific military. 
Unfortunately, Gray’s Nuclear RMA refers only to the American one; yet there were also the 
Soviet, the British, the French and others. There are militaries that never went through this 
                                                          
15 See Stephen Rosen, ‘The Impact of the Office of Net Assessment on the American Military in the Matter of the 
Revolution in Military Affairs’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2010, pp. 569-482. 
16 See Andrew Krepinevich, ‘Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions’, National Interest, no. 
37, 1994, pp. 30-42; Andrew Marshal, ‘Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions’, Office of Net Assessment 
memorandum, 1993.   
17 See Andrew Krepinevich, ‘Cavalry to Computer...’; Andrew Marshal, ‘Some Thoughts on Military 
Revolutions…’. 
18 See Colin Gray, Strategy for Chaos…; Max Boot, War Made New...; Tim Benbow, The Magic Bullet? 
Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs, (London: Chrysalis Book Group, 2004); Richard Hundley, 
Past Revolutions Future Transformation: What Can History of Revolutions in Military Affairs Tell Us about 
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process, and there are some that seem to be still in the midst of the process, even 70 years 
later.20 
The Merger 
 There is no doubt that these two independently developed concepts, MR and RMA, 
share a mutual nature. The very first attempt to integrate them was made by the historian 
Williamson Murray in 1997 in his article “Thinking about Revolution in Military Affairs”21 
and later in his book, co-edited with an other military historian Macgregor Knox, The Dynamics 
of Military Revolution, 1300-2050. Murray’s main breakthrough is rooted in his attempt to take 
the idea of MR out of its context of Early Modern Europe and determine a conceptual definition 
of this phenomenon and the relation between it and RMA. According to Murray, MRs are 
“earthquakes” that bring “systematic changes in politics and society … [and] recast society and 
the state as well as military organisation”; and RMAs are “less-embracing changes” that appear 
within military institutions and “require the assembly of a complex mix of tactical, 
organisational, doctrinal, and technological innovations in order to implement a new 
conceptual approach to warfare or to a specialized sub-branch of warfare”.22 Murray claims a 
very interesting connection between MRs and RMAs: “If Military Revolutions are compared 
with earthquakes, we can think of RMAs as pre- and aftershocks”.23 In other words, RMAs can 
be considered as traceable evidences before and after MRs. For example, he argues that the 
MR of Early Modern Europe had pre-shock RMAs: the longbow, Edward III’s strategy, 
gunpowder, and fortress architecture; and direct and aftershock RMAs: the Dutch and Swedish 
tactical reforms, the French tactical and organisational reforms, the naval revolution.24 It seems, 
that all these innovations, indeed, can be related to the Early Modern Europe MR; however, an 
attempt to establish any casual relations between them and their influence on or from the social 
and political “earthquake” of the 17th century creation of the modern state looks as a very 
confusing procedure. 
 The perplexity of Murray’s connection comes, again, from taking too broad 
perspective. As it was shown above, any revolutionary phenomenon must be analysed 
                                                          
20 The Iranian Nuclear Program can be easily defined as an on-going Iranian Nuclear RMA. There is no doubt 
that if Iranian military will have nuclear capability (i.e., a technological breakthrough), it will project on future 
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21 Williamson Murray, ‘Thinking about Revolution in Military Affairs’, Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 16, 1997, pp. 
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22 Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox, (ed.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution…. p. 6-7. p.12. 
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regarding a specific place. Therefore, a casual chain between MR and the related RMAs can 
be established only in the context of a specific country, its society and its army. For example, 
the relations between MR of Early Modern England and: the English RMA of Fortification, 
the English RMA of Navy, the English RMA of “Dutch and Swedish tactical reforms”25, etc. 
The misleading current conceptual debate about MRs, RMAs and the connection between them 
is concealed by its broadness and the detachment from nationalised specification. The next part 
makes an effort to cover this gap in the current theory. Its title contains the term nationalisation, 
emphasizing the connection to a specific player. It is obvious that the discussed phenomena are 
much older than the term nation in its modern context; however, it seems more suitable and 
accurate to use, than “localisation” or “domestication”. 
 
Part Three: The Conceptualisation of MR and RMA  
It seems, especially as discussed above, that RMAs have a pivotal role in the MR’s life-
circle, though the connection between them is still unclear. On the one hand, RMAs trigger 
MRs; on the other hand, RMAs' are the direct outcome of MRs. In addition to these 
indistinguishable relations, there is no doubt that different RMAs seem to be connected one to 
another. For example, The Fortification RMA of the 16th century (trace italienne), is the 
obvious answer to the improvements of siege artillery that occurred at the end of 15th.26 Also, 
there is no doubt that any revolutionary change in one sphere of social life, such as economy, 
would have significant impact on other social spheres, such as politics. 
There are two major steps that should be explored in order to clarify these relationships. 
The first is the examination of specific nationalised cases, as any revolution is specific to the 
certain society and only within this context it can be properly examined. The second is making 
several very generic assumptions:  (1) All RMAs have certain impact on the social-political 
structure, such as required economic or political changes; (2) All RMAs need specific social-
political conditions required for their occurrence, such as a suitable economy, form of 
governance, proper army, etc.; (3) RMAs are usually inter-connected and their connections can 
have a consequential nature (e.g., one RMA provides a technological background to another) 
or replying one (RMA replies to the changes caused by the previous one); and (4) Social-
                                                          
25 The adaptation of Dutch and Swedish tactical reforms by the English infantry. 
26 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution…, p. 6-13. 
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political changes within MRs are, also, usually consequentially connected (e.g., each following 
change requires the occurrence of a part, or even all, of previous changes).  
 According to the first assumption RMAs that occur within the military of a specific 
country contributes its own part to the total amount of social changes within what is called “the 
Military Revolution of the country”. (See Fig. 1). 
 
The visualisation of the connections presented by the second, third and fourth assumptions 
requires situating RMAs and the social changes on a time-line. (See Fig. 2). Due to the fact that 
the history of only one country is under analysis, there should be no difficulties to situate the 
events chronologically. 
 
 The vulnerability of the connections, as illustrated in Fig. 2, is concealed in its general 
detachment from the historical time-line. There is no doubt that before and after a presented 
period, whatever it is, pre- and post RMAs occur, as well as social changes. Therefore, the 
phenomena within the right context of the general time-line are presented in Fig. 3. 
Nonetheless, even this illustration is not free of criticism, as it raises a new conceptual dilemma 
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regarding the rules that determine the start and the end of MRs; in other words, a theory that 
decides which RMAs and social changes are included and which remains behind (or ahead) is 
still missing. This theory will be introduced in the following part providing a more conceptual 
explanation about the relation between social changes and military innovations. 
 
 
Part Four:  RMA and the Unbalanced Political-Military System 
 Previously, the revolution phenomenon was defined as a fundamental, rapid, time-
frameable and dichotomous change, which had taken place within a certain context within a 
certain place. Considering the later discussion on problematic interconnection between social-
political changes and military innovations, this definition raises questions whether these 
relations are a matter of revolution, rather than an evolutionary development. Evolution is 
defined as “[an] advancement through a near-infinite number of infinitesimal changes”;27 and 
indeed, it seems that RMAs and socio-political changes might be defined as a evolutionary 
development, rather than revolution. On the one hand, it is obvious that the innovations in 
warfare and socio-political life might be a part of the evolutionary process. On the other hand, 
historians of MRs point at certain periods of time and present changes that can hardly be named 
“infinitesimal”. Moreover, it seems that these periods of revolutionary changes in social-
political, as well as military, dimensions were surrounded by slower evolutionary process. 
Concurrently, the definition of the phenomena of RMA, or MR, as a revolutionary event within 
an evolutionary development, demands a more developed theory. 
 A paradigm that is able to provide a conceptual framework for the further examination 
of RMA and MR and determination their revolutionary (or not) nature is a theory of Punctuated 
Equilibrium. Initially, this theory was proposed in 1972 by two palaeontologists Stephen Jay 
Gould and Niles Eldredge, who for the first time interpreted the fossil records and not just 
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described it, as it was acceptable before. 28 Gould and Eldredge, in an attempt to explain the 
development (or lack thereof) of fossils, argued that species’ development occur in relatively 
short bursts, punctuated by the long periods of near stasis or equilibrium. In other worlds, the 
incremental, evolutionary, equilibrated development is interspersed by a rapid, short, 
discontinuity event. Their theoretical concept of Punctuated Equilibrium combines both, 
evolutionary as well as revolutionary, types of development;29 hence, it seems suitable for the 
examination of RMA and MR theories. 
 The concept of Punctuated Equilibrium was rapidly adopted by the Social Sciences and 
other scientific disciplines30, and the fact that it fits RMA and MR theories has already been 
noted by many researchers.31 The problem with the existing literature, however, is that it only 
suggests that RMAs or MRs can be defined as a discontinuity or nonlinearity in the general 
background of the slow incremental progress. It does not define why this disequilibrium 
happens or why the system remained equilibrated. Thus, a further examination of the ways, in 
which the concept of equilibrium explains the revolution phenomenon, is required. 
 In 1966, six years before the Punctuated Equilibrium concept of evolution was 
presented, an American Professor of Political Science Chalmers Johnson published a book 
Revolutionary Change, in which he made an attempt to explain the reasons behind political 
revolutions.32 Johnson assumes that due to the fact that revolution is a socio-political 
phenomenon, the key to “the study and the conceptualization of the revolutionary violence lies 
in social system analysis”.33 Following this assumption he established a theory that explains 
revolution as a failure of homeostasis or system disequilibrium.34 According to Johnson, even 
rapid changes within a society do not necessarily cause a revolution, and that there are two 
different possible results: either, change would be absorbed by the system causing the 
homeostatic changes and preserve the system’s equilibrium; or, the dissonance caused by the 
change would exceed the homeostatic capacity of the system, creating system disequilibrium 
– i.e., revolution.35 In other words, as long as the system is equilibrated, stasis would remain; 
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once the balance between the system’s components is lost, revolution would occur. This 
dichotomous differentiation seems to be more suitable for the determination of the RMA’s or 
MR’s phases of existence. However, as RMA and MR are a more political-military phenomena 
than Johnson’s socio-political revolution, a definition of appropriate Political-Military System, 
situated in a supposed equilibrium is required. 
The Political-Military System 
The very first step in defining Political-Military System is a determination of what a 
system is. The term system, when properly used, means: 
Any group of variables which are so arranged that they form a whole, and which 
have a particular kind of relationship with each other…. [these variables] are 
mutually influencing and they tend to maintain the relationship they have with 
each other over time.36 
According to this definition, there are two main characteristics of a system as a group of 
variables. The first is the mutual influence that characterises the variables within the system as 
interdependent. And the second is the variables’ tendency to maintain their relationship as an 
aspiration to preserve the system equilibrated; without these relations, whatever their nature is, 
the system would collapse (dis-equilibrated), its variables would be replaced until a new 
equilibrium would be reached. Consequently, the definition of a Political-Military System has 
to answer these two generic characteristics of the term system. 
The second step in the conceptualization of the Political-Military System is defining 
the variables that create this system, and there is no better way for that than turning back to the 
classic writings of Carl von Clausewitz. In his book On War, Clausewitz claims that "war is 
nothing but a duel",37 a bipolar phenomenon that occurs between military forces of two nations, 
or a group of nations. Accordingly, the first two most basic elements of war are rivaling armed 
forces. He continues to state that “war is a mere continuation of policy by other means”, 38  
emphasizing that there are two additional components needed to compose “war” – the rivaling 
political entities standing behind their militaries forces. Moreover, political bodies can 
relate not only through military means, but also have an independent political link. Further on 
in the book, Clausewitz advocates the importance of the capabilities and means that 
governments assign specifically for the purpose of war, saying that: “Governments […] had to 
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treat the maintenance of the army”. 39 Therefore, as the assignment of capabilities and means 
is an essential part of a political decision, they are connected to the military through the political 
entity. (See figure 4). 
 
The importance of the definition of a revolution as a phenomenon related to one player 
has already been discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Therefore, for the sole purpose of 
analysing revolutions, the Clausewitzian system has to be reduced to a national level – in 
essence, it has to be nationalised.40 To achieve this nationalised level all the elements of one of 
the players would be assembled into a single component – the political-military challenge that 
a player presents to his opponent. This component would present the individual player as a 
homogeneous element within the system of its rival (See Figure 5). 
 
The three main component of the system – political entity, military and political-military 
challenge – constitute the Political-Military System that, according to the definition of system, 
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has to be equilibrated. As the means are controlled by the political entity, this element is 
subordinate, and therefore not included in the main political-military equilibrium. 
The analysis of the Political-Military System demands an understanding of its 
interdependency; however, it is important to discern that war, in itself, does not mean that the 
Political-Military System is imbalanced. Essentially, the Political-Military System can 
continue functioning in equilibrium during a war, as long as its components succeed in 
maintaining their mutual balance. Moreover, as it was discussed previously, RMAs constitute 
MRs, consequently it seems right to argue that while a MR is the product of a significant 
imbalance of the Political-Military System, followed by dramatic alternations of all its 
components, an RMA is a lesser imbalance, followed by a military transformation only. 
 
Part Five: Why RMAs Occur (or not) 
Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff in their book The Sources of Military Change argue that 
the main factors behind fundamental military changes (i.e., RMAs) are: technology, politics 
and culture.41 The question is, however, which one of these factors triggers an RMA and which 
determines its way. In other words, which factors explain why the RMAs occur and which 
shapes the how.  As it was discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the existing conceptual 
literature of the RMA phenomenon does not offer an immediate answer to this question, 
however, it seems that an analysis of RMA theories, suggested by different scholars, can help 
to conceptually differentiate between the “triggers” of the RMA phenomenon and its 
“designers.”  
On the one hand, different scholars suggest different models for the RMA phenomenon. 
While in his Strategy for Chaos Colin Gray suggests a nine-step model of an RMA life-cycle,42 
Steven Metz and James Kievit in their Pattern of Military Revolutions offer only a five steps 
model,43 and Richard Hundley in his Past Revolutions Future Transformation reduces the 
number of the RMA’s phases to four.44 On the other, it seems that these models overlap and 
complement, rather than contradict each other, expressing the interest of the study of their 
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architects.45 While their models are different, all scholars came to the same conclusion that 
despite the fact that technology is, undoubtedly, an essential component of the RMA 
phenomenon, it does not trigger it. Indeed, history provides a large number of cases when a 
novel military technology failed to ignite an RMA.46 Moreover, when Hundley argues that 
“RMAs are often adopted and fully exploited first by someone other than the nation inventing 
the new technology,”47 he does not only underline the fact that the “novel” technology behind 
an RMA is not exactly novel, but also suggests that it was even invented by somebody else. 
The story of the RMA of Armoured Warfare offers one of the best examples of a technology 
(i.e., tanks) that was developed by the British military in the First World War, but the RMA 
itself occurred first in Nazi Germany, 20 years later.48 While this example will be analysed in 
more details in the next part of this chapter, it is possible to claim that technology by itself does 
not serve as a trigger for RMA. In other words, a new technology is essential for the occurrence 
of an RMA, but it does not ignite it. 
In describing the process that leads to an RMA, Richard Hundley claims that “unmet 
military challenges are an essential element” that drives to the breakthrough process of RMA.49 
Colin Gray elaborates this idea of unmet challenge arguing that the implementation of RMA 
demands that “some lawful authority” will “decide that there is a challenge, a threat, or an 
opportunity, in need of RMA solution.”50 Further in his book he states: 
For an RMA to succeed, both narrowly as a military-technical (inter alia) 
enterprise, and strategically as an agent for enhanced effectiveness, it has to 
translate into political defined goals.51 
Combining this understanding with the conclusion of Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff that 
“strategic pressures operate through political processes in shaping military change”52 it seems 
possible to deduct that a successful implementation of RMA demands political leadership to 
define to their military a challenge, which will require a fundamental military change. In other 
words, for an RMA to be triggered, a military organisation has to realise that a challenge that 
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had been put in front of it by its political leadership cannot be met by existing capabilities and, 
therefore, a change is required, and the bigger the challenge, the bigger the change. As 
Stephanie Carvin and Michael Williams claimed: “it is civil policy-makers that set the 
framework within which military doctrine is composed.”53 It is important to note, however, 
that while there are scholars who claim that a military, facing new strategic developments, such 
as new enemy strategy or technology, might perform an internal change, independently from 
political pressure,54 this argument seems to be not fully developed. In the end, it is a political 
leadership that defines a challenge, which its military would seek to meet, and supports its 
military throughout the process of change. While some RMAs might be seen as independently 
performed, they were nonetheless triggered by a political challenge that was translated by the 
military in an unmet military challenge. Consequently, it seems right to argue that it is a 
political decision to deal with a certain threat that forces military transformations, and in the 
case when this threat cannot be faced by existing technology, concepts of operations and 
military organisation, an RMA will occur. 
The last factor behind military changes that was suggested by Theo Farrell and Terry 
Terriff is culture. The vitality of cultural characteristics for the understanding of military 
organisations and their transformations has been suggested by many scholars in the field of 
military affairs and strategy, producing a vast variety of theoretical and empirical studies. 
While Theo Farrell, Collin Gray and Jeremy Black concentrated more on the national defence 
policies examining the interconnection between national norms, culture and strategic 
behaviour,55 Stephen Rosen focused on the influence of social structures on national styles in 
generating military power.56 While Elizabeth Kier and Beatrice Heuser examined how cultural 
predispositions of specific nations shape their military doctrines,57 Dima Adamsky focused on 
the influence of cultural aspects on the military organisational, doctrinal and technological 
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innovations.58 All of these studies, however, focus on how different cultural factors influenced 
military changes and transformations, as Farrell and Terriff concluded: ”cultural continuity can 
shape military change by defining organisational responses to strategic, political, and 
technological developments.”59 As Adamsky argued in his book The Culture of Military 
Innovations that “under the impact of [different] cultural factors countries interpret differently 
the changing character of war,”60 it seems, therefore, right to argue that culture is important as 
it shapes the way of the political-military decision-making process, as well as the way a novel 
technology is perceived by the military. While culture, undoubtedly, influences political 
leadership in their definition of challenges and threats, as well as the military in its 
interpretation of these challenges and finding possible solutions, it is the context of RMA, 
rather than the reason for it. In other words, culture shapes the environment for the fundamental 
military changes (i.e., RMA), rather triggers them. 
 Combining the analysis of these three main factors that stand behind the occurrence of 
RMA (i.e., technology, politics and culture) with the model of  Political-Military System 
discussed above, it seems right to propose a conceptual framework that explains the occurrence 
of RMA: an RMA occurs when a political leadership, shaped by certain socio-cultural 
circumstances, defines to its military a challenge that military culture interprets as unmet and 
dealing with it requires fundamental change that combines novel, but an already available 
technology, operational concept and organisation. Usually, as most of the discussed above 
literature suggests, the military organisation will realise that the challenge is, indeed, unmet 
only after a defeat or almost-defeat. However, this is not always the case, as, sometimes, a close 
dialogue between the political leadership and its military, combined with the right cultural 
environment, can help to avoid this detrimental experience.61  Whether this way or that, as was 
discussed above, an RMA can only begin after a political-military challenge was posed by a 
political leadership, and its military defined it as an unmet.   
To conclude this conceptual discussion, it is important to highlight an obvious 
precondition of an RMA’s occurrence: an availability of the required means and resources 
(economic, industrial, human, etc.), without which an RMA just cannot occur. This 
“availability”, however, is relative and usually determined by the political will of a nation. 
While, sometimes, there are states that for obvious reasons have no resources, no political will 
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to perform an RMA (e.g., San Marino or Somalia), in most of the cases it is just a matter of 
political decision. In other worlds, for an RMA to occur, a decision of political leadership to 
face an unmet challenge is not enough, it also has to stand behind it.  In both of the analysed 
below examples, the political leadership decided not to redirect all resources required for the 
occurrence of RMA (experimentation with new technologies and operational and 
organisational concepts requires not only cultural openness for new ideas, but also significant 
funding).62 As it will be highlighted in the case of the RMA of Fortification in Early Modern 
England, when a political leadership does not provide enough material support to its military 
when it faces unmet challenges on the battlefield, it means that it can tolerate the consequences 
(i.e., defeat or surrender). The second case will focus on the RMA of Armour Warfare in 
interwar Britain, when the Royal Army was not only undersupplied to perform the RMA, but 
also displayed strong cultural conservatism in adopting tank technology. It will be shown, 
however, that these two drawbacks that failed this RMA were highly interconnected, as it was 
the British political leadership that did not pose a required challenge to their military, rather 
than a stagnation of the British military thought, after all, Fuller and Liddell Hart were both 
Britons.                 
 
Part Six: Why RMAs Occur (or not) – Historical Examples 
The following examination will focus on two historical examples of RMA: the RMA 
of Fortification in Early Modern England and the RMA of Armour Warfare in interwar Britain. 
Utilising previously established conceptual understanding of the RMA’s occurrence, the 
following examination will analyse these two unsuccessful RMAs in an attempt to point to the 
reasons that stood behind their failures. In each case, the analysis will focus on: (1) what was 
the RMA about (i.e., technology, concept of operation and organisation); (2) the absence of 
this RMA in England/Britain; (3) the reasons behind this absence. 
The absence of the RMA of Fortification in Early Modern England 
There are some historians who suggest that the initial drive behind the MR of Early 
Modern Europe was the revolutionary development of fortification – the trace italienne.63 
While the criticism against the concept of an European MR was already raised in previous parts 
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of this chapter, there is no doubt that the trace italienne was an outcome of the significant 
improvement in siege artillery.64 Clifford Rogers called this relatively rapid growth in siege 
artillery power, in the 14th and 15th centuries, an “Artillery Revolution”. This development, 
however, can hardly be called RMA, as Rogers explained this himself, it did not involve 
organisational or tactical changes, and these “new” guns were used in the same way as the 
regular siege artillery was used in the pre-gunpowder era, such as the ballista or the catapult.65 
Technology –The Trace Italienne 
The proliferation of stone-built castles in the 11th and 12th centuries altered the balance 
between defence and offence in favour of the first one. The domination of these fortifications 
extended for more than two hundred years, and was terminated by the appearance of powerful 
siege artillery in the 15th century.66 The significant and rapid developments of siege guns during 
the first 30 years of the 15th century made high and thin stone walls too vulnerable and thus 
obsolete. Novel designs and manufacture processes, new loading methods, as well as improved 
gun-powder formulas, made possible the destruction of even the strongest fortresses of the 
time.67 
The answer to this new artillery’s far-reaching effects was found in Spanish Italy in the 
end of the 15th century, when a novel design of fortification –the  trace italienne – was invented. 
This new design was based on two main innovations: the bastion and the novel, low and thick 
walls. The first reduced the dead zones close to the walls and allowed to place effective flaking 
fire. The second effectively protected the defenders against the enemy’s bombardment and 
enabled to place defensive artillery, keeping the siege-guns distant enough. This new type of 
fortification was the perfect defensive answer in the early modern gunpowder environment. It 
allowed “(1) to protect the fortress from storm by infantry; (2) absorb bombardment without 
tippling or crumbling; (3) shelter the defenders from attacking fire, and (4) subject the attackers 
to effective artillery fire.”68 
Operational Concept – The Comeback of the Siege 
 The introduction of the trace italienne did not just reinstate the balance between defence 
and offence, but shifted it back in favour of the first. During the 16th and 17th centuries the new 
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defensive style was widely spread throughout continental Western Europe, making a siege an 
event that could take months or even years.69 According to the development of besieged tactics, 
different tactical solutions were invented to maximise the strength of walls and bastions, as 
well as the effectiveness of defenders. “Crownworks”, “hornworks”, “ravelins”, redoubts and 
other tactical fortifications were invented to improve defensive capacity. While the trace 
italienne brought the siege tactics back into fashion, compared with the 11th century, early 
modern siege demanded more manpower, more time and much more money from both sides 
of the walls.70 
Organisation – Permanent garrisons 
 The significant improvements of fortification in the 16th and 17th centuries made them 
sophisticated and valuable assets, and their value increased not only as strategic defence 
strongholds, but also in terms of funds invested in their building. These two reasons, 
sophistication and costs, demanded a creation of permanent garrisons that protected the fortress 
during peace time, maintained the fortifications and were familiar with all their advantages and 
weaknesses.  During the 17th century, the number of troops assigned to garrison duty in Europe 
multiplied: “seventeenth-century military opinion insisted that it was unacceptable to maintain 
a fortress without a garrison”.71 These permanent garrisons tied down an enormous number of 
troops. Although the number of troops in any individual fortress was not that significant, their 
numbers multiplied by the number of strongholds, making the actual sum of all defensive 
troops pivotal. For example, in 1639, the Spanish Army of Flanders “numbered 77,000 men, 
of whom over 33,000 were distributed in 208 separate garrisons, the largest of which numbered 
scarcely 1000.”72  
The absence of the RMA of Fortification in Early Modern England 
  The English military was aware of the revolutionary change of fortification in 
continental Europe in the 16th century. Thus, in 1539, Henry VIII of England established a 
massive development program, building 28 new forts and improving many older ones in 
eastern and southern England, as well as in English territories in France.73  Unfortunately, the 
fortifications were built by English native architect and had a shape of hollow rings and not 
angular bastions according to the trace italienne design. These forts were ineffective against 
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concentrated artillery bombardment, as was proven in 1558 when after a short siege; England 
lost its sole remaining possession on the European mainland – Calais.74  
 Even though it was Edward III who introduced gunpowder weapons to Europe in 
1327,75 and though his predilection for artillery technology was adopted by his successors, the 
English military failed to produce effective fortresses: Henry VIII's massive and very expensive 
plan proved itself as an entire failure. Moreover, in 1559, Elizabeth I found that the fortification 
programme that started twenty years earlier was stalled, many defensive works were unfinished 
and garrisons suffered from unsatisfactory firepower and deficient personnel.76  
 One hundred years later, on the eve of the Civil Wars, the fortifications in England were 
still completely outdated compared with their improvements on the continent. Only few forts 
on England’s coasts acquired the standard of the trace italienne in 1642. During the Civil Wars, 
several strategic cities, such as London and Oxford, were fortified according to modern 
standards. Others were provided with partial fortifications.77 While one can argue that these 
ad-hoc modifications were in fact the English RMA of  Fortification,  it was, however, too little 
and too late for two reasons. The first is indeed the quantity: the number of modern 
fortifications and especially the amount of troops designated to garrisons in peace time were 
notably small by European continental standards.78 The second is the time factor. The Civil 
Wars and Cromwellian conquests of Ireland, in 1649-1652, and Scotland, in 1650-1652, 
offered other military transformations, in light of which the RMA of the trace italienne was, 
indeed, too late. 
Why the RMA of Fortification did not occur in Early Modern England 
 To answer why the RMA of Fortification did not occur in England, it is important to 
understand whether the challenge of the rapid growth in siege artillery power in the continental 
armies was realised by the English political leadership and was posed as a challenge to its 
military. It seems, however, that the answer is obvious: England controlled territories in France 
and was constantly confronted by continental militaries.  Moreover, the very fact that Henry 
VIII of England established a massive fortification program suggests that he realised the unmet 
challenge of siege artillery and pressed his military to change. 
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 While this attempt proved itself as a failure, it seems that the English political leadership 
withdrew its support from military attempts to revolutionise its fortifications.  An assumption 
that the lack of English political pressure led to the absence of the Fortification RMA during 
the 16th century suffers from simplicity of explanation, after all, England was fighting and 
losing in France and the enemy’s siege artillery remained to pose a challenge that Englishmen 
had no answer for. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the English Crown had no doubt that the 
French Army was superior, the question is, therefore, why English monarchs did not provide 
their military with the resources and support required to implement the RMA of Fortification. 
 Historians point to the fact that the RMA of Fortification in continental militaries was 
accompanied by a rapid centralisation of power converting France or Spain into absolute 
monarchies.79 The English political system, however, shaped by the heritage of the Magna 
Carta and the consequential dependence of the Crown on parliamentarian grants, refused to 
accept European absolutism. Although, due to their increased power, Henry VIII and Elizabeth 
I were often called despots or absolute monarchs; in terms of real power they were, in fact, 
powerless and relied to an extreme extent on Parliament. The key to their ascendancy was a 
close relationship with the House of Commons, rather than gain more power by attempting to 
undermine or destroy Parliamentary power.80 Charles I's decision to centralize power under his 
own “personal rule” led him to the scaffold and England to the Civil Wars. The early Tudors 
made several different attempts to find alternative sources, such as the reorganization of the 
Exchequer by Henry VII81, or the dissolution of the monasteries by Henry VIII, after the break 
with the Church of Rome.82 These sources of money, however, had a temporary character. 
They were essential in allowing the Crown to maintain certain, or rather specific, campaigns 
and military developments, such as Henry VIII’s fortification program, but it was not enough 
to go through the very expensive RMA of Fortifications, which required not only a massive 
investment in fortresses, but also an establishment of a powerful regular army that had to 
protect them. In other words, the English Crown was unable to recruit enough resources for its 
wars in France due to the culture of the English political system that was based on separation 
of power between Parliament and the Crown. As Parliament saw no potential benefit from the 
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wars in France and felt no threat (due to geographical isolation from the continent), England 
had to accept its defeat. 
Analysing this understanding by the concept of the Political-Military System, it seems 
right to argue that the French Army presented an unmet challenge that imbalanced the English 
system. However, the RMA of Fortification did not occur because the English cultural-political 
background shaped by the Magna Carta heritage prevented the Crown from supporting its 
military in the required transformation, thus, rebalancing the system not by military 
transformation, but by military defeat. 
 
The absence of the RMA of Armoured Warfare in interwar Britain 
 It has been much thought and written about the “big surprise” of the Second World War 
– the German Blitzkrieg or the RMA of Armoured Warfare performed by the German military 
during the interwar period.83 Also, a significant amount of research has been done analysing 
the failure of the British Army to implement this RMA despite the fact that the technology (i.e., 
tanks) had been developed by the British military during the First World War, and despite the 
fact that Britons (i.e., J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart) invented the theory of its 
employment.84 While these works analyse this failure from different angles, suggesting slightly 
different explanations, it seems right to argue that they do not contradict each other, but 
compliment, and therefore their generalisation under the concept of Political-Military System 
is possible. 
Technology – The Tank 
 In terms of military technological innovations, the First World War generally held to 
be the cradle of the radio, the over-the-horizon artillery, the military airplane and the tank. 
While all these were essential for the RMA of Armour Warfare, it seems right to argue that the 
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main technological drive behind this RMA was the tank, not only due to its technology per se, 
but because it was the main inspirer for novel operational concepts.85   Since its first appearance 
on the battlefield on 15 September 1916, through different military conflicts during the interwar 
period, and until the late 1930s, the technology had been significantly developed and improved. 
During the 1920s and 1930s, from the slow and unreliable machines of the First World War 
with limited firepower and thin armour, tanks had become the symbol of manoeuvrability and 
the core of land warfare in the Second World War.86 
Operational Concept – The Theory of Armour Warfare 
 The stalemate of the First World War, shaped by the rise of the firepower, drove many 
military theorists to look for a way to bring the manoeuvrable offence back onto the 
battlefield.87  While most historians agree on the fact that the initial prophets of what would 
become the theory of armour warfare were J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart, they also 
agree on the fact that its true fathers were  Heinz Wilhelm Guderian,  Mikhail Nikolayevich 
Tukhachevsky and other German and Soviet generals in the interwar period.  Through close 
(but short-lived) cooperation in the late 1920s and the series of confrontations during the 
interwar period these two militaries experimented with the operational concepts, as well as 
technology, to maximise both.88 The way in  which the Second World War began (and 
especially Operation Barbarossa – the German invasion into the U.S.S.R.), however, teaches 
that Germans, in contrast to their Russian counterparts, were much more successful in the 
implementation of the RMA of Armour Warfare, after all, the second name of this RMA is 
Blitzkrieg.  An analysis of the German military publications before and during the Second 
World War, defines best the operational concept of this RMA: 
The concentrated employment of armour and air forces to confuse enemy with 




                                                          
85 Mary Habek, Storm of Steel…; Paul Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks…; Robert Larson, The British Army… 
86 Peter Beale, Death by Design…; Mary Habek, Storm of Steel… 
87 Robert Citino, The Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe 1899-1940, (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2002), chapter 6. 
88 Mary Habek, Storm of Steel…; Robert Citino, The Quest for Decisive Victory…, chapter 6. 
89 Karl-Henz Frieser, John Greenwood, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West, (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 2005), p.6. 
45 
 
Organisation – The Panzer Division90 
 While the immature technologies of the First World War shaped the organisational 
concept around the understanding that tanks were only “available for use to help infantry to get 
through heavy defences,”91 with the progress of technology combined with the development of 
new operational concepts in the 1920s and 1930s, this perception had found itself outdated. To 
achieve the “far-reaching thrusts” and “successful breakthroughs” that the theory of armoured 
warfare was based on, tanks had to be concentrated in large units, rather than parcelled out in 
“penny pockets” among slow infantry forces.92 In other words, the RMA of armoured warfare 
required “a self-contained combined arms team, in which tanks were backed up by other arms 
brought up, as far as possible, to the tank’s standards of mobility”93 – a Panzer Division.    
The absence of the RMA of Armoured Warfare in interwar Britain 
Analysing the development of the theory of armour warfare, as well as technological 
improvements of British tanks, it seems right to argue that the British Army was one of the 
leaders for more or less the first decade after the end of the First World War. However, as 
Robert Citino put it: 
While it seemed as if Britain had an insurmountable lead in theory and practise of 
mechanised war, it lost that lead in the course of the 1930s to its once and future 
foe, Germany.94 
While all researchers agree that the British Army failed to implement the RMA of 
Armoured Warfare during the interwar period,95 “a failure for which it paid a heavy price 
between 1939 and 1942,”96 the remaining question is why a military, which performed so well 
in inventing the technology, as well as the theory for its employment, failed to implement it on 
the battlefield.    
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Why the RMA of Armoured Warfare did not occur in interwar Britain 
The existent research suggests three main explanations for the British failure in the 
implementing of the RMA of Armoured Warfare before the Second World War. The first one 
is that while during this period the army tried to exploit the potential inherent in the tank, it 
“was held back in this endeavour by its own institutional conservatism.”97  The second 
explanation claims that the main reason was the “Cinderella” position of the British Army, in 
general, and the British armour units, in particular, in terms of funding. Having been in this 
position for almost a decade (since the Depression of 1930-1931), “the Army was ill prepared 
in 1939, and the Army’s tank forces had suffered from inadequate preparation and funding 
more than all other arms.”98 The third explanation blames the British political leadership, “who, 
anxious to avoid another bloodbath on the scale of the First World War” kept their army “short 
of funds and decreed that its main function was to act as a colonial force.”99 It seems, however, 
that these three do not directly contradict each other, but rather help to establish a clearer picture 
of events. 
To hold the British Army’s conservatism as the main reason behind the failure to 
implement the RMA seems to be a too simplistic explanation. All military organisations are 
conservative, and even in the German military in the mid-1930s, Guderian had to deal with 
comments like “Alles Unsinn, Alles Unsinn, mein lieber Guderian” (all nonsense, all nonsense, 
my dear Guderian).100 The British Army had the material and intellectual potential to perform 
the required transformation, the question, however, is for what. Until the late 1930s the British 
government had never put before its military the challenge of fighting an European military 
(i.e., Germany’s), and when finally it had, it was too little too late.101 The balance of the 
Political-Military System of Britain, at that time, remained intact because the unmet military 
challenge of the German threat was never defined by the British political leadership. This 
explains not only the lack of funding, but also the conservatism of the British military that was 
not forced to innovate. 
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It is important to note, however, a military, as well as its political leadership, are the 
products of their parent society. The “blindness” of the British political leadership was deeply 
rooted in the British cultural-social interpretation of the political reality. After the First World 
War, the view of the British people was “that they had made immense sacrifices but above all 
they won” and therefore “it will never be necessary to do it again.”102 In other words, the RMA 
of Armoured Warfare did not occur in interwar Britain because the British cultural-political 
background, as was shaped by the First World War, prevented the British political leadership 
from defining to its military a challenge that would require this RMA. 
To conclude the discussion on this example it is important to point to another important 
factor that has been discussed in existent literature – the British military culture. The best 
examples are David French’s Raising Churchill’s Army where he  focuses on the impact of 
British military culture on the British army and its relation with tanks before and during the 
Second World War, and  John Stone’s The Tank Debate where he continues this discussion 
from then and until today. 103 While it is difficult to deny the importance of military culture on 
the occurrence of an RMA, as was discussed above, military culture does not stop (or trigger) 
its occurrence, it shapes its way, but this is a completely different story.    
 
Part Seven - Conclusions 
 The main purpose of this chapter was to enrich the existent knowledge and literature by 
offering an alternative conceptual explanation of the RMA phenomenon. It is important to 
highlight, that the idea that political-military relations determine fundamental military changes, 
and the point that political decisions shaped by cultural characteristic drive an RMA forward – 
both are not novel ideas. As it was shown in the previous parts of this chapter, these ideas have 
already been vastly discussed in existent literature. The problem that this chapter tried to solve 
was driven from the fact that existent literature on RMA is generally divided between 
theoreticians, who discussed different concepts of how it happens (such as Andrew 
Krepinevich, Richard Hundley, Steven Metz and James Kievit, etc.), and historians (such as 
Max Boot, Williamson Murray, Clifford Rogers, etc.), who analysed the successful RMAs of 
the past, thus, again, focusing on the process only. While there were scholars, who dealt with 
both theory and history, (e.g., Colin Gray) or analysed the RMA phenomenon through the 
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cultural lens (e.g., Dima Adamsky), they all focused on successful RMAs. Moreover, many 
researchers analysed fundamental military challenges without using the RMA terminology at 
all (e.g., Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff). Of course, not every military change is an RMA, after 
all, RMA is a very narrowly defined change in military affair, and, therefore, any valid analysis 
of military transformation is important. While it seems that nobody tried to analyse an absence 
of RMA, the opposite is true. For example, as it was demonstrated above, the British Army 
failure with the armour warfare before the Second World War was vastly studied. The problem, 
however, that these studies were primary done by historians, who paid little regard to the 
theoretical concepts, or by strategists, who appreciate concepts, but pay little attention to cases 
of failure that do not allow conceptualisation.  This research focuses on RMAs that did not 
occur, and, therefore, it requires a modified conceptualisation that combines what has been 
studied, so far, by history and by strategy. 
 Throughout the parts of this chapter, this combination ultimately has led to the idea that 
an RMA is an outcome of imbalance between political leadership, its military and challenges 
that are defined as ones that have to be met. While the political decision to define a challenge 
is the instrumental trigger of an RMA, the culture that shapes the political environment has an 
indirect but equally important role.  As the case of Early Modern England demonstrated, the 
existence of an unmet challenge in the cultural environment, which does not create required 
political conditions to meet this challenge (i.e., that society is ready to tolerate the 
consequences), will not drive the required RMA forward. Moreover, as the case of the British 
Army and armour warfare displayed, the inability of political leadership to realise the challenge 
and put it in front of its military is primarily rooted not in its inanity, but in the political-cultural 
context of its parent society. Consequently, an RMA occurs when: 
(1) a political leadership, shaped by certain socio-cultural circumstances, defines to its military 
a challenge;  
(2) the military, shaped by its military culture, interprets this challenge as unmet and dealing 
with it requires fundamental change that combines novel, but an already available technology, 
operational concept and organisation;  









Thus, an analysis of the RMA in a “certain affair” that did not occur has to follow the following 
questions: 
(1) Did the political leadership define this “certain affair” as a military challenge? If not, then 
what was the socio-cultural context that influenced the political-military leadership in its 
decision-making process?  
(2) If the challenge was defined, how did the military, shaped by its military culture, interpret 
this challenge? If it was interpreted as a challenge that the military can deal with, then what 
was the military cultural context that influenced the military leadership in its decision-making 
process? 
(3) If the challenge was defined by the military as unmet, did the political leadership support 
its military through the transformation? And if it did not, what was the socio-cultural context 
that prevented the political leadership from supporting it military?  
   
While these three questions seem to be straight forward, it will be wrong to assume that 
any of them will provide a clear-cut answer. Human nature is a too complex phenomenon, let 
alone a combination of culture, politics and military affairs. It seems however, that through 
these questions it would possible to shed light on the reasons behind the absence of an RMA, 
an understanding that might contribute no less than the existent analysis of successful RMAs, 
because, as Richard Hundley put it: “there are probably as many failed RMAs, as 
successful.”104 
                                                          




NON-LETHAL WEAPONS – THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS THAT 
DID NOT OCCUR 
 
Introduction 
The main subject of this research is the Revolution in Military Affairs of Non-Lethal Weapons, 
and as such the purpose of this chapter is threefold. The first part of this chapter provides a 
general background about the idea of non-lethality in general and Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) 
in particular. The analysis of the background is divided into four main topics. First, it discusses 
the perplexity of the definition of NLW, what they are and what they are not. Secondly, it 
provides a historical brief discussing the implementation of NLW since their appearance in the 
beginning of the 20th century. Thirdly, it discusses different technological aspects of NLW and 
their counter-personnel and counter-materiel effects. Finally, it examines the complex, and to 
some degree paradoxical, relations between NLW and modern international law of armed 
conflict. 
 The second part of this chapter reproduces a theoretical depiction of the potential RMA 
of NLW. While the main purpose of this research is to explain the reasons behind the lack of 
the RMA of NLW, this part provides an essential understanding of what this RMA might have 
been or could still be, as a reference for the analysis of its absence. The third part utilises the 
concept of Political-Military System, as presented in Chapter 1 in the specific context of the 
potential RMA of NLW in Russia, Israel and the U.S.  The main purpose of this part is to pave 
the methodological way for the further analysis of the American, Russian and Israeli cases. 
  
Part One: NLW – The Background 
Non-Lethal Weapons – A Perplexing Definition 
Defining “Non-Lethal Weapons” is not a simple task. The very idea of non-lethality 
sounds like an oxymoron, when applied to weapons. Different terms have been suggested to 
avoid this semantic contradiction: “less-lethal”, “less-than-lethal”, “disabling”, “sub-lethal”, 
“soft-kill” and others. While all of these refer to the same family of weapons, none can escape 
criticism.1 This, in fact, is one of the main reasons for the variety of terms that have been used 
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by different institutions in different countries. In the U.S., the two most prevalent terms are 
“Non-Lethal Weapons” and “Less-Lethal Weapons”. While, in Russian military literature, the 
dominant term is oruzh’ie neletal’nogo deistviya (Weapons with Non-Lethal Action);2 the 
Russian Ministry of Interior has decided to avoid any connection with lethality defining devices 
with non-lethal effects employed by the Russian Police and other Ministry of Interior forces, 
adopting the term special’nie sredstva (Special Means).3 In Israel, there are three terms, used 
concurrently: neshek pahot katlani (Less-Lethal Weapons), neshek al-hereg (Non-Kill 
Weapons), and simply emtzaim lepizur hafganot (Riot Control Means).4 
This variety of terms directly projects the perplexities of the attempt to fit together the 
concept of weapons with the idea of non-lethality. Nonetheless, this research adopts the term 
“Non-Lethal Weapons” (NLW),5 as it focuses on the military (and not law enforcement) 
implementation of these weapons, and the professional military literature in all three countries 
of interest titles them in that way. The interesting reason for this similarity is the fact that the 
U.S. Department of Defence (DOD) was the first military to distinguish NLW from other 
armaments, starting to pay more coherent attention to NLW in the early 1990s and igniting the 
intensive discourse about the military implementation of NLW.6 Since then, the DOD’s 
definition states that NLW are weapons “that are explicitly designed and primarily employed 
to incapacitate personnel or materiel immediately, while minimizing fatalities, permanent 
injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property, facilities, materiel, and the 
environment.”7 This definition serves as a starting point in official and professional military 
literature not only in the U.S. and NATO,8 but also in Russia9 and Israel.10 
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This commonly used definition, however, requires several clarifications. First, unlike 
their lethal counterparts that are designed to eliminate the threat through gross physical 
destruction caused by blast, penetration or fragmentation, NLW prevent targets from 
functioning through temporary and reversible incapacitation.11 Secondly, though the term 
“Non-Lethal” suggests that no fatalities can ever occur through an employment of NLW, this 
is not the case. By their definition, NLW are developed with “the intent to minimize the 
probability of producing fatalities, significant or permanent injuries … but do not, and are not 
intended to, eliminate risk of those actions entirely.”12 Similar to lethal weapons that do not 
always fulfil their purpose, and their lethality depends on many factors (the level of the soldiers’ 
professionalism, the state of the target, environmental conditions, etc.); NLW are also victims 
of these factors, and, despite their non-lethal nature, can, under certain circumstances, cause 
permanent damage or even death. Third, NLW do not exclude the probability of damage to 
property and the environment. In fact, there are certain systems that are deliberately designed 
to cause property damage in an attempt to reduce the probability of causing serious injuries or 
fatalities.13 Fourth, unlike lethal weapons that are designed to cause irreversible damage to the 
target, NLW “are intended to have relatively reversible effects on personnel or materiel.”14 
Fifth, while there are many military actions that aim to reduce fatalities during military 
confrontations, such as Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) or Cyber Warfare (except for non-
lethal “electronic attack”);15 NLW are physical weapons, rather than activities, and therefore 
have to be considered accordingly. 
A Brief History of Non-Lethal Weapons  
The definition of NLW, as discussed above, is the fruit of American military thought 
of the early 1990s; however, the history of weapons, defined today as non-lethal, is long and 
complex. Probably the first known application of NLW can be dated over 2,000 years ago, 
when the Chinese forces used ground-pepper to temporary blind their enemies.16 The modern 
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history of NLW can be traced as back as 1912, when the French Police for the first time 
employed hand-grenades that dispersed an irritant chemical agent (ethyl-bromoacetate) to 
subdue “criminals and riotous individuals or groups”.17 During the First World War, similar 
non-lethal irritant agents were the first chemical weapons to be used, before they were 
precipitously replaced by more lethal gases.18 These two examples from the early history of 
NLW already point to the fact that non-lethal technologies and their employment policies have 
two different, but interconnected, story-lines – military and law enforcement.19 While it is 
obvious that these two complement each other to create the most comprehensive history of 
NLW development; the principal focus of this research is military, thus, its main emphasis is 
on the military record of NLW. Moreover, as this research is about the RMA of NLW, its main 
interest is the cases of the military implementation of NLW on the battlefield and during 
military operations, rather than civil disorder and riots, e.g., the British military employment 
of NLW in Northern Ireland20 or Cyprus,21 or the IDF’s usage of NLW in the Western Bank.22 
The history of the military implementation of NLW during military operations23 can be 
generally divided into four main periods: (1) the First World War, (2) the inter-war period and 
the Second World War, (3) the Vietnam War and other military interventions during 1960s and 
1970s, and (4) Post-Cold War conflicts. It is important to clarify that until 1970s, the NLW 
employed by the different militaries were mainly irritant non-lethal chemical agents, that, on 
the one hand, increased the effectiveness of conventional lethal weapons;24 but on the other, 
(due to their non-lethal nature) allowed to bypass legal issues related to the implementation of 
chemical weapons.25 
The first appearance of non-lethal chemical agents on the battlefield was very short. An 
interesting fact is that while the question of which nation initiated Chemical Warfare in the 
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First World War ignited an acrimonious debate among French and German commentators in 
the early 1920s, very little attention was paid to the French employment of tear-gas hand-
grenades. The use of irritant chemical agents on the battlefields of the First World War was 
apparently initiated by a conscripted Parisian policeman who, upon returning from leave, 
brought back to the war front some tear-gas hand-grenades.26 Though the significance of this 
incident is unclear, non-lethal irritants, undoubtedly, were the first chemical agents to attract 
the imagination of military commanders on both sides of the front.  As war progressed, more 
effective ways to deploy gases were invented (e.g., artillery shells) and more lethal agents 
developed. The introduction of chlorine gas27 in the Second (1915), and the later employment 
of mustard gas in the Third (1917), Battles of Ypres were milestones in the rapid military 
adaptation of more lethal chemicals that replaced previous non-lethal irritants.28    
After their short appearance on the battlefields of the First World War, Chemical NLW 
remained in the focus of military research and development as integrated major parts of the 
inter-war chemical and biological warfare (CBW) programmes.29 For example, during the 
1920s the US Army Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) performed more research on CN 
(chloroacetophenone) than any other chemical agent, promoting civilian use of this irritant 
agent as an anti-riot police weapon.30 The broadness of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,31 which 
aimed to limit the usage of chemical weapons as a method of warfare, did not stop either 
development, or employment of chemical weapons, including non-lethal ones. Two such 
examples were: the employment of artillery shells with tear-gas by Spanish governmental 
forces in 1936, during the Spanish Civil War; and the employment of artillery shells, air-bombs 
and toxic candles consisting of CN by the Japanese forces in China in 1937 (although, CN was 
only a part of the vast variety of chemical agents employed by the Japanese, including highly 
lethal hydrogen cyanide, mustard gas and others). 32 Toward, and during, the Second World 
War large arsenals of chemical weapons (including chemical NLW) were produced and 
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stockpiled by both the Allies and the Axis powers. These arsenals, however, remained unused 
for fear of retaliation and the bewildering lack of certainty in their military effectiveness.33   
The period of the 1960s and the 1970s was, probably, the period of the vastest military 
employment of non-lethal chemicals. While CS (2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile) was invented 
and researched in the U.S. during the 1930s and the 1940s, it was the British military, which in 
the mid-1950s concentrated its efforts on developing weapons based on this more effective 
non-lethal agent.34 The incomparable effectiveness of CS over CN was demonstrated by the 
British police as early as 1958-1959, however, both agents remained in the service of the British 
colonial police and military and were employed on, at least, 124 occasions during the short 
period between 1960 and 1965. CS munition became an integral part of the weapon arsenal of 
British troops sent abroad; for example, the British contingent deployed to Anguilla in 1969 
was armed (in addition to conventional weapons) with some 2,000 CS cartridges and 
grenades.35  While the British were the first to employ CS, it was the U.S. military in Vietnam 
that realised the concept of massive employment of this non-lethal agent. Despite the initial 
intention of the U.S. military to use CS only for riot-control, CS based weapons were, almost 
immediately, widely employed in the form of various munitions, including hand-grenades, 
mortar and artillery shells, and even helicopter and aircraft canister dispensers.36 The second 
part of the 1960s was the period with the most massive employment of CS in regular combat 
operations; between 1964 and 1969 the U.S. forces employed almost 7,000 tons of different 
forms of CS.37 It is important to note that while the initial explanation of American officials 
for the use of chemical non-lethal agents was the humanitarian nature of these weapons and 
their ability to separate harmlessly between combatants and non-combatants,38 CS based 
weapons, very quickly, became the normative choice of the available weapons and were 
frequently used to make other fires more lethal.39  
Due to the wide-spread criticism of the American employment of CS in Vietnam and 
uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of CS against troops equipped with gasmasks,40 the 
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1980s were a period of relative stagnation regarding NLW in the military.41 Despite the fact 
that most NLW available to law enforcement at this time were the result of military-funded 
research, “[NLW] were given no real priority in context of Cold War military planning.”42 With 
the end of the Cold War there were two main factors that reshaped the attitude toward NLW. 
The first was the re-evaluation of new political-military environment and the emerging 
understanding of top level Washington decision-makers regarding the enormous potential of 
NLW in future military conflicts.43 The second was a bottom-up process formulated within the 
growing demand for NLW from U.S. operational commanders. The culminating point of this 
demand in the early 1990s was the operation “United Shield”, the U.S. assistance to the 
withdrawing UN peacekeepers from Somalia, when the I Marine Expeditionary Force, due to 
specific requirement “to pursue less-lethal alternatives in dealing with unarmed hostile 
elements,” became a test-bed for military employment of new technologies designed “to fill 
the gap between verbal warning and deadly force.” 44 
These two vectors drove the DOD to start paying more attention to NLW. The process 
of the institutionalisation of NLW in the DOD started in 1990 when Richard Cheney, then the 
U.S. Secretary of Defence, became interested in the subject and, in March 1991, commissioned 
the Nonlethal Strategy Group (NSG) to examine it.45 Based on the NSG report, the process was 
led by a Non-Lethal Weapons Steering Committee (NLWSC) established in 1994 and the 
Council on Foreign Relation; the process was finalized in 1996 with the establishment of the 
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program (JNLWP).46  
While it is obvious that this new policy toward NLW, led by the U.S., was almost 
immediately adopted by NATO;47 more interestingly, the military institutions of other 
countries started to developed their own policies echoing the Post-Cold War political military 
environment dominated by low intensity asymmetric conflicts involving civilian population 
and growing international concern regarding harming innocent civilians. The best example of 
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this is the Russian’s “Conception of the Development and Employment of NLW”, approved 
by the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation in 2005.48 
The rapid rise of interest toward NLW in the yearly 1990s ignited an entirely new 
military, as well as academic, discourse, an outcome of which different centres of knowledge 
and research were established, such as the Institute for Non-Lethal Defence Technologies 
(INLDF) at the University of Pennsylvania,49 the Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research 
Project (BNLWRP) at the University of Bradford,50  and the European Working Group Non-
Lethal Weapons (EWG-NLW).51 There is little doubt that in the last 20 years NLW have been 
at the centre of a vast professional and academic debate, concerning their potential contribution 
to military success on the 21st century battlefield. It seems, however, that except for this debate, 
very little has been done within the military forces themselves. From the technological point 
of view, it is notable that “[NLW] that have been recently adopted by the military are primarily 
commercial off-the-shelf technologies, rather than the product of military sponsored research 
and development.”52 Moreover, the spectrum of NLW that are currently employed “does not 
differ greatly from similar compilations 30 years previously.”53 
From the implementation point of view, the “operational use of available NLW by the 
military has been limited.”54 For example, the employment of NLW by the U.S. forces in Iraq 
was mostly in two very limited areas: compliance tools for controlling prisoners and the 
stopping of vehicles at check-points.55 The reports on, and the analyses of, two other military 
operations – the Russian forces in the Russia-Georgia War (2008) and the Israeli forces in the 
Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009) – that were greatly criticised for the disproportional use of 
force and harming enemy civilian population, mention nothing of NLW. Not only that NLW 
had not been used, but there were not even plans to use them.56 In 2004, an Independent Task 
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Force sponsored by the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations stated that “currently, both military 
and civil leadership remain insufficiently familiar with the capabilities and limitations of 
NLW.”57 It seems that ten years later on this situation has not been changed. 
Non-Lethal Weapons – A Technological Brief  
As it was mentioned in the introduction, this research does not accept the idea of 
technological determinism. However, organised around NLW, it has to provide a basic 
technological background of these types of weapons and their capabilities. As the main purpose 
of NLW is the temporary and reversible incapacitation or neutralisation of the target, the main 
focus in the development of NLW is the Non-Lethal Effects (NLE) that these weapons cause 
to the target. The following discussion focuses on seven main types, or “families”, of NLW 
according to their NLE: kinetic, chemical, biological, electrical, optical, acoustic, and directed 
energy. Another important division of NLW is the nature of the target and it includes two main 
categories: counter-personnel – NLW that affect people, and counter-materiel – NLW that 
affect machines of war and related to them equipment. In other words, each family of NLW 
can be divided to two: counter-personnel NLW and counter-materiel NLW (e.g. chemical 
counter-personnel NLW and chemical counter-materiel NLW). 
Kinetic NLW 
“Kinetic”, “Low-Kinetic Impact”, “Blunt Impact” or “Traumatic” – all these terms 
describe a family of impact projectiles that are intended to “induce pain, irritation and minimal 
injury to the subject without causing any life-threatening injuries.”58 First introduced in 1960s 
in the form of baton rounds made of teak wood, Kinetic NLW experienced significant and rapid 
development creating vast variety in calibres (from 5.56 mm and 12ga to 40mm and above) 
and impact power (from 30 Joules to 100 Joules and even more); projectiles’ material (plastic, 
rubber, foam, beans bags and others) and shape (batons, rounds and bullets); and the methods 
to shoot them (from the direct use of lethal platforms such as rifles, shotguns and grenade 
launcher, through different attachments and adaptations to these lethal platforms, to the 
specially designed non-lethal rifles, pistols and launchers).59 
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The NLE of Kinetic NLW are directly related to the blunt trauma created by an 
immediate impact of the projectile. While this family of NLW designed to merely cause 
superficial hurt rather than penetrate, causing more serious injury or even death, there are no 
assured guaranties, as the non-lethality (or lethality) of the Kinetic NLW depends on many 
different variables. For example, striking an especially vulnerable person (young, old or sick), 
or in a very sensitive or defenceless body part (eye, head or neck) can cause permanent damage 
or even death. Another very influential variable is the difference between the effective distance 
of the projectile and the actual distance to the target (each Kinetic NLW has very specifically 
defined effective range, i.e., when the impact occurs at a shorter distance it might be lethal, and 
when it occurs at a longer distance it is not effective).60  This operational disadvantage, 
however, does not stop Kinetic NLW to be widely employed, as a way to overcome this 
disadvantage has been found in suitable training and appropriate rules of engagement. 
The second part of the Kinetic NLW include the various counter-materiel technologies, 
which consists of different stopping devices (explicitly designed barriers, nets, etc.) that are 
intended to stop the vehicles and vessels containing kinetic power and, in this way, minimizing 
damage to their operators.61 
Chemical and Biological NLW 
Chemical, Biological and Biochemical NLW are different non-lethal agents commonly 
dispersed in form of gases, smokes, aerosols, powders and liquids that cause lacrimation, 
irritation and inflammation or other types of temporary incapacitation.62 While the most known 
agents are Chloroacetophenone (CN), 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile (CS) and Oleoresin-
Capsicum (OC);63 there are many other malodorants, calmatives and other chemical or 
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biological based substances, such as Skunk, a liquid that creates a terrible odor of rot and 
sewage on whatever it touches.64 
 The spectrum of the possible delivery methods of Chemical and Biological NLW is 
vast. It can be generally divided into two main groups. The first is special methods, designed 
explicitly as NLW, these include: water cannons, aerosol sprays, canisters and dispensers, a 
variety of non-lethal munitions and projectiles that consist of non-lethal chemical agents (hand 
grenades, pepper-balls, pneumatic and pyrotechnic explicitly designed pistols and rifles). The 
second group is non-lethal munition that consist of non-lethal chemical agents fired from 
conventional lethal weapon system (rifles, shotguns, grenade launchers, mortars, artillery guns 
and even tanks, helicopters and jets).65 The NLE of Chemical and Biological NLW are directly 
related to the spectrum of symptoms that these non-lethal agents cause. On the one hand, the 
more common CS, CN and OC cause direct irritation to eyes, skin and mucous membranes, 
creating burning and tearing of the eyes, flushing, tingling and intense burning sensation of the 
skin, and the feeling of burning in the mouth, increased salivation, gagging, nausea and 
vomiting.66 On the other hand, there are other calmatives that cause completely different 
symptoms varying from unconsciousness to hallucinations.67 
As most of Chemical and Biological NLW are delivered by kinetic methods (i.e. bullets, 
rounds, grenades) their NLE might be complemented by blunt trauma (for example FN-303).68 
Most of Chemical and Biological NLW, however, are not designed for a kinetic impact with 
the target, but only for delivering the agent into the area. In the case of direct hitting, these 
munitions suffer from the same disadvantages as Kinetic NLW. Together with these counter-
personnel Chemical and Biological NLW, there is a large group of counter-materiel agents that 
are intended to disable vehicles and prevent effective infrastructure functioning. These NLW 
include combustion modifiers, fuel and lubricant contaminants, and other substances that 
disable engines and vehicles. Against infrastructure might be used corrosives, abrasives and 
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depolymerisation agents.69 Despite the fact that theoretical literature considers these agents as 
NLW, most of them barely answer the criteria of the reversibility requested of NLW and, in 
many cases, they might even be lethal to personnel. Consequently, despite the vast research 
programs in this field,70 there is no official employment of such counter-materiel chemical or 
biological agents in any modern military or law enforcement agencies. 
Electrical NLW 
Unlike many others, Electrical NLW do not originate from the military or law 
enforcement, but rather from farming and torture. The first stunning device was the “picana 
electrica”, the electrical version of the barbed cattle prod, introduced in Argentina in the 1930s 
and rapidly adopted by local police as a torture device during interrogations.71 Since then the 
family of Electric NLW significantly expanded including different types of electro-shocking 
devices, stun batons and stun guns.72 
The NLE of Electrical NLW depend on implemented technology and can be generally 
divided into two groups: neuromuscular incapacitation and muscular pain. The first group 
includes different stun guns that fire harmless projectiles that deliver electrical charge by means 
of very thin wires that temporary immobilise the target, as “the affected person normally falls 
to the ground due to inability to operate his or her legs.”73 The second group includes different 
“touch stun” devices (i.e., batons) with effects ranging from significant painful muscular 
sensations up to unconsciousness, but have no neuromuscular paralysing effects. Despite this 
general division, there are certain stun guns that project electrical charge with wires (as the first 
group), but create only muscular effect similar to “touch stun”.74 
The counter-materiel counterparts of these Electrical NLW are different electrical 
devices for the temporary and reversible disabling of vehicles by targeting their electrical 
circuits and components (e.g., the Pre-emplaced Electric Vehicle Stopper that stops and 
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disables vehicles by providing an electrical pulse through deployed contacts that shuts down 
power train electrical circuits and components).75 
Optical and Acoustic NLW 
While Acoustic NLW produce a direct beam of powerful acoustic energy,76 and Optical 
NLW create a light powerful enough to dazzle or temporary blind the target;77 the NLE of both 
of these families are similar – disorientation and temporary incapacitation of the target. The 
Acoustic NLW aim to employ powerful audio beams to create effects ranging from significant 
discomfort and nausea to a tickling in the mouth and a disturbance of physical equilibrium, 
without causing permanent damage to the hearing mechanism.78 Despite significant research 
efforts from the early 1960s to the late 1990s, the technological difficulties of producing an 
effective, but also non-lethal, Acoustic NLW led the researchers to generally dismiss this 
concept.79  Only two non-lethal Acoustic technologies have been developed. The first one is 
the Acoustic Hailing Devices (AHD),80 which, in fact, are not NLW, but devices that “provide 
scalable, directional warning tones or intelligible voice commands beyond 500 meters.”81 The 
second type of Acoustic technology is a range of underwater acoustic guns. Interestingly, as 
acoustic beams behave differently underwater than in the air; it seems more feasible to 
implement this technology in a non-lethal way. These systems, however, are still under 
development.82 
Optical NLW aim to produce a powerful light that targets the eyes, creating their 
reflexive closure and saturating the vision cells that lead to a temporary loss of vision.83 Despite 
significant improvement in optical technologies during the last decades, Optical NLW proved 
as inefficient, especially after the appearance of directed energy technologies. 
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While Acoustic and Optical NLW have struggled to find their ways as stand-alone 
technologies, their combination, in one NLW, proved as very effective. Different “flash-bang” 
devices that combine a very powerful beam of light (a flash) and a painful, but short, sound 
pressure (a bang) have been in use for more than 30 years.84 The most common devices are 
hand grenades; there are, however, also other different types of air-burst munitions, intended 
to produce these effects above the target.85 
Directed Energy NLW 
 While Directed Energy is a general term that covers different types of technologies, 
which create “a beam of concentrated electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic 
particles;”86 the Directed Energy weapon is  “a weapon or system that uses directed energy to 
incapacitate, damage, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, and/or personnel.”87 In general, 
the technology of Directed Energy weapons embraces two main areas: lasers (laser is an 
acronym for Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation) and devices that 
produce radio frequency, microwave, or millimetre wave beams.88  While the major military 
interest in Directed Energy weapons was in their potential as lethal weapons, different 
technological developments in the field have found their way to NLW. 
 The NLE of Directed Energy NLW, based on laser technology (so called “dazzling” 
lasers), are “temporary blindness (flash-blindness) or visual disturbance without permanent 
adverse effects on the eyes.”89 In the early 1990s, when first “dazzling” laser were introduced, 
the immature technologies struggled to find the right equation between the type and the power 
of the devices and the safety concerns about possible permanent damage. The fruit of this 
labour is the fact that from the mid-2000s different types of “dazzling” lasers have been 
successfully employed in different countries.90   
 Today, Directed Energy NLW, based on laser technology, are solely counter-
personnel.91 The research and development process, however, has not stopped; and there are 
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several very promising developments in this field (e.g. “The Pulse Energy Projectile”, 
“Wireless Electrical Weapons” and “Thermal Lasers”) that might expand the future arsenal of 
counter-personnel, as well as counter-materiel, NLW. Though, these programs receive their 
funding mainly because of their potential as lethal weapons, there is still time for their non-
lethal implications to be studied.92 
The development of Directed Energy weapons that produce radio frequency, 
microwave, or millimetre wave beams also started as extremely classified military programs in 
the second part of the 20th century. Only at the late 1980s and early 1990s the concepts of 
possible non-lethal implementation had emerged.93  While today this technology is “perhaps 
the most intriguing new nonlethal weapons technology,”94 and there are already different 
concepts and prototypes; the U.S. remains the only country that has ongoing (or, at least, 
unclassified) research programmes in this field. 
 The counter-personnel Non-Lethal system that is based on this technology is the Active 
Denial System (ADS) that produce an invisible and inaudible millimetre wave energy beam 
that causes targets to feel “as if they are being intensely burned.”95 The NLE of the ADS are 
based on beams that have a frequency of 95 gigahertz (GHz) that instantly heat the skin of the 
target at a depth of 0.3-0.4 millimetre to the temperature of 45-55 degrees Celsius. Permanent 
damage and burns that might be caused by these beams are prevented by very limited duration 
of exposure.96 Although the ADS has already been proved as safe in more than 11,000 tests 
and demonstrations on more than 700 humans, it has never been employed as “the newness of 
the technology, coupled with concerns over its mischaracterisation as a “microwave” weapon 
that “fries,” ”cook,” or sterilize its targets, resulted in a lack of willingness to employ it.”97 
 The counter-materiel NLW that produce radio frequency, microwave, or millimetre 
wave beams are the Multi-Frequency Radio-Frequency Vehicle Stopper (MFRFVS) and the 
Radio Frequency Vessel Stopper (RFVS) that produce high power microwaves to disrupt the 
vehicle's or vessel’s electrical components and cause their engines to stall.98 These two systems 
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are currently under development and there is no indication as to when they will be ready to be 
employed.  
 Another possible technology for counter-materiel Directed Energy NLW is 
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) – “the electromagnetic radiation from a strong electronic pulse, 
most commonly caused by a nuclear explosion that may couple with electrical or electronic 
systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges.”99 The potential of EMP to damage 
and destroy electrical equipment has attracted the military from the first time it was observed 
in high-altitude airburst nuclear tests. Since then, extensive work has been done in different 
countries on nonnuclear EMP,100 however, to this day much of this work is classified and there 
is no evidence of emerging NLW based on EMP. 
Other Non-Lethal Technologies 
While these seven families embrace the most prevalent modern NLW, there are certain 
devices, systems and technologies that are not covered by this umbrella. The first group of such 
NLW includes technologies and concepts that had been developed and even employed in the 
past, but proved to be inefficient. The best examples of these are different net-guns that were 
intended to capture and restrain individuals by deploying a net, and different foam-based 
weapons that were intended to create barriers by instantly employed very sticky foam.101 Even 
though some of these systems had actually been employed on several occasions; they proved 
themselves as tactically impractical.102 
The second group of NLW that are not included in this brief consists of different 
features or activities that despite their non-lethal nature, are not physical perceptible weapons. 
While some researchers include these features and activities within their discussion of NLW 
due to cultural, legal or linguistic differences in the definition of NLW, others suffer from a 
lack of conceptualisation. An example for the first type is the fact that the term special’nie 
sredstva (“special means” – the equivalent of NLW used by the Russian Ministry of Interior) 
does not comprise the word “weapons”, which allows it to include, for example, specially 
trained police dogs.103  An example for the second type is the misleading attempt to place 
Information Warfare under the definition of NLW.104 
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The last group includes a very limited list of very different, mainly counter-materiel, 
niches of NLW that due to their unique and original nature cannot be referred to any of the 
families listed above. The best example of this type of NLW is cluster bombs (in which each 
bomblet is stuffed with 147 tiny spools of glass-like and highly conductive aluminum fibers) 
designed to cause reversible damage to electricity lines and transformation stations taking them 
out of service for many hours or even days.105  
NLW and International Law 
 While the idea that armed hostilities can be regulated by rules and laws is a part of 
“almost all societies, without geographical limitations,”106 the history of the current, applicable, 
Laws of War starts from the mid-nineteenth century when unilateral codes and bilateral 
agreement107 started their transformation into open-ended multilateral treaties (i.e., open to 
later accession by other states).108 The modern law of armed conflict (LoAC) is based on four 
cardinal principals: arms control regulations on specific weapons, discrimination, military 
necessity, and proportionality.109 While the first principle deals with the prohibitions or 
restrictions on the development, production, stockpiling, transfer or use of certain military 
technologies and weapons (Arms Control Regimes); the next three focus on the regulations and 
restrictions on the employment of permitted weapons (International Humanitarian Law). 
As NLW are weapons by definition, they have to be subject to the full corpus of LoAC 
and answer to all its principals. Consequently, it is not surprising that any comprehensive 
analysis of NLW includes their legal implications.110 Moreover, the relations between the 
concept of “non-lethality” and LoAC have inspired a vast debate in the field of International 
Law.111 Today, there are 19 different international treaties, laws, protocols and regulations that 
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concern NLW112 and the following discussion is divided into three main parts: NLW and 
International Arms Control Regimes; NLW and International Humanitarian Law; and – The 
impact of LoAC on the employment NLW.  
NLW and International Arms Control Regimes 
The seven main families of NLW can be regrouped into three main categories according 
to International Arms Control Regimes: chemical, biological and conventional.113 
Chemical NLW and International Arms Control Regimes 
While the 1925 Geneva Protocol generally prohibited the use of “asphyxiating, 
poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquid materials or devices,”114 the  more 
contemporary and detailed  1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) prohibits developing, 
producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining, transferring, or using chemical weapons.115 It 
defines chemical weapons as “toxic chemicals and their precursors … which through [their] 
chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm 
to humans or animals.”116 Consequently, the counter-personnel chemical NLW, designed to 
incapacitate enemy troops, fall under this treaty. It is important to note that counter-materiel 
chemical NLW are not directly restricted by CWC, as long as their employment does not affect 
humans or animals (or the environment, as covered by International Environmental Laws),117 
and, hence, these types of chemical weapons are not forbidden.118 
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The CWC also differentiates Riot Control Agents (RCA) from other chemical weapons. 
It defines RCA as “any chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans 
sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following 
termination of exposure,”119 and it permits their use for “law enforcement including domestic 
riot control purposes,”120 but prohibits them “as a method of warfare.”121 Thus, it seems that 
while chemical counter-personnel NLW are permitted for law enforcement purposes, they are 
banned from the battlefield. 
Interestingly, the CWC contains no definition for “methods of warfare” and while it 
undeniably bans counter-personnel NLW during inter-state conflicts, the legitimacy of their 
employment during Military Operations other Than War (MOOTW) – peacekeeping operation, 
counter-terror operations, hostage rescue operations, etc. – is debatable. For example, the 
position of both the U.S and Russia is that during MOOTW the use of RCA, and therefore 
counter-personnel chemical NLW, is unaffected by the CWC.122 
Biological NLW and International Arms Control Regimes 
While the same 1925 Geneva Protocol generally prohibited “bacteriological methods 
of warfare,”123 the contemporary 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) 
bans developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring, retaining or using biological weapons – 
“microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, 
of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes.”124  
Unlike CWC, BTWC does not distinguish between different groups of biological 
weapons and its ban is absolute. Consequently, despite the promising potential of biological 
NLW described above, International Law unconditionally prohibits their development and 
employment in any circumstances. 
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Conventional NLW and International Arms Control Regimes 
In an addition to CWC and BTWC, both of which restrict or ban the Chemical and 
Biological weapons, LoAC include the 1980 UN Conventional Weapons Convention125 with 
its four Protocols. Protocol I that prohibits the use of “any weapon the primary effect of which 
is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays.”126 Protocol II 
that prohibits use of land mines, body-traps and other devices that are designed “to kill, injure 
or damage and which are actuated by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time”127 
(This field is also regulated by the 1997 Land Mine Convention, which bans anti-personnel 
mines designed “to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will 
incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons”).128 Protocol III that prohibits making civilian 
population the object of attack by incendiary weapons (“any weapon or munition which is 
primary designed to set fire to object or to cause burn injury to persons”).129 And Protocol IV 
that bans the employment of “laser weapons specifically designed … to cause permanent 
blindness.”130 
 These international legal regulations, written to regulate, restrict or prohibit certain 
military technologies, concern the development and employment of NLW in various ways. For 
example, Protocol I has to be considered in the development of different kinetic counter-
personnel NLW (this is one of the reasons for the metal core of many rubber, plastic and other 
bullets and rounds); and Protocol IV had vast influence on the development of “dazzling” 
lasers.131  
 While these treaties refer only to very specific military technologies (including non-
lethal ones), all others remain generally permitted for use. For example, there are no 
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prohibitions on Electrical, Acoustic, Optical, and Electromagnetic NLW.132 The employment, 
however, of all these permitted or regulated NLW (exactly as their lethal counterparts), has to 
be done in accordance with International Humanitarian Law. 
NLW and Humanitarian Law 
 In addition to Arms Control Regimes, as mentioned above, there are three additional 
principles of LoAC: discrimination, military necessity, and proportionality. These principles 
regulate the ways in which military force can be employed and are defined by different 
international treaties, conventions and protocols.133 These documents, however, do not 
distinguish between different types of weapons, but set concrete principles, by which any 
weapon can be employed. Consequently, NLW are subject to these international laws, just as 
any other lethal weapon or military device or platform.    
 Although there is no international law that directly uses the terms “proportionality”, 
and “indiscriminate harm of civilians,” the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Convention is considered as the main reference to the legal debate in this area.134 The protocol 
states that: 
those who plan or decide upon an attack shall … take all feasible precautions in the 
choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and … minimizing, 
incidental loss of civil life … [and] refrain from deciding to launch any attack 
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life … which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete … military advantage anticipated.135  
While this statement can be interpreted in different ways,136 it is clear that it argues against the 
unnecessary harming of civilians caused by indiscriminate military activity or disproportional 
use of force even in the case when there is a legitimate military necessity. In other words, 
anything beyond the minimum required force directed exclusively toward military objectives 
in a way that best minimises possible damage to civilians, will be unnecessary, disproportional 
or indiscriminate, or all of the above. 
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In fact, NLW seem to have no contradictions with these International Humanitarian 
Law principles, as they offer a solution placed somewhere “between bullhorns and bullets.”137 
By their definition and essence, NLW are designed as weapons that minimise “fatalities, 
permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property, facilities, materiel, and the 
environment.”138 And, while there are understandable legal problems with the indiscriminative 
characteristics of chemical NLW139 (usage of which is anyway regulated by CWC); all other 
legitimate families of NLW seem to offer the required solutions to the demands of 
Humanitarian Law for selective and proportional attacks directed toward legitimate targets, 
according to legitimate military necessity. 
The impact of LoAC on the employment NLW 
 While it seems that NLW are “new weapons [that] coming in scope with the law of 
war,”140 in fact, some of them have become the victims of this law. Indeed, “it is more human 
to incapacitate enemy than kill him,”141 however a legitimate enemy can be legitimately 
killed.142 The main purpose of NLW is not to prevent the legitimate killing of a legitimate 
enemy (although they are able to); their main purpose is to offer a flexibility of action in 
situations where lethal alternatives are less suitable for legal, military, economic or political 
reasons. On the one hand, NLW are designed to minimise civilian casualties and property 
losses, especially in combat situations, where it is difficult to distinguish between combatants 
and non-combatants (e.g., urban warfare),143 or in MOOTW, where the objectives contradict 
the harming people that the military was sent to protect.144  On the other hand, minimising 
collateral damage, NLW “deliberately target civilian non-combatants”145 and, thus, are 
automatically exposed to LoAC criticism.  
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 The legal paradox of NLW was best formulated by former U.S. Secretary of Defence 
Donald Rumsfeld, who complained to the House Armed Service Committee that “in many 
instances our forces are allowed to shoot somebody and kill them, but they’re not allowed to 
use a non-lethal riot control agent.”146 Although his argument regards non-lethal Riot Control 
Agents, the military employment of which is banned by CWC, it emphasises the main legal 
problem of NLW: from the legal perspective it is sometimes simpler to wait for a situation that 
will allow the use of lethal force and legitimately kill combatants, as well as a number of non-
combatants, then to employ NLW from the onset and accidentally injure or kill a single non-
combatant. There are many explanations for this awkward and paradox relations between 
LoAC and NLW,147 and there are certain scholars in this field who advocate radical changes in 
the existing system concerning NLW.148 Until, these changes will occur, however, the 
development and employment of NLW have to comply with the existing laws, or find a way to 
bypass them by the implementation of new technologies that are not regulated (e.g., 
electromagnetic), or by fully utilizing gaps in the current legislation (e.g., the fact that CWC 
has no definition for “methods of warfare” and, de facto, legitimises149 the usage of chemical 
counter-personnel NLW during MOOTW). In other words, the development of NLW have to 
concentrate on the range of technologies that are not prohibeted by International Arms Control 
Regimes, such as Kinetic, Electrical, Acoustic, Optical and Electromagnetic, as well as 
Chemical (during MOOTW only). As it will be discussed during the examination of the 
American, Russian and Israeli cases, defence industries of these countries already introduced 
enhanced NLW (e.g., tank shells, aerial bomb, artillery shells, etc.) that answer the 
requirements of International Law, and the fact that these NLW are not employed is not LoAC 
to blame. 
 
Part Two: The Revolution in Military Affairs of NLW (that did not occur) 
While the main purpose of this research is to explain the reasons behind the absence of 
the RMA of NLW, it is essential to understand what this RMA could or should be.  In other 
words, it is important to create a general picture of the potential RMA of NLW as a reference 
for the analysis of its absence. This theoretical manipulation, however, might attract extensive 
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criticism, as it attempts to portray phenomenon that did not occur. To avoid this criticism, the 
construction of this hypothetical RMA of NLW has to be based on three main pillars: the 
existing knowledge about the RMA process;150 extensive literature, written mainly in the late 
1990s, that explicitly predicted the RMA of NLW and its characteristics;151 and other, mainly 
official, documents that define a possible future military employment of NLW. Although these 
three allow creating a more or less detailed portrait of the RMA of NLW, it is important to 
keep it in very general lines to avoid the discussion, unnecessarily and unproductively, sliding 
into fiction. 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, RMA phenomenon consists of changes in three dimensions 
– military technology, military organisation, and the concept of operations. Each of these 
dimensions is “a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition”152 for an RMA, because only 
changes in all three have a potential to revolutionise military affairs. Thus, the portraying of 
the theoretical RMA of NLW has to concentrate on these three dimensions. 
The Concepts of Operations (CONOP) 
 CONOP is a general, but clear and concise, statement that expresses what the military 
intends to accomplish and how it will be done.153 From the historical analysis of past RMAs it 
seems right to argue that the development of a new CONOP, and not the military technology 
in itself, is the first main step toward the RMA’s implementation. For example, as it was 
discussed in the previous chapter, the tank initially appeared during the First World War, 
however, it was the theory of the armoured warfare that propelled the tank towards the RMA.       
 While the theoretical and conceptual debate within the U.S. military circles started in 
the early 1990s,154 the first official military document that attempted to define the CONOP of 
NLW was, probably, the U.S. Army’s “Concept for Nonlethal Capabilities in Army 
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Operations”, published in 1996. 155 The main force behind this quest, for new non-lethal 
technologies and the concepts of their employment, was the emerging understanding that Post-
Cold War security environment would demand military solutions that lie between diplomacy 
and force156 “where the destructiveness of conventional weaponry is too much and diplomacy 
is not enough.”157 In other words, due to the changes in global security and the political system 
the military “must be capable of attaining its objectives and be politically usable”, and therefore 
“armed forces equipped with both lethal and nonlethal weapons [have] greater political utility 
than those which only have lethal means”.158 
 Defining the CONOP of NLW, the literature of the 1990s and early 2000s explicitly 
emphasised that NLW are equally applicable in MOOTW and Major Theatre Wars, and they 
are capable in fulfilling a spectrum of missions, minimising civilian casualties and collateral 
damage. This early literature clearly stated that while the military would intend to accomplish 
its mission avoiding any unnecessary damage (minimising unacceptable political costs and 
pressures), NLW would offer a solution that is operationally attractive, legally defensible, 
ethically and morally favourable, technically feasible, and economically affordable.159 
Organisation 
 An analysis of past RMA suggests two possible ways in which militaries fundamentally 
change their organisations.  The first is the way of “reorganisation”, a process that reshapes the 
existing forces building their capabilities according to the new CONOP.  For example, the 
RMA of Fortification, discussed in the previous chapter, did not demand a creation of entirely 
new type of forces, but reorganisation of the existing infantry, artillery, cavalry, etc., according 
to the new military realities created by the comeback of the siege operations. The second way 
emphasises the establishment of a new type of forces that, according to the new CONOP, are 
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intended to fight on their own, fulfilling specific missions on the main battlefield, or fighting 
within an independent dimension. The best examples are the establishment of the Panzer 
Division, in the process of the RMA of armour warfare,160 the establishment of Nuclear 
Strategic Forces in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., as an outcome of the Nuclear RMA;161 and the 
very recent establishment of new special cyber units in the U.S., as a part of the American 
Cyber Warfare RMA.162 
 Consequently, these two ways suggest two different possible changes in the 
organisation of the military that implements the RMA of NLW: (1) the reorganisation of the 
existing forces that integrate non-lethal capacities, and (2) the establishment of a new branch 
of non-lethal forces. While it is obvious that the new military organisation depends very much 
on the nature of military technology, the new CONOP plays a significantly greater role, as it 
defines how this technology is going to be employed. Consequently, the answer to the required 
change in military organisation lies in the CONOP of NLW. 
 Early architects of the CONOP of NLW formulated two main characteristics that 
suggest the way in which military forces, that intend to employ NLW successfully, should be 
organised. The first is the fact that “nonlethal capabilities do not replace or diminish the role 
of lethal capabilities for the force … [they] simply provide the commander additional options 
for applying military force”.163 The second is the expectation from NLW to be employed by 
military forces simultaneously with their lethal counterparts, especially in such tactically 
challenging scenarios as Urban Warfare in Major Theatre Wars.164  
 Consequently, it seems right to assume that the new military organisation demanded by 
the RMA of NLW is not the establishment of independent Non-Lethal Forces, but an 
integration of non-lethal capabilities within existing conventional forces. After the 
implementation of the RMA of NLW, military units should be able to accomplish their stated 
or directed objectives exploiting the minimum required, but  maximum necessary, force from 
the whole available arsenal of capabilities (from non-lethal to lethal). 
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As discussed, the technology that lied at the core of any RMA, usually was around for 
many years, and it was a new CONOP that ignited the process of changes. The analysis of past 
RMAs shows that with the implementation of a new CONOP and a new organisational 
structure, the technology also experienced significant transformation, adopting and improving 
according to the challenges created by the conceptual and the organisational changes. This 
process of technological change is understandable, as the specific characteristic of the new 
CONOP and the organisational challenges direct the R&D efforts of the existing technology. 
 The previous discussion on the non-lethal technologies focused not on the specific 
existing weapons system employed (or not) by the military but rather on the technological 
nature of NLW and their capabilities. It is interesting, however, how the presented CONOP of 
NLW and the integrated organisation (that suits that CONOP) could influence these 
technologies. The best vision of these new generation NLW is, in fact, provided by the 2008 
U.S. Army TRADOC Pamphlet “Force Operating Capabilities”: “[the military] must be 
provided with organic nonlethal capabilities … with multifunctional/multirole lethality options 
in integrated multipurpose system configurations.”165 In other words, the implementation of 
the RMA of NLW will demand integrated weapons and weapon systems that are capable of 
creating inbuilt lethal as well as non-lethal effects. While the potential integration of non-lethal 
capabilities within existing fire supports conventional platforms, such as aircrafts,166 artillery167 
and precision-guided munitions,168 has been vastly debated during the last decade; the RMA 
of NLW demand more comprehensive integration of non-lethal capabilities, even within the 
weapon systems and firearms used by combatants on the ground (i.e., assault rifles).169 
 
                                                          
165 Department of the Army Headquarters, United States Army, Force Operating Capabilities: TRADOC 
Pamphlet 525-66, Fort Monroe, 7 March 2008, p. 88. 
166 Justin Bobb, Non-Lethal Weaponry: Applications to AC-130 Gunships, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 
Air University, 2002). 
167 Frank Siltman, John Frisbie, ‘Fire Support Just Got Harder: Adding Nonlethal Fires as a Core Competency’, 
Fires Bulletin, No. 6, July-September 2008, pp. 6-8. 
168 Joseph Siniscalchi, Non-Lethal Technologies: Implications for Military Strategy, p. 10. 
169 The combination of simultaneously available non-lethal and lethal capabilities in assault rifles is not only 
technologically feasible, but has been already demonstrated by defence industries and even employed by the 
U.S. Military. The two best examples are: (1) The M26 Modular Accessory Shotgun System (MASS) – under-
barrel shotgun attachment for the M16/M4 assault rifles that offers simultaneous capability of the non-lethal 
12ga munitions and 5.56 mm lethal one (see Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Annual Report 2012: Non-
Lethal Weapons for Complex Environments, 2012, p.9); (2) The FN 303 Mount – under-barrel compressed-air 
powered launcher attachment for the M16/M4 assault rifles that offers capability of the non-lethal 0.68 calibre, 
8.5 gram, fin-stabilised, non-lethal projectiles  and the simultaneous lethal capability of the 5.56 mm service 
rifle (see Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Non-Lethal Weapons(NLW): Reference Book, pp. 13-14). 
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Part Three: The Absence of RMA of NLW: The Framework for the Analysis 
 While technological determinism would immediately suggest that it is the immature 
technology of NLW that holds the RMA back, this argument can be easily fended off for two 
reasons. First, the process of taking a military technology and making it a revolutionary one is 
not a matter of science alone and it involves a wide range of factors. As it was shown in the 
previous chapter, the tank technology of the 1920s was also immature for the RMA of 
Armoured Warfare, and it was a combination of the German military culture, German national-
cultural context and Adolf Hitler who “recognised the potential of tank warfare more rapidly 
than some other national leaders of the day”170 and pressed its military and industry to raise the 
tank into its adulthood. The second reason is that, as it will be shown in the following chapters, 
military industries have already demonstrated several developments that can answer the 
CONOP and organisation of the RMA of NLW – the fact that this weaponry is not employed 
has not technology to blame. Therefore, the technological immaturity of NLW seems to be a 
consequential factor and it appears that there is something much more fundamental that has led 
to the failure of the RMA of NLW.  
 While the conceptual framework developed in the previous chapter suggests three main 
questions that should be asked during the analysis of a failed RMA in a “certain affair,” it is 
important to understand first the nature and character of this “certain affair.” In other words, it 
is important to define the character of the challenge that the political leadership put (or did not) 
in front of its military. For example, in the case of the discussed RMA of Fortification the 
challenge was the enemy’s siege artillery, and in the case of the RMA of Armoured Warfare 
the challenge was the increased role of firepower that had created a defensive stalemate 
occurred during the First World War. Consequently, the first step in the analysis of the RMA 
of NLW has to be the definition of the challenge that this RMA supposedly is intended to 
overcome. According to the definition of NLW, these weapons are intended to minimise 
civilian casualties, therefore the challenge that these weapons are intended to deal with is a 
minimisation of enemy civilian casualties. Following the conceptual logic of the RMA’s 
occurrence, or absence thereof, presented at the end of the previous chapter, it seems right to 
assume that the RMA of NLW would occur when: 
 
                                                          
170 Robert Citino, The Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe 1899-1940, (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2002), p. 204. 
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(1) a political leadership, shaped by certain socio-cultural circumstances, defines the 
minimisation of enemy civilian casualties during military operations as a significant challenge. 
(2) the military, shaped by its military culture, interprets this challenge as unmet and dealing 
with it requires the RMA of NLW.  
(3) in return, political leadership decides to supports the fundamental military transformation. 
 
Keeping this understanding in mind, each one of the following analyses of the RMAs of NLW 
will be divided into three parts. The first part will analyse the status of NLW in each military 
determining whether the RMA of NLW occurred or not. Only when the absence of this RMA 
will be determined, the analysis will be able to focus on the factors that had led to its absence. 
The second part will focus on the political leadership and national socio-cultural 
predispositions that shaped the political attitude towards enemy civilian casualties. This part 
will consist of two different but highly interconnected areas: national foreign policy, and 
national character. In an attempt to analyse whether the political leadership defines the 
minimisation of enemy civilian casualties during military operations as a significant challenge 
or not, it is important to understand the degree to which this leadership is pressed to do so. In 
other words, to what degree the political leadership is pressed (internationally as well as 
domestically) to demand from its military a significant reduction of civilian casualties and 
collateral damage. While there is broad agreement among scholars that international political 
pressure presents a crucial factor that leads to the reduction of killed or injured civilians and 
destroyed civil infrastructure,171 an analysis of the existence of this pressure, its strength and 
roots is beyond the scope of this research and therefore it will assume its existence, yet not 
delve into it. It seems very important, however, to understand how policy-makers comply with 
or fend this pressure off. In other words, to understand whether political leadership defines the 
minimisation of enemy civilian casualties during military operations as a significant challenge, 
it is vital to understand how foreign policy is crafted within the context of international 
criticism, in general and the criticism regarding civilian casualties during military operation, in 
particular.    
 An additional factor that influences political leadership in its decision-making process 
is, obviously, domestic political factors. Existing research clearly shows that each nation has 
its own “way of war” or “strategic culture” and that a nation’s cultural context affects the 
                                                          
171For example see: Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003); Ivan Arreguin-Toft , How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005); Michael  Gross, Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination, and 
Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetrical Conflict, (New York: Cambridge Press, 2010); Eric Patterson, Just War 
Thinking: Morality and Pragmatism in the Struggle against Contemporary Threats, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 
2007); David Koplow, Death by moderation… 
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political decision-making process.172 An understanding of “what people think about war and 
enemy civilian casualties” will shed a light on the level of domestic political pressure (or lack 
thereof) to minimise collateral damage during military operations, consequently endorsing (or 
not) the political leadership to define the minimisation of enemy civilian casualties during 
military operations as a significant challenge. While the analysis of this cultural context will 
focus on several narratives relevant to the idea of reducing violence applied toward enemy 
population; it is important to note that this research analyses a general national cultural 
character, i.e., the cohesive complex of specific social-physiological aspects of a given nation, 
rather than specific characters of individual groups or elites in each nation.  
 The third and the last part of the analysis will focus on military culture and the idea of 
NLW. The analysis of past RMAs shows that one of the major factors that produces an actual 
innovation is the extent to which militaries recognise and exploit the opportunities inherent in 
new tools of war.173 Consequently, military approach toward NLW seems to be an important 
factor in the analysis of the RMA of NLW or its absence.  
 
Part Four: Conclusions 
 The purpose of the first part of this chapter was to shed light on the perplexing nature 
and history of NLW. It aimed to provide a general perspective on the idea of NLW and their 
technological roots, as well as on the legal implications and complications concerning their 
employment on the battlefield. While this historical, technical and legal background was 
essential for the general understanding of NLW, the second and third parts were critical for the 
further analysis of the absence of RMA of NLW in the U.S, Russia and Israel. 
 The theoretical construction of the RMA of NLW (i.e., the RMA of NLW that could 
be) is crucial as a reference for the further analysis of its absence. Since the main objective of 
this research is to explain the failure of this RMA in the U.S., Russia and Israel, the first step 
                                                          
172See Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG, (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1998); Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of War, (New York: Routledge, 
2006); Jeremy Black, War and the Cultural Turn, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012); Theo Farrell, Terry Terriff, 
(ed.), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2002); Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution 
in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); Emilio Willems, 
A Way of Life and Death: Three Centuries of Prussian-German Militarism – An Anthropological Approach, 
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1986); Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), Chapter 5. 
173Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare and the Course of History, 1500 to Today, (New York: 
Gotham Books, 2006), p.10. 
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in the analysis of each one of the cases is to establish that the RMA of NLW indeed did not 
occur. The CONOP, technology and organisation of the RMA of NLW, generated in this 
chapter, make the argument that the RMA of NLW did not occur as methodologically possible.  
The last part of this chapter paved the methodological way for the analysis of the 
absence of the RMA of NLW. This process highlighted three main elements that are relevant 
for the implementation of the RMA of NLW: (1) foreign policy and its attitude towards 
international criticism regarding collateral damage and civilian casualties; (2) domestic 
national cultural attitudes toward enemy civilian population; (3) the military culture concerning 
novel technologies in general, and NLW in particular. These three elements are vital to the 
creation of the required causal chain that could lead to the RMA of NLW, as only their 
combination directed toward the minimisation of civilian enemy casualties during armed 
conflicts can create a required process that will ignite the RMA of NLW. In other words, only 
in the case where (1) the state complies with the international criticism that requires to reduce 
civilian casualties during conflicts; (2) domestic society demands to reduce enemy civilian 
casualties; and (3) the military of this state has a culture that is able to promote the idea of 




THE (ABSENCE OF THE) RMA OF NLW IN THE U.S. 
 
Introduction 
As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the contemporary understanding of NLW 
is a fruit of American military thought of the early 1990s. During this time, American military 
was mesmerized by theorizing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), an implementation of 
new military technologies combined with fundamental shifts in military doctrine and 
organization. Speculations about new military technologies that have revolutionary potential 
did not overstep NLW; for example, the Washington based Center for Strategic and 
International Studies held in 1993 that: “If U.S. forces were able… to incapacitate or render 
ineffective enemy forces without destroying or killing them, the U.S. conduct of war would be 
revolutionized.”1     
In 2009, however, almost two decades after the initial rise of NLW, the United States 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated that “The joint non-lethal weapons program 
has conducted more than 50 research and development efforts and spent at least $386 million 
since 1997, but it has not developed any new weapon.”2 This difference, between the initial 
enthusiasm and inability to deliver results, is striking and it is not surprising that the GAO’s 
report points at the Department of Defense (DOD) vain management as the main reason to its 
failure to successfully develop and employ NLW within the U.S. military. While the 
employment of NLW, undoubtedly, demands a paradigm shift in military affairs; the GAO’s 
accusation of the DOD’s mismanagement seems to be a too simplistic explanation of the 
detrimental situation with NLW in the U.S. military. As it was discussed before, a successful 
implementation of fundamentally new military technologies requires particular political and 
cultural environment that promotes and supports the development and employment of these 
weapon systems. Subsequently, it seems that the roots of this astonishing gap between early 
expectations from NLW and their actual deployment are much deeper than a simple financial 
misconduct of the American military establishment.            
                                                          
1 Michael Mazarr, The Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework. Final Report of the CSIS Study 
Group on the MTR, (Wachington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), p. 43.  
2 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), DOD Needs to Improve Program Management, Policy, 
and Testing to Enhance Ability to Field Operationally Useful Non-Lethal Weapons: Report to Congressional 
Requesters, Washington, April 2009, p.18. 
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Following this introduction, the discussion will be divided into five parts. The first part 
analyses the current status of NLW in the U.S. military. It discusses the state of technology 
offered by the American manufacturers and the level of the actual employment of NLW by the 
U.S. military forces. While this part shows quite a detrimental situation, the following parts 
make an attempt to explain the political, sociological and cultural roots of it. The second part 
focuses on aspects of the American foreign policy.  
As it was discussed previously, one of the main aspects, which has a potential to 
increase the employment of NLW, is the international political pressure and criticism that 
demands to minimise collateral damage and civilian casualties during military operations. 
American military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been vastly criticised by different 
NGOs for harming civilian population. For example, Amnesty International (AI) stated that in 
Iraq “scores of civilians were killed apparently as a result of excessive use of force by US 
troops”3 and “both, the US-led Multinational Force (MNF) and Iraqi security forces, committed 
grave human rights violations, including … excessive use of force resulting in civilian deaths.”4 
Regarding Afghanistan, Amnesty International stated in its 2009 Annual Report that “civilian 
casualties have been increasing since 2001 and 2008 proved to be the bloodiest year yet” 
expressing “serious concerns about the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of [American] 
air strikes were raised following several grave incidents.”5 Moreover, several types of weapons 
used by the US in Iraq and Afghanistan drew vast criticism not only from NGOs, but also from 
governments and intergovernmental organisations. For example, criticising the American 
usage of cluster bombs, the European Parliament called for “immediate moratorium” on cluster 
bombs, saying that “they pose a serious long-term threat to the civil populations.”6 Facing 
international criticism, however, it seems that Washington has been very successful in 
defending its actions. This part discusses different mechanisms of the American foreign policy 
intended to withstand this pressure. 
The third part concentrates on cultural aspects of American society. More specifically, 
in an attempt to explain the existence (or a lack thereof) of internal political pressure for the 
wider employment of NLW, this part offers insight into American general cultural attitudes 
toward wars and enemy civilian casualties. The fourth part analyses the attitudes of American 
                                                          
3 Amnesty International, Annual Report, 2004, London, p. 282. 
4 Amnesty International, Report 2006: the state of the world’s human rights, 2006, London, p. 143 
5 Amnesty International, Report 2009: the state of the world’s human rights, 2009, London, p. 56 
6 Human Rights Watch, Fatally Flawed: Cluster Bombs and Their Use by the United States in Afghanistan, 2002, 
New York, p. 17 
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military culture toward technological innovations in general and NLW in particular. It follows 
the development of American military thought in this field and its influence on the employment 
of NLW. The final part integrates the four previous parts in an attempt to explain the reasons 
behind the failure of the RMA of NLW in the U.S. Based on political and cultural aspects, it 
clarifies why despite the fact that the concept of NLW was born in the U.S., American military 
still holds back from using them. 
 
Part One: The Status of Non-Lethal Weapons in the U.S. 
As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the U.S. military had been employing NLW 
(mainly chemical) significantly before the concept of NLW was born in the early 1990s. 
However, due to the international criticism that followed the vast employment of chemical 
NLW in Vietnam7 and the Cold War oriented military planning, which left little space to such 
niche technologies as NLW,8 the development of these technologies was mainly done by, and 
for, law enforcement agencies.9  
The U.S. military started to pay more coherent attention toward NLW in 1995, during 
the operation “United Shield”, the U.S. assistance with withdrawing UN peacekeepers from 
Somalia.  General Anthony Zinni, who commanded the mission, became the prime advocate 
for the development and employment of these weapons, clearly stating that he “would never 
field a peace-support operation again without them.”10 The process of the institutionalisation 
of NLW in the DOD was led by a Non-Lethal Weapons Steering Committee (NLWSC), 
established in 1994, and the Council on Foreign Relation. This process was finalised in 1996 
with the establishment of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program (JNLWP)11 and the DOD 
Directive 3000.3, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons that defined NLW as:  
Weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate 
personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, 
and undesired damage to property and the environment. 12 
                                                          
7 Malcolm Dando, A New Form of Warfare: The Rise of Non-Lethal Weapons, (London: Brassey’s Ltd, 1996), 
pp. 76-77. 
8 Nick Lewer, Steven Schofield, Non-Lethal Weapons: A Fatal Attraction?, (London: Zed Books, 1997), p. 34. 
9 John Alexander, ‘Shoot, But Not to Kill – Non-Lethal Weapons Have Yet to Establish a Military Niche’, Jane’s 
International Defense Review, 1 June 1996; David Boyd, ‘The Search for Low Hanging Fruit: Recent 
Developments in Non-Lethal Technologies’, Malcolm Dando, (ed.), Non-Lethal Weapons: Technological and 
Operational Prospects, Jane’s Special Report, November 2000. 
10 Quoted in John Alexander, ‘Shoot, But Not to Kill…’, p. 219. 
11 Neil Davison, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), p.52.  
12 US Department of Defence, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, Directive 3000.3, Washington DC, 9 July 1996. 
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While, since 1996, JNLWP has been responsible for identifying and developing NLW 
into operationally suitable and effective solutions and for facilitating the acquisition and 
fielding of NLW,13 it seems that very little innovation has been done.14 Most of the NLW 
approved by JNLWP and employed within different American forces are based on the existing 
solutions previously developed for law enforcement, such as small arms kinetic, electric and 
chemical weapons.15 The only state-of-art technology, development of which has been led by 
JNLWP, is the Active Denial System (Directed Energy weapons that produce microwave 
beams).16 Despite the fact that several systems were shipped for deployment in Afghanistan,17 
due to operational difficulties and fear from the mischaracterisation of the system as a 
“microwave” weapon that “fries,” “cooks,” or sterilise its targets,  this flagship of the JNLWP’s 
activity and investment, has never been used.18 
Interestingly enough, the military theoretical interest in NLW has never faded since the 
late 1990s, the peak of the NLW enthusiasm. During the last decade, American officers 
conducted a vast amount of research considering NLW, their possible implications and ways 
of deployment.19 Nevertheless, it is very hard to say that anything from what was suggested in 
this purely academic research has ever been materialised. For example, on the one hand the US 
Air Force (USAF) had expressed its initial interest in NLW already in 1999, when Major 
General Norton Schwartz, then the USAF Director of Strategic Planning, said: “We have yet 
                                                          
13 Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, Purpose, http://jnlwp.defense.gov/about/purpose.html, [accessed: 26 
August 2015]. 
14 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), DOD Needs to Improve… 
15 Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Non-Lethal Weapons Reference Book, 30 June 2011. 
16 David Koplow, Death by Moderation: The U.S. Military’s Quest for Usable Weapons, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), p.196. 
17 Shane McGlaun, ‘U.S. Military Demonstrates “Active Denial System” Non-Lethal Weapon’, DAILYTECH, 
12 March 2012, 
http://www.dailytech.com/US+Military+Demonstrates+Active+Denial+Syste%20m+NonLethal+Weapon+/ar
ticle24208.htm, [accessed: 10 September 2015). 
18 Tracy Tafolla, David Trachtenberg, John Aho, ‘From Niche to Necessity: Integrating Non-Lethal Weapons into 
Essential Enabling Capabilities’, Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 66, 2012, pp. 71-79; United States Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), DOD Needs to Improve …, p. 25. 
19 For example, see: James Ogawa, Evaluating the U.S. Military’s Development of Strategic And Operational 
Doctrine for Non-Lethal Weapons in a Complex Security Environment, (Fort Leavenworth: Command and 
General Staff College, 2003); Richard Scott, Conflict Without Casualties: Non-Lethal Weapons in Irregular 
Warfare (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007); Jeffrey Voetberg, Non-Lethal Weapons: Considerations 
for the Joint Force Commander, (Newport: Naval War College, 2007); Ryan Whittemore, Air-delivered Non-
Lethal Weapons in Counterinsurgency Operations, (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air Command and Staff College, 
2008); Timothy Cullen, Lethality, Legality, and Reality: Non-Lethal Weapons for Offensive Air Support, 
(Maxwell Air Force Base: Air Command and Staff College, 2008);  Dewey Granger, Integration of Lethal and 
Nonlethal Fires: The Future of the Joint Fires Cell, (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 
2009); Team Bravo/Cohort 19, Viable Short-Term Directed Energy Weapon Naval Solutions: A Systems 
Analysis of Current Prototypes, (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013). 
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to explore non-lethals from the air. This is the next logical step.”20 Consequently, it is not 
surprising that, in the following years, a vast research was conducted by military officers 
investigating the implications of air-delivered NLW.21 On the other, the only airborne NLW 
that has since been discussed by JNLWP is an Airborne Active Denial System – a system that 
was not taken further from the stage of concept.22 
From very beginning, the role of NLW has been understood by the American military 
establishment as a tool to answer the blurring line between “law enforcement – with its restrain 
on the use of force – and the military”23 – approach that explains well the reason why JNLWP 
has concentrated mainly on the existing law enforcement solution. In 1991, the very beginning 
of the NLW debate, a research survey done by the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department 
of State reported that NLW “will have to be carefully integrated with currently-existing 
technologies and systems to achieve their maximum potential.”24 More than 20 years later, it 
seems that very little has been done, as most of the NLW listed in the JNLWP’s “Non-Lethal 
Weapons Reference Book” are still purely law enforcement weapons and munitions.25 
Moreover, Lieutenant General Richard Tryon, the Deputy Commander of the Marine Corp and 
the Chairman of the JNLWP Integrated Product Team, repeated, in 2012 (20 years after the 
Policy Planning Staff), the very same narrative: “Non-Lethal Weapons should be compatible 
with existing [military] weapons/platforms.”26  
Though some integrated (lethal and non-lethal) platforms have been introduced recently, 
they still remain in the area of infantry weapons only. The best example is the M26 Modular 
Accessory Shotgun System (MASS). It is an under-barrel shotgun attachment for the M16 rifle 
that, while preserving the lethal capability of the main rifle, simultaneously provides a 
                                                          
20 Quoted in Bryan Bender, ‘USAF Seeks Air-Dropped Non-Lethal Weapons’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 24 March 
1999. 
21 Timothy Cullen, Lethality, Legality, and Reality: Non-Lethal Weapons…;Ryan Whittemore, Air-delivered Non-
Lethal Weapons… 
22 Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Non-Lethal Weapons Reference Book…, p. 60. 
23 Steven Metz, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons: A Progress Report’, Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 28, 2001, pp. 18-22; Also 
see: Douglas Lovelace, Steven Metz, Nonlethality and American Land Power: Strategic Context and 
Operational Concepts, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998); Joseph Siniscalchi, ‘Non-Lethal 
Technologies: Implications for Military Strategy’, Center for Strategy and Technology Occasional Paper, No. 
3, 1998; Gerald Norbut, Non-Lethal Weapons: Force Enabler for the Operational Commander Conducting 
Peace Operations, (Newport: Naval War College, 2001). 
24 U.S. Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Non-Lethal and Discriminate Weapons and Technologies, 
Washington, 1991. 
25 Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Non-Lethal Weapons Reference Book… 




warfighter with an additional capability of 12ga non-lethal ammunition.27 Interestingly enough, 
this integrations was not a fruit of JNLWP activity, but a product of the U.S. Army Program 
Executive Office Soldier.28  
To summarise the current NLW situation in the U.S., it is important to emphasis two 
main factors. The first one is the nature of the employed NLW and the level of their 
employment. The range of the NLW employed by the U.S. military does not much differ from 
the law enforcement technologies that have been available for the last four decades.29 
Excluding the Active Denial technology (that, in fact, has yet to be deployed), the JNLWP has 
been concentrating on existing commercially available NLW developed for law enforcement 
purpose,30 or on developing munitions with enhanced effects for these existing systems.31 The 
operational use of these available NLW has been limited to specific out-of-battlefield missions, 
such as crowd and riots control, security patrols, check points, etc. 
The second factor is the technological status. Since the Second World War, the U.S. 
military has been a technological leader in military affairs, and the American military industrial 
complex has been able to deal with all technological challenges posed in front of it, but 
“without concepts for the use of Non-Lethal Weapons, developers will not be successful in 
focusing ideas and programs.”32 The example of the M26 MASS shows that facing a right 
definition of the desired capabilities, which focus research and development efforts, American 
manufactures are able to produce effective military-oriented NLW weapons. Taking NLW out 
of their law enforcement niche and creating technologies that will answer military requirements 
should not pose an enormous technological gap; it is mainly a question of political pressure put 
on the military establishment to make things right – i.e. minimise civilian casualties to a 
maximum possible minimum. 
 
                                                          
27 Dan Parsons, ‘Army, Marine Corps Succeed in Rapidly Fielding Specialized Individual Weapons 
(UPDATED)’, National Defence, January 2013. 
28 The U.S. Army Program Executive Office Soldier, Equipment Portfolio, 2014; Joint Non-Lethal Weapons 
Program, Annual Report, 2012, p.9. 
29 See Security Planning Corporation, Non-Lethal weapons for Law Enforcement: Research Needs and Priorities: 
A Report to the National Science Foundation, (Washington: Security Planning Corporation, 1972). 
30 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), DOD Needs to Improve … 
31 Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Current Non-Lethal Weapons, 
http://jnlwp.defense.gov/CurrentNonLethalWeapons.aspx, [accessed: 27 August 15]; Joint Non-Lethal 
Weapons Directorate, Developing Non-Lethal Weapons, 
http://jnlwp.defense.gov/DevelopingNonLethalWeapons.aspx, [accessed: 27 August 15]. 
32 National Security Council, An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology, (Washington: 
National Academies Press, 2003), p.99. 
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Part Two: American Foreign Policy and International Criticism 
 It has been much thought and written about the U.S. foreign policy. Different scholars 
have discussed it from different perspectives developing different ways of analysis. Some 
decided to divide the history and development of the American foreign policy by 
administrations, analysing the approach of specific presidents,33 or comparing between them;34 
others examined different persistent narratives of the U.S. foreign policy through history.35 
Some focused more on the relations between the U.S. and its main allies;36 and others focused 
on the American foreign policy and its main foes.37 Some of these researchers generally praised 
American performance38 and some others were more critical.39 The main purpose of this 
research, however, is not to take a side in this highly intellectual debate, but rather to focus on 
the main inherent mechanisms of the U.S. foreign policy intended to deal with international 
criticism, in general, and regarding civilian casualties caused by the American military, in 
particular.  
 Though the main emphasis of this chapter is on current affairs and how the U.S. 
policymakers deal with international criticism, in the second decade of the 21st century, it seems 
important to begin this analysis with different trends and narratives developed during the period 
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of the Cold War, as an understanding of these trends is vital to the analysis of contemporary 
American behaviour on the international arena.40     
 At the end of Second World War, while the European countries, the Soviet Union and 
Japan – the great powers of the Second World War – were devastated, America emerged from 
the war relatively unscathed finding itself as the dominant political, economic and military 
power.41 The relations between the former allies – the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. – rapidly 
deteriorated. Influenced by the American foremost expert on the Soviet Union, George Kennan, 
President Harry Truman, on 12 March 1947, not only revealed the main American enemy: 
“totalitarian regimes imposed on free people [i.e. the Soviet Union] undermine the foundation 
of international peace and hence the security of the United Sates,” but also articulated the 
narrative that will shape the American foreign policy for decades to come: “I believe that we 
must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies.”42 The American-Soviet rivalry of the 
Cold War and the American sense of manifest destiny “to support free peoples who are resisting 
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures”43 dominated world politics 
for nearly half a century and was at the centre of American foreign policy not only directly vis-
à-vis Moscow, but all around the world. 
  Since then, the combination of these two narratives – America as the protector of the 
free world against a great evil – have shaped American foreign policy, as President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower put it at the dawn of the Vietnam War: “We must maintain a common worldwide 
defense against the menace of International Communism [i.e., great evil] And we must 
demonstrate and spread the blessing of liberty [i.e., protecting freedom]”44 As these two 
narratives remained at the focus of American foreign policy for the entire period of the Cold 
War, each one of these deserves a more detailed discussion. 
In his famous article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” Kennan suggested two main 
directions for American foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union: (1)“the main element of 
any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm 
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and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies,” and (2) “American people … 
accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended 
them to bear.”45 These two were highly emphasised by Truman and Eisenhower and continued 
to dominate American foreign policy for the rest of the Cold War. 
President Kennedy was defending “the entire Western Hemisphere” from the “Soviet 
threat to world peace”46 and was ready to “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, 
support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” 47 President 
Johnson was “concerned with threats to the peace and security of the peoples of southeast Asia” 
coming from “the Communist government of North Viet-Nam”48 as “there is no one else who 
can do the job. Our [American] power alone in the final test can stand between 
expanding communism and independent Asian nations.”49 President Nixon believed that 
although “the defense and progress of other countries must be first their responsibility” facing 
“the emerging polycentrism of the Communist” the role of the U.S. “remains indispensable,”50 
and President Ford promised that “the United States will fulfil its responsibilities as a leader 
among nations.”51 While President Carter famously stated that he has “no fear of communism 
and no inordinate concern about communism,” he saw the “inherent strength of the United 
States… [as] superior to that of the Soviet Union” and was ready “to act promptly and 
decisively to help countries whose security is threatened by external forces [i.e., 
Communism].”52 President Reagan, was concerned about “becoming powerless to deter or 
counter Soviet aggression around the world” and had been unable to “assist friendly 
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governments facing threats from the Soviet Union, its surrogates, and from other radical 
regimes.”53 
And then the Cold War came to an end. Already at the end of 1989, in his final message, 
President Reagan was “confident that relations between our two countries [the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R.] will continue on the positive” and that “we have been able to find some common 
ground.”54 His successor, President Bush, observing the collapse of the Soviet Empire 
cautiously stated that the “whole policy for the United States … will be to watch for those 
changes and try to facilitate them and work with those who are willing to move towards 
freedom and democracy.”55 Bush, whose political views were shaped by the strategy of 
containment, felt very uncomfortable trying to design a new strategy for the rapidly changing 
world. His main problem was best formulated by an American commentator, Norman Ornstein: 
“What does a superpower do in a world no longer dominated by superpower conflict?”56 With 
the disappearance of the communist great evil, the Bush team of closest advisers, who by 
themselves were a product of the Cold War and, in fact, were more prepared to contain the 
non-existent Soviet Union, rather than reshape America’s international agenda in the new 
world,57  tried to stick to the Cold War dogma. Dealing with the Persian Gulf Crisis in 1991, 
the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was described as the “worldwide threat to democracy” 
against whom America was “ready to use force to defend a new order emerging among the 
nations of the world –  a world of sovereign nations living in peace.”58 
An attempt to define a new great evil, however, was not an easy task. While the case 
of Iraq eventually corresponded with both of the traditional narratives of American foreign 
policy, in other cases the Bush administration had to compensate the lack of an evil enemy, by 
amplifying the second narrative of the U.S. as the protector of freedom and peace: “in a world 
where we are the only remaining superpower, it is the role of the United States to marshal its 
moral and material resources to promote a democratic peace. It is our responsibility, it is our 
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opportunity to lead. There is no one else.” 59 This amplification is best demonstrated by the 
American involvement in the 1989 Philippine coup attempt, which was described as a move 
“to safeguard democracy in the Philippines;” the 1989 Invasion of Panama that was advocated 
as the protection of “the security of the Canal;” and the 1992 U.S. involvement in Somalia that 
was an attempt to “stem this human tragedy of Somalia.”60 
The outcome of the 1992 elections symbolised George Bush’s failure to read the 
American voters’ hearts in a world without a Soviet threat. Americans decided to give a chance 
to Bill Clinton, not because of his (mostly lacking) experience in foreign affairs, but because it 
seemed that he, unlike Bush, knew how to deal with American problems at home.61 And, 
though, it was interpreted as if the U.S. had lost its “missionary zeal”, the narratives of Clinton’s 
foreign policy did not differ much from his predecessor. Clinton, indeed, put much effort to 
make the U.S. economic agenda as a centrepiece of his foreign policy successfully promoting 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).62 American military 
involvement during the Clinton presidency, however, proved that America had no intentions 
of abandoning the world. Clinton was the first American president in a truly post-Cold War 
world and the narrative of the great evil definitely did not suit any more. In the absence of other 
alternatives, the Clinton administration had to persist with the maintaining of the remaining 
Cold War narrative of America as the protector of free people and democracy.  
Clinton inherited the conflict in Somalia from George Bush and could not immediately 
withdraw American forces from this troubled intervention, therefore, he continued to explain 
that “we went to Somalia because without us a million people would have died. We, uniquely, 
were in a position to save them.”63 The following American reaction in 1999 to the conflict in 
the Balkans persisted to promote this narrative: “We act to protect thousands of innocent people 
in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war, to diffuse a 
powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with 
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catastrophic results.”64 Unlike Bush who rushed to title Saddam as “an unusual and 
extraordinary threat,”65 Clinton was very cautious in playing the narrative of a great evil – 
describing Milošević’s activity in Kosovo he hesitated to use the term “genocide”.66 It did not 
stop him, however, from emphasising the narrative of America as the protector of free people 
and democracy, as “ending this tragedy is a moral imperative” and “America has a 
responsibility … to save innocent lives and preserve peace, freedom, and stability in Europe.”67 
The arrival of the new millennium did not forecast any significant changes for 
American foreign policy. Bush Junior, like Clinton before him, struggled to find a proper great 
evil at a time when Eurasia’s greatest powers that had a potential to challenge “the peace” that 
America had sought – China was only a “competitor” and the U.S., in fact, was “Russia’s ally 
in self-reform.”68 Consequently, it is not surprising that from the beginning of his presidential 
campaign, his vision of American foreign policy was shaped mainly by America’s success as 
the protector (and promoter) of free people and democracy: 
Our world, shaped by American courage, power and wisdom, now echoes with 
American ideals. We won a victory, not just for a nation, but for a vision. A vision 
of freedom and individual dignity – defended by democracy, nurtured by free 
markets, spread by information technology, carried to the world by free trade. The 
advance of freedom – from Asia to Latin America to East and Central Europe – is 
creating the conditions for peace.69 
 Then, on the morning of 11 September 2001, the presidency of George W. Bush, as 
well as American foreign policy, were turned upside down by two highjacked airplanes that 
brought down the World Trade Centre in Manhattan and a third that seriously damaged the 
Pentagon. Later that day, in his Address to the Nation, Bush stressed that “today our Nation 
saw evil, the very worst of human nature” but “we go forward to defend freedom and all that 
is good and just in our world.”70 In this speech he emphasised that America is not any more the 
protector of free people and democracy against no enemy, as it was in the previous decade; but 
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there is a great evil – “terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them.”71 
After 9/11, the Bush Administration rediscovered the two main foreign policy narratives of the 
Cold War -   America is the protector of the free world against a great evil, with the only 
difference that Soviet Communism was replaced by International Terrorism. Both narratives 
of the Cold War foreign policy were, undoubtedly, brought back by Bush after 9/11 as the 
declared Global War on Terror was to ”lift a dark threat of violence … [and] rally the world … 
by our efforts, by our courage.”72  
Moreover, in an addition to the Cold War legacy in the American foreign policy, after 
the devastating attacks on American soil, Bush enjoyed the same unlimited freedom of action 
as Franklin D. Roosevelt did after the Pearl Harbour attack 60 years earlier. But, while 
Roosevelt’s evils were just “arrogant rulers whose selfish purpose is to destroy free 
institutions”73 (i.e., Japan, Germany and Italy), Bush’s great evils were infused by the Cold 
War heritage:74 on a general level there was the Islamic radicalism that “like the ideology of 
communism … is dismissive of free peoples,”75 and on a personal level there was Saddam 
Hussein who was “a student of Stalin, using murder as a tool of terror and control.”76  
The following American interventions, in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, were 
presented not only as “monumental struggle of good versus evil,” 77 but, maximising the 
narrative of protector of freedom and democracy, Afghan people were promised help “in this 
time of confusion and crisis in their country,”78 and the Iraqi people, once “freed from the 
weight of oppression,” were assured of “help [to] rebuild their economy and create the 
institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq at peace with its neighbours.”79 Consequently, it is not 
surprising that the intervention in Afghanistan was quickly renamed from initial “Operation 
Infinite Justice” to a one more suitable with foreign policy goals “Operation Enduring 
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Freedom” (though the given reason for the change was to sidestep the objections in the Muslim 
world to the first title),80 and the intervention in Iraq from the very beginning was dubbed 
“Operation Iraqi Freedom”. Despite the rising opposition to the lengthening interventions in 
Iraq and Afghanistan,81 in 2004, Bush was re-elected for the second term, persisting with the 
narratives of American fight against a great evil to protect the free world:  “Our military has 
brought justice to the enemy and honor to America. Our Nation has defended itself and served 
the freedom of all mankind.”82 
 Undoubtedly, the maintenance of these two narratives played an important role 
assisting in fending off criticism of American policies. One of the best examples is the case of 
the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp – “a safe and secure location to detain and interrogate 
enemy combatants”83 established after the beginning of the Iraqi and Afghani campaigns. 
Almost immediately after its establishment, the Guantanamo Camp fell under extensive 
criticism from the international community. For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
said in 2006 that “an institution like Guantanamo in its present form cannot and must not exist 
… We must find different ways of dealing with prisoners,”84 and Irene Khan, the Secretary 
General of Amnesty International, stated in the foreword to the 2005 Annual Report that “the 
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay has become the gulag of our times, entrenching the 
practice of arbitrary and indefinite detention in violation of international law.”85 To fend off 
the rising international criticism that protested the legal status and physical condition of 
detainees at Guantanamo Camp, American leadership firmly persisted with the narratives of 
fighting the great evil to protect the free world. Defending the existence of the detention camp, 
Bush stated in 2006 that the people, who were held at Guantanamo, “aren't common criminals 
or bystanders accidentally swept up on the battlefield, [but] suspected bombmakers, terrorist 
trainers, recruiters and facilitators, and potential suicide bombers … and individuals involved 
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in other attacks that have taken the lives of innocent civilians across the world” and that keeping 
them there and questioning them “has given us information that has saved innocent lives by 
helping us stop new attacks, here in the United States and across the world.”86 
President Barak Obama, who replaced Bush in 2008, had already during his election 
campaign described the Guantanamo Camp as a "sad chapter in American history" and 
promised to close it.87 The real reason behind this attempt, however, probably was an outcome 
of internal political sparring, rather than the result of international pressure. Newly elected, 
Obama was looking for an opportunity to criticise Bush and advocated the closure of the camp 
because “our [previous] government made a series of hasty decisions … based upon fear rather 
than foresight, and all too often trimmed facts and evidence to fit ideological predispositions.”88 
Though Obama’s vision of foreign policy was seen by many as a U-turn away from the core 
principles of Bush’s worldview, he was not a “non-interventionist calling for a retreat to 
Fortress America.”89 On the one hand, Obama, unlike Bush, demonstrated high reluctance to 
embrace physical humanitarian intervention facing different crises (e.g., the Arab Spring events 
in 2011 and the following lengthening Syrian Civil War; the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL) on the territories of Iraq and Syria; the Ukrainian Revolution in 2014 
and the following Russian annexation of Crimea). On the other hand, in many ways the 
relationship between Bush’s and Obama’s foreign policy rhetoric is marked more by 
continuity, rather than change. After all, the great evil was still there: 
Russian aggression in Europe recalls the days when large nations trampled small 
ones in pursuit of territorial ambition.  The brutality of terrorists in Syria and Iraq 
forces us to look into the heart of darkness.90 
As well as the American duty to protect the free world: 
I can promise you that the United States of America will not be distracted or 
deterred from what must be done.  We are heirs to a proud legacy of freedom, and 
we’re prepared to do what is necessary to secure that legacy for generations to 
come.91 
                                                          
86 George Bush, Remarks on the War on Terror, Washington, 6 September 2006, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=779, [accessed: 24 June 2015]. 
87 Alex Spillius, ‘Barack Obama 'proposes to move terrorists suspects from Guantanamo Bay'’, The Telegraph, 
10 Nov 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/3417913/Barack-Obama-
proposes-to-move-terrorists-suspects-from-Guantanamo-Bay.html, [accessed: 24 June 2015]. 
88 Barack Obama, Remarks at the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, May 21 2009, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86166, [accessed: 24 June 2015]. 
89 James M. Lindsay, ‘George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the future of US global leadership’,  International 
Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4, 2011, pp. 765–779. 
90Barak Obama, Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, New York, September 24 
2014, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=107615, [accessed: 24 June 2015]. 
91 Barak Obama, Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly… 
96 
 
Since the end of the Second World War, and especially since the end of the Cold War, 
the U.S. has been enjoying a position of unprecedented economic, technological, political, and 
above all military power. While many scholars accuse the Americans of imperial ambitions, 
the establishment of a unipolar world and becoming a “New Rome”,92 others argue that the 
U.S. enjoys the position of leadership, rather than autocracy, and it has to work hard to preserve 
it.93 Since the mid-20th century the United States has considered itself as “the leader of 
European-American civilization against upstart challengers to that civilization,”94 first Nazi 
Germany and Imperial Japan, then Soviet Communism and, finally, Global Terrorism. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that American leaders continuously have addressed their 
country as the protector of the free world against the great evil. While this demonstration of 
good will, undoubtedly, helped Americans to fend off some of the international criticism, 
especially the one originating outside the “free world”, it was not enough to create a politically 
acceptable environment for American military operation. The additional mechanism that 
helped American leadership to facilitate hostile international opinion has always been their 
ability to create alliances and coalitions as a part of their strategy, thus minimising the pool of 
possible criticisers and spreading the remaining criticism among as many players as possible.95 
In the American view of the international relations, alliances have a special place as they 
not only “presumably transcend and subordinate separate national interests,” but also 
“represent indigenous harmony and initiative”96 allowing the United States to be the first 
amongst several “equal” partners. While in both World Wars the U.S. was a latecomer and 
naturally joined the existent alliances, since the beginning of the Cold War, the American 
leadership have paid great efforts to attract as many potential partners as possible to support 
American actions in any possible way: militarily, materially or just verbally. 
An interesting point is that since Korea and Vietnam, through to the Gulf War, and up to 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (with probably one exception, Kosovo)97 the United States 
overwhelmingly dominated its allies not only in terms of military power, but also in the 
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decision-making  process regarding the direction of the war.98 It is not the military forces that 
the U.S. wanted most from their allies, but their politically visible support, as President Johnson 
told the British Prime Minister Wilson in 1966, after the U.K. declined to send troops to 
Vietnam: “a platoon of bagpipers would be sufficient; it was the British flag that was wanted.”99 
From the American viewpoint, the major role of the “coalition of willing” is sharing the 
political burden of the military action, rather than the physical one. American leadership, on 
the one hand, has always desired to preserve its freedom of action, while, on the other, it wanted 
to enjoy the political benefits of collective actions dispersing the political responsibility and 
potential consequential liability. For that reason, the American first choice of action was not 
working through formal institutions and alliances (e.g., NATO) that consists of players who do 
not necessarily share the American desire and tend to bargain for their political support, but to 
establish an ad-hoc multinational cooperation with international players, who were ready, due 
to their own interests, to comply with the American subduing leadership.100 The American 
interventions in Afghanistan in 2001, and in Iraq in 2003, are very good examples (the first 
was very successful, the second almost a failure) of this mechanism to minimise international 
political pressure. 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the international community expressed a strong 
solidarity with the U.S. While immediately after the attacks NATO invoked Article 5 and 
offered assistance, the American reaction was lukewarm. Bush’s administration, enjoying an 
overwhelming international support,101 desired immediate action and did not want to 
complicate decision-making process with NATO bureaucratic procedures and slow the pace of 
operation. The American determination to act outside the NATO framework, taking aboard 
only partners that were ready to abide to American leadership, was best demonstrated by 
Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. Secretary of Defence, who stated in September 2001: “The mission 
determines the coalition. And the coalition must not be permitted to determinate the 
mission.”102 Only in 2003, when U.S. leadership started to attract too much criticism over its 
uncompromising decision to invade Iraq, Washington began to consider a larger NATO role in 
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Afghanistan, officially transferring the command to the alliance in August 2003.103 The main 
purpose of the Coalition’s operational involvement in Afghanistan was not only to lessen the 
burden of war on the United States, but also to provide the required legitimacy for military 
activity.104 In this way, despite the fact that the U.S. remained the main contributor to the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the political responsibility for 
the consequences of the military activity was formally shifted to NATO.   
The attack on Iraq was a completely different story. Unlike Afghanistan, there was no 
direct linkage between the 9/11 attacks and Saddam Hussein did nothing (at least in the terms 
of an immediate threat) to provoke international intervention in his country. Moreover, while 
the American attack on Afghanistan materialised within 4 weeks after 9/11 (the bombing of 
Taliban positions and al-Qaeda bases had already began on 6 October 2001),105 the idea of 
attacking Iraq was treading water for a year and half. It is not surprising that many NATO 
members, such as France, Germany and Turkey, as well as other countries, such as Russia and 
China, which had backed the U.S. actions in Afghanistan, withdrew their support for the Iraqi 
campaign.106 Despite the hollow claim of the U.S. that it had a coalition of some 44 members, 
in reality, the Washington “coalition of the willing” consisted of the U.S., Britain and Spain, 
on the political front, and of the U.S., Britain and Australia, who contributed their forces for 
the action.107 Compared with Afghanistan, the American attempt to share the burden of political 
responsibility in the Iraqi War was a complete fiasco. Despite the fact that the British went all 
the way with Americans come hell or high water, due to their traditional belief in “Special 
Relationship” with the U.S.,108 it was mainly Washington, which had to deal with the political 
consequences on the international arena.109 
The main purpose of this chapter is to understand why the American military does not 
employ NLW. One of the main assumptions of this research is that international political 
criticism can be one of the main drivers that would force political leadership to press their 
military to significantly decrease civilian casualties, i.e., employ NLW. The analysis of the 
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different mechanisms of American foreign policy presented above, and the ways in which 
Washington fends international criticism off, clearly shows the independence of American 
military activity from international pressure. 
American political-military decision-makers are not meaningfully preoccupied by 
international public opinion for several major reasons. First, there are structural conditions that 
improve the U.S. ability to act without the political approval of the rest of the world: the size 
and vitality of the American economy and its military might; the lack of political unity within 
Europe; and Russia that still struggles to recover its positions in the global arena.110 Referring 
to the Bush decision to go to war in Iraq without explicit UN backing, UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan accused Washington of “proliferation of the unilateral and lawless use of force, 
with or without justification.”111Even this unambiguous criticism, however, did not stop the 
U.S. from invading Iraq. 
The second reason is the fact that after World War II the United States defined itself as 
the leader of the democratic free world. As it was discussed above, the narrative of the U.S. as 
the protector of the free world against the great evil has dominated the American foreign policy 
from the Cold War until today. While at the end of the Cold War, Gorbachev's adviser Georgiy 
Arbatov said that: "We are doing something really terrible to you – we are depriving you of an 
enemy;"112 new great evils have been continuously reinvented – Soviet Communism was 
replaced by Global Terrorism, and Global Terrorism seems to have been replaced by ISIL and, 
probably, Putin’s Russia. The success of American leadership to maintain the principle that 
“we are good”113 significantly eased international pressure on American political decision-
makers. From 2002 to 2006 only, approximately 200,000 people were killed as a result of the 
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violence of the war that began with the U.S. invasion of Iraq114 - it seems that the U.S. has 
emerged relatively clear from any significant political consequences.115 
The third and final reason is the success of Washington to recruit other countries, even 
if only by flying their flags, sharing the political responsibility and minimising international 
pressure. Avoiding the slow negotiation within existing bureaucratic alliances and utilising the 
national interests of independent nations, which try to cash in the coin of their own political 
advantages from supporting the U.S., Washington succeeds to defuse international criticism 
and continue with the course of its military actions. 
The combination of these three narratives of the American foreign policy allows 
American decision-makers to be relatively relaxed about their military performance regarding 
enemy civilian casualties and they feel no need for fundamental changes to make their military 
less lethal. With this absence of significant external political need, the only factor that has the 
potential to influence American leadership to change its mind is political pressure from home, 
in other words, domestic opposition that values enemy’s population. To understand the 
prospects (or lack of them) of such internal political pressure, it is important to analyse the 
American cultural perspective on war and the extent to which American people appreciate 
human life – their own, as well as the lives of their enemies.      
 
Part Three: American Culture and Civilian Casualties 
Defining the American Mind, Henry Steele Commager famously stated that it is “the 
product of an interplay of [the American] inheritance and environment, both varied and 
complex.”116 In other words, the American character is a brew of a cramped Europe with its 
values rooted in Ancient Greece and Rome and the American environment - “the sense of 
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spaciousness, the invitation to mobility, the atmosphere of independence, the encouragement 
to enterprise and to optimism.”117 An analysis of the American cultural context demands an 
understanding of the fundamental influence of the so called “free land” phenomenon on the 
minds of European immigrants and how modified inherited institutions and values shaped the 
“American Way”, “American Dream” and “American Mind”.  
The significance of the “free land” concept in shaping American character was highly 
advanced by renowned American historian Frederic Jackson Turner in his famous paper on 
“The Significance of the Frontier in American History” that he read before the Chicago meeting 
of the American Historical Association in 1893. Since then his thesis that “the existence of an 
area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westwards, 
explain American development”118 has been at the centre of a vast discourse among American 
historians, attracting many supporters, as well as detractors.119 And while it is not the place of 
this work to take a side in this discourse, the Turner’s thesis seems to have a vital contribution 
to the understanding of the American culture as “the frontier is the line of most rapid and 
effective Americanisation.”120  
The following analysis does not intend to produce the whole picture of the American 
cultural context, this mission is beyond this work, its narrow purpose is to understand how 
American history and cultural predispositions have shaped what Americans think about war 
and enemy civilian casualties. Those who are interested in a broader discussion of the 
distinctive American way of thought and its influence on the American conduct of war, are 
advised to focus more on the principal works of American historians that rest at the core of this 
analysis, such as Henry Steele Commager,121 Stow Persons,122 Daniel Boorstin,123 and Russell 
Weigley.124 In an addition to these classic titles, the following analysis is also based on more 
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contemporary scholars dealing with the cultural-socio-political context of American history, 
such as John Grenier,125 John Mueller,126 Thomas Mahnken127 and John Tirman.128 
Thus, American character is an outcome of the impact of a wilderness environment 
upon an old established European culture. Although America was settled by immigrants who 
transplanted cultures centuries old, the New World was genuinely new and different from the 
Old. And, yet, an understanding of this newness requires a comprehensive knowledge of the 
cultural baggage brought by first settlers and then waves of immigrants across the Atlantic. 
Unfortunately, given constraints of space, this research will merely focus on the final product 
of this “most ambition experiment ever undertaken in the intermingling of peoples”129 – the 
American character. 
American Character and the Value of Human Life 
 The story of America is very much a story of a conquest. In contrast to the European 
understanding of conquest, when it is a successful outcome of a violent struggle between two 
counterparts, the conquest that shaped American character was a subjugation of ferity and the 
darkness of wilderness on behalf of progress and enlightenment. And the most essential and 
influential part of this expansion was the frontier – “the meeting point between savagery and 
civilization”130 that was “one of the forces which did most to shape American life from the 
beginning.”131 
 With their arrival in North America, Europeans found a continent with a very healthy 
climate that demanded neither acclimatisation, nor a painful process of adjustment. Moreover, 
the local inhabitants, were too few and too primitive to imperil the colonisation. With the 
establishment of the first significant foothold it was quickly acknowledged that life in the New 
World might be not only prosperous, but it can be obtained by anyone, as it offered a boundless, 
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almost ungraspable for the European mind, “free to take” land.132 Since the mid-17th century 
America acquired the image of a New World, “a potential New Eden in the West,”133 with 
unlimited wilderness that was just waiting to be conquered. And while this New World offered 
opportunities, new hopes and potential success for the European immigrant, its main appeal 
was its limitless resources. In contrast to the Old World that was full of political, social and 
economic restrictions, built and maintained through centuries, America offered free land, and 
“so long as free land exists, the opportunity for a competency exists, and economic power 
secures political power.”134    
 The most important factor in the American conquest of the wilderness was the fact that 
even with the establishment and the development of the East coast, the promised opportunity 
of the New World did not stop there – the prospect of free land areas continually existed on the 
western border of the settled parts of the United States until the end of the 19th century, when 
“the year 1890 is usually taken to mark the date when there was no more frontier available.”135 
Undoubtedly, the slow conquest of the West brought with it social and economic limitations to 
the settled areas, however  “whenever capital tended to press upon labour or political restrains 
to impede the freedom of mass, there was this gate of escape to the free conditions of the 
frontier.”136 The possibility of escaping this burden, the chance of restarting from the beginning 
– whether from the Old World to the New, or from the established New to the wilderness – 
exemplifies better than anything else one of the most important characteristics of the American 
character shaped by the frontier phenomenon – indefinite optimism. One’s past, his mistakes 
and errors do not bind him irretrievably – “fresh starts could be made, tomorrow promised to 
be better than today, and progress always seemed to be possible.”137 
 The main source of this optimism was the fact that this progress was a part of the 
frontier experience. A frontiersman witnessed it daily, he was a part of the transformation of 
the wilderness into farms, villages into towns and cities. As the past was left behind, the 
Americans were dreaming of the future and they were used to seeing their visionary plans 
become reality.138 The conquest of the wilderness was not an easy labour, but being an 
American meant to have “dreams and behold visions … to have faith in man, [and] an 
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unbounded confidence in his ability to make his dreams come true.”139 This leads to the next 
characteristic that the frontier sculpted within the American mind, as it transformed the 
European immigrant into an American – with boundless self-confidence and belief in 
America’s destiny. Hence, an essential part of the American character is an engraved 
presumption that an American can solve any problem. A strong belief in the “can do” and a 
predisposition to “get on with it” have characterised the American psychological mind-set since 
the conquest of the frontier.140 In fact, the famous 2008 victory speech of the first African-
American president “Yes, We Can!”141 demonstrates, better than anything, the actuality of this 
narrative in the beginning of the 21st century. Moreover, based on the Puritan heritage of first 
settlers, Americans deeply believe in the American exceptionalism and that the United States 
is inherently different from all other nations. Since the times of Puritan John Winthrop, who, 
in 1630, still aboard the ship Arbella, admonished the future Massachusetts Bay colonists that 
their new community would be "as a City upon a Hill,"142 American mind-set has been 
predisposed to believe that, as President Reagan put it, “Americans [are] awed by what has 
gone before, proud of what for them is still…a shining city on a hill.”143 
Little by little the wilderness transformed the European germs brought from the Old 
World into a new product that was purely American. Spacious and boundless land did not only 
beget spacious ideas, it magnified two very European ideals that were restricted by the 
European realities – individualism and personal freedom.  Limitation of resources, especially 
land, engraved within the European mindset the necessity to quest for more efficient ways of 
exploiting natural resources, ultimately leading to the strong narratives of individualism, on the 
one hand, and personal freedom, on the other. Both of these characteristics found a flourishing 
ground on American soil that was free from the Old World’s boundaries – “out of his 
[frontiersman’s] wilderness experience, out of the freedom of his opportunities, he fashioned a 
formula to social regeneration – the freedom of individual to seek its own.”144 
Free land promoted individualism.  The conquest of the wilderness was driven by 
individuals seeking their own benefits, rather than a well planned activity led by the authorities 
or great enterprises. The first was the individual pioneer, then the settler and only then the men 
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of capital and enterprise. Each one was driven by his own dreams and ambitions, stimulated by 
his individualistic aim to build a better tomorrow.145 This social flexibility of the American 
life, so different from the over-crowded Europe, predisposed the American character towards 
a very strong sense of individualism. It does not mean that the frontiersman preferred social 
isolation, as pioneers and, obviously, settlers could definitely appreciate the benefits of 
community. However, the membership in the community (company) was secondary to the 
individual’s aims – “it was not unusual at all for people to leave one company to join a second 
or third, abandoning each when it no longer served their purpose.”146 The European social 
boundaries of a complex society did not withstand the limitlessness of opportunities offered by 
free land, the frontier’s influence was to some degree anti-social, admiring individualism and 
producing “antipathy to control, and particularly to any direct control.”147  
This strong sense of individualism, ultimately led to a very keen relations of the 
American character with personal freedom. The concept of free land and endless opportunities 
magnified the inherent traditions of the Magna Carta, brought by the first waves of British 
immigrants. Americans, as nowhere else, even in Britain, were able to exercise personal liberty 
and dared to contend any attempt of the authorities to limit it. The frontier, “where individual 
liberty was something confused with the absence of all effective government,”148 and new 
generations raised into this reality played a significant role in shaping the cultural 
predispositions that explain the relations between Americans and their state.  
 Due to the inherent individualism, independence and personal freedom, “American’s 
attitude toward authority, rules, and regulations was the despair of bureaucrats and 
disciplinarians.”149 The initial communities, and then villages and towns, were organised by 
people who not only personally chose to join them, but essentially helped to build them. The 
conquest of the Western wilderness was a business of Americans rather than the state, and 
frontiersmen, facing an absence of legal authority, had to developed ways to preserve the order. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that in the reality, when the individual was not ready to limit 
his freedom by complex legal regulation, “a crime was more an offence against the victim, than 
a violation of the law of the land.”150 
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 Raised and bred in the wilderness, “the American was always taking a short cut to 
freedom, a short cut to fortune, a short cut to learning, and a short cut to heaven”151 and he was 
always eager to protect his freedom of making his short cuts. This avidity of the American 
character to safeguard his freedom ultimately led to a kind of built-in resistance to any type of 
governmental invasion of privacy and general assumption that an excessive conformity with 
authority is “akin to cancer.”152 While the strong senses of individualism and personal freedom, 
mixed with the narrative of strong resistance to any attempts to restrict these qualities of the 
American character, explain the widely discussed American predisposition towards 
lawlessness,153 they are also one of the main reasons behind the American tendency towards 
violence. The conquest of the American wilderness was a violent affair and this experience that 
lasted for nearly three centuries undoubtedly played a role in shaping the American character. 
It is important to note, however, that the violent origins of the frontier stem from the people, 
rather than the rough environment. From the very beginning of the colonies the Anglo-
American settlers were violent. Free from the European socio-cultural restrictions that had 
limited violence in the Old World, on top of being continuously involved in violent struggles 
against the indigenous Indians, as well as against other colonies, “the Anglo-American colonial 
people were prone to violence.”154  
So it seems that an American attitude towards violence is an outcome not only of 
American freedom created by the frontier, but an inherent right, even a duty, to protect it at any 
cost. The fact that American individualism led to a general distrust of authorities played an 
essential role in shaping the American violent nature. In the American mind, one’s freedom 
and privacy are the most precious values that have to be protected and, as one does not trust 
the authorities providing this protection, or wants to (as such protection will limit his freedom), 
one would preserve this task for oneself. In other words, in an American’s eyes, the protection 
of his life and his property is first and foremost his own duty and right, rather than the 
responsibility of the state. And American people, raised on the traditions of the frontier, value 
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the use of violence as an effective method not only to protect, but also to solve any 
disagreement or conflict.155 
This fundamental belief in the legitimacy of each citizen to apply violence explains best 
not only the fact that “Americans, more than any other people in the world, are able to own 
destructive weapons for private use,”156 but also the reason why Americans interpret the 
Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States as a constitutional right to own 
these weapons. In fact, the amendment states that: “A well regulated militia being necessary to 
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed” 
– and the interpretation of this amendment as a right to possess firearms in contemporary 
America proves that the violence of the frontier, and the amendment that represents it, is still 
deep in the heart of American society.157  
Another evidence that the frontier’s violent experience is still influential in the 
American mind is the prevalence of capital punishment in law and practice. The 
straightforward violence of the frontier created lynching as “a punishment for anyone accused 
of an offence which outraged the community.”158 Effectively, during the years, with the 
empowerment of the state and the rule of law, the tradition of lynching transformed into 
legalised capital punishment, which is still practised by most of the states in the U.S. When 
capital punishment was largely abolished by the rest of the modern Western World, in the U.S., 
in 2015, it still enjoys a vast public support, with 60% of the population considering it as 
morally acceptable.159           
While these narratives generally describe the inherent motifs of violence engraved in 
the American character, they also point to the general attitude towards value of life. Americans 
appreciate first and foremost American lives (as individual and as whole) and anyone who 
endangers their lives, property and freedoms deserves a violent and decisive response. The 
experience of the American frontier beget the European individualism into extreme, and, 
therefore, Americans value human life in a more individualistic and selfish manner than any 
other nation. This very self-centred value of life, based on the American traditional self-
reliance, have shaped American social life for generations and anyone (whether a fellow 
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American, American authority or a reckless and uncouth non-American) who dared to stand 
between an American and his “dream” – “that dream of land in which life should be better and 
richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for each”160 – deserved to experience 
American violence to its full capacity.  
War and the American Character 
The experience of the frontier, and the previously discussed narratives, implanted into 
the American character have an exceptional explanatory power in an attempt to understand the 
American attitude towards wars in general and toward others’ suffering in particular.161 While 
the constructive perspective (strategy, tactics, etc.) of what is called the “American Way of 
War” has been widely discussed,162 the main focus of this work is the cultural dimensions of 
this phenomenon. It is, however, important to understand the historical process that has 
designed the contemporary American public attitudes about war. 
The historiography of the “American Way of War” generally divides this phenomenon 
into three main periods: “The First American Way of War” (from the beginning of the colonies 
until the War of 1812), “The American Way of War” (from the War of 1812 until the end of 
the Cold War) and “The New American Way of War” (since the end of the Cold War until 
today).163 And while all these three are highly interconnected and the characteristics of the 
previous periods ultimately shaped the following ones, each one of these periods played its 
own cultural, social and military role designing the American unique understanding of the war 
phenomenon and, therefore, deserves a short introduction.  
As discussed, the impact of the frontier on the European germs shaped the American 
character creating its own specific cultural narratives. It also played a vital role in shaping what 
is characterised as “The First American Way of Way”.164 As many historians already pointed 
to the fact that the encounter between European military culture and the wilderness with its 
inhabitants (i.e., native Americans) and their military culture created something very distinctive 
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from the European practice of war165 - “the interaction of military cultures in New England … 
produced a compound more toxic than either of its elements”166 While both, the European 
colonists and the native Americans used to have unwritten codes of warfare that regulated and 
restricted violence predominantly to battlefields, their encounters produced a startling wanton 
outcome. The frontier freed the European mind not only from the social restrictions discussed 
above, it unleashed the European-style warfare from the formalised European practice of war, 
where “armed conflict remained a ritualised activity, regulated by a code of honour and fought 
between armies, not entire population.”167 From the very beginning the military experience of 
the New World was characterised by a violent style of what the 18th century writers called la 
petite guerre – early Americans understood war not as a clash between military organisations, 
but rather as: “disrupting enemy troops, supply, and support networks … ambushing and 
destroying enemy detachments … and, most important, destroying enemy villages and fields 
and killing and intimidating non-combatant population.”168  
The American Revolution was a culminating point of the “First American Way of War” 
on both strategic and tactical levels. While the struggle against British forces were managed 
more or less according to the old European traditions, the military operations on the frontier, 
against the indigenous Indians, between 1774 and 1783 emphasised the extravagant violence 
of  the American petite guerre tactics.169 In other words, in terms of fighting against native 
Americans, the goal was their subjugation through violence; in terms of fighting Britain, it was 
a mild revolution “staged by reluctant rebels for limited goals, which were well within their 
reach.”170 From this perspective, the American Revolution is the best example of what today’s 
American military calls asymmetric irregular warfare171 – “to win, the British army had to 
destroy the Continental Army. The Continental Army had only to survive.”172  
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It is important to note, however, that the war on the frontier, rather than the civilised 
battles with the British, were those which shaped the “First American Way of War” and its 
brutality. Moreover, the conquest of the wilderness from its natives engraved in the American 
mind the two main ways to justify war. The European jus ad bellum, based on the Christian 
traditions, generally justified wars when “military actions [were] undertaken by lawful 
sovereigns for legitimate causes, such as self-defence or avenging the wrong.”173  The frontier, 
lacking “lawful sovereigns” by its definition, simplified this concept to pure vengeance and a 
strong belief that through facing the primitive and heathen population with violence, Americans 
do God’s work.174  While the first justification of war as vengeance derives from human nature 
that is not unique to Americans, the second one deserves a more detailed discussion. 
The origins of the beliefs that war against native Americans, those “savage beasts or 
evil instruments of the devil,”175 is God’s work are based on the Christian traditions of the 
Puritans, who were the first to wage these wars on the frontier and held a “strong hostility 
towards cultures unlike their own.”176 During over four centuries of American history, the sense 
of promotion of God’s Will, as a justification of war, has been transformed into a narrative of 
rightness of war fought against a savage enemy. The “First American Way of War” engraved 
in the American mind that war is about “the righteous cause, … the brutish enemy, … and the 
cold indifference to the suffering of the natives.”177     
 The successful end of the Revolution and the establishment of the U.S. Army in 1784 
opened a new chapter in American military history. The 19th century, and especially the Civil 
War, shaped what Russell Weigley considers as “The American Way of War”. Based on the 
traditions of the petite guerre against native Americans, rather than on restricted war against 
the British, Americans encouraged the belief that “the object of war is nothing less than the 
enemy’s destruction.” 178 This belief helped in shaping one of the most distinctive American 
qualities of conducting wars – extreme aggressiveness “at all levels of conflict, from tactical 
(the conduct of individual fights) to operational (the orchestration of battles in time and space) 
to the strategic (the planning out of campaigns to achieve the objectives of war).”179 The 
“American Way of War” moulded by the Civil War and tuned through the First World War, 
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triumphed in the Second World War.180 Describing the four main characteristics of this 
“American Way of War”, Eliot Cohen emphasised – excessive aggressiveness, decisiveness, 
lack of constraints (political or material) and “bright” lines between politicians and military;181 
it is important, nonetheless, to understand the socio-cultural roots of these narratives embedded 
in the American character.  
Constructed by the frontier philosophy and decisive, as well as destructive, wars with 
the native Americans, waged with the purpose of a pure military defeat, rather than political 
resolution or compromise,182 American military minds tended to give “little regard to the non-
military consequences of what they were doing.”183  Unlike the classic Clausewitzian view that 
“war is a mere continuation of policy by other means”, 184 the “American Way of War” is built 
on the assumption that “[an] inter-state war [is] not a continuation of political intercourse, but 
a symptom of its failure.”185  The U.S. Army’s textbook on strategy, published in 1936, simply 
stated that: 
Politics and strategy are radically and fundamentally things apart. Strategy begins 
where politics end. All that soldiers ask is that once policy settled, strategy and 
command shall regarded as being in a sphere apart from politics.186 
From that perspective, in the American mind, a war is an unfortunate obstacle that stands 
between them and achieving their “dream”, and, as it was discussed above, it has to be 
overcame as soon as possible. As Colin Gray put it: “Americans have approached warfare as 
regrettable occasional evil that has to be concluded as decisively and rapidly as possible.”187 
This predisposition, quite an apolitical one, towards war offers a possible explanation of an 
interesting and, to some degree, contradicting aspect about “The American Way of War”. 
While the American character is built on the sense of opportunity and exploiting available 
prospects for one’s own benefits, through their history Americans generally failed to  utilise 
the political opportunities created by wars and too often the U.S. military efforts “have not been 
suitably cashed in the coin of political advantage.”188      
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 While many scholars would argue that this “American Way of War” is still prevalent 
in the American way of conducting wars in the beginning of the 21st century,189 others argue 
that since the end of the Cold War, a “New American Way of War” has been developing.190 
The main argument in favour of this new approach is that in the era of a proactive exercise in 
the policing of the so called Pax Americana, the American way of war has been adopting itself 
to the use of warfare as a political instrument.191 Regardless of this theoretical discourse, the 
realities of the American armed confrontations in the last decades clearly show that American 
cultural predispositions, which originated from the previous two periods, are still in the heart 
of the American military activity. 
The American mind-set still considers war as a temporary unfortunate disruption and, 
fuelled by historical inherent violence it believes that the most moral approach to wage war is 
“at the highest possible intensity in order to finish it as soon as possible.”192 Moreover, based 
on the narrative of the “First American Way of War” that Americanised the wilderness, 
Americans still justify war as a right act of vengeance and as a rightful act intended to “free” 
or “protect” local population, promoting (American) democracy, (American) freedom and 
(American) rule of law. On the one hand, the extreme sense of vengeance can be clearly seen 
in the request of a mourning father, who had lost his son in the 9/11 attack, “to put his [son’s] 
name on some piece of armament in the Iraq War.”193 On the other, the intense sense of the 
right cause is emphasised by another father, who, meeting his son coming back from almost 5 
years in the Taliban’s captivity, said “he was proud how far his son was willing to go to help 
the Afghan people.”194 Addressing these two vital narratives of the American cultural ways to 
justify war, President Bush told Congress and the public, just days after the 9/11 attack that,   
Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our 
grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies 
to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.195 
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This chapter explores the reasons behind the fact that the American military has failed 
to employ NLW. American political decision-makers are, undoubtedly, very sensitive to public 
attitudes regarding their (and American military as well) performance. Facing domestic 
political pressure to decrease civilian casualties during American military operations, the 
American leadership would definitely look for a way to solve this problem. The main question, 
however, is whether the American public cultural attitudes, based on their inherent violence, 
aggressiveness, justification of revenge and an excessive belief in the rightness of everything 
American, are predisposed towards valuing the lives of the enemy’s population. 
The analysis of the “First American Way of War” clearly shows that the roots of the 
American approach to conduct warfare are everything but an appreciation of enemy population, 
“the European settlement of America was a violent affair, arguably genocide … [and] that 
experience, lasting nearly three centuries, shaped Americans’ attitudes toward war, particularly 
the depiction of the enemy.”196 The different ways (against native Americans and against the 
British) in which Americans fought during the Revolution engraved in the American mind that 
rules of war apply differently on somebody who does not share the same race, religion and 
culture.197 The Civil War was definitely a crucial turning point in designing American cultural 
attitudes towards war, however, it seems that the then established “American Way of War” 
changed very little, if at all, in the American attitude towards the enemy’s population – “of all 
the enemies the United States has fought in its history, the enemy population most intensely 
hated was probably the Japanese in World War II”198 – the culminating point of the “American 
Way of War”. Analysing American public attitudes from the Second World War, through 
Korea, Vietnam and the rest of American military operations up to Kosovo, John Mueller 
concluded that “[Americans] seem to be remarkably insensitive to casualties suffered by 
foreigners including essentially uninvolved – that is, innocent – civilians.”199 Although, an 
analysis of American views about the use of nuclear weapons, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 
1945 that targeted civilian population, shows that the approval of the bombing has been 
diminishing over time – from 85% in 1945 to 55% in 1994 – it still remains very high.200 More 
contemporary surveys show that this tendency has not changed much, as in 2015 “the share of 
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Americans who believe the use of nuclear weapons [against civilian population] was justified 
is 56%”.201 
  If something has changed in the American attitude towards war that can be related to 
the so called “New American Way of War” is sensitiveness to friendly casualties, especially 
when war discords with the American inherent cultural perceptions of war – decisive 
aggressiveness with a fast resolution. The experiences of the Korean War and, especially the 
War in Vietnam, proved that “Americans don’t like to see their fathers and sons dying, 
especially in long wars fought over unclear limited objectives.”202 Moreover, since the 
evolution of a high-technology way in warfare, this understandable sensitivity to friendly 
casualties in wars has been fuelled by an expectation for an exceedingly low casualty rate, due 
to the fact that new technologies allow minimising mortal danger, to which American soldiers 
are exposed.203     
  It is important to note that even this increasing value of Americans’ lives is very 
relative. When a war is congruent with the American cultural predispositions, they are ready 
to tolerate casualties. As polls showed, in October 2001, directly after the 9/11 attacks, 
“anywhere from about 60 to 75 percent expressed a tolerance for ‘substantial’ casualties … 
and said they still would consider the war to be worth its costs.”204 Moreover, the following 
wars, in Afghanistan and Iraq, proved again that the American public shows “relatively little 
concern about civilian casualties incurred in the war.”205 Even after high profile incidents with 
a high number of enemy civilian casualties, such as the Wedding Party Incident in Afghanistan 
in 2002,206 or the Marketplace Incident in Iraq in 2003,207 the American public showed an 
astonishing obtuseness, continuing to support “brave American soldiers” fighting against a 
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“brutish enemy”.  Despite vast and mainly negative coverage of these incidents in the domestic 
and foreign media outlets: after the first incident, official polls showed that about 83% of 
Americans still approved the U.S. military action in Afghanistan;208 and after the second 
incident this approval was even raised from 75% to 77%.209 
 
 An analysis of the American public reaction to civilian deaths caused by the U.S. 
military in the last two decades (Iraq, 1991; Kosovo, 1999, Afghanistan 2001; Iraq, 2003) 
stated that “very large majorities [of Americans] consistently stated their belief that civilian 
casualties in these wars were unavoidable accidents of war.”210 Even during the peak of the 
American anti-war protests, during the Vietnam War, the argument that American military 
causing the deaths of innocent civilians was extremely marginal – in 1967, only 6 percent of 
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responses to the question “What two or three things about the war in Vietnam most trouble you 
personally?” referred to civilian casualties.211 
 
American public opinion, based on the inherent American attitudes towards war is far from 
pressuring political and defence decision-makers to minimise enemy civilian casualties in wars. 
In the light of this American cultural context, it is difficult to disagree with Ralph Peters, who 
stated in his very controversial book “Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph?” that: 
The citizenry of the United States, in fact, will tolerate the killing of enormous 
numbers of foreigners, so long as that killing does not take too long, victory is 
clear-cut, friendly casualties are comparatively low, and the enemy dead do not 
have names, faces, and families. 212   
 
Part Four: American Military Culture and NLW 
The existent research clearly shows that many of the previously discussed features of 
the American character have shaped American military culture, as Colin Gray concluded: 
“American strategic culture … [is] the product of the significantly unique American historical 
experience.”213 For example, researchers often interpret the U.S. interventions in Iraq as a 
continuation of the American frontier,214 or point to the fact that American traditional apolitical 
strategy (i.e., the separation between politics and military activity)215 leads the U.S. “to fight 
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the wars as if they were battles …[confusing] the winning of campaigns … with the winning 
of wars.”216  
This research focuses on the failure of the American military to successfully employ 
NLW, i.e., combine military technology with accordingly formulated concepts of operations 
and military organisation. Consequently, it seems important to analyse the role of technology 
in the American military culture in general and what the American military thought has to say 
about NLW in particular. 
American Military Culture and Technology. 
One of the most prominent features of American military culture is a great emphasis on 
technology. Reflecting the growth of American industrialism and consequent capitalism in the 
19th century and the American pioneering of mass production process in the early 20th century, 
American military culture has been shaped around the concept of overwhelming the enemy by 
logistic superiority and state-of-the-art technology.217 While some argue that the American way 
of war can be more often described as logistic, rather strategic,218 the majority agree that 
“reliance on advance technology has been a central pillar of the American way of war… [and] 
no nation in recent history has placed greater emphasis upon the role of technology in planning 
and waging war then the United States.”219 
The military fascination with technology is deeply rooted in the American culture itself. 
In the 19th century, America’s productivity powered by European immigrants suffered from a 
shortage of skilled craftsmen, who preferred to stay in Europe, and Americans were forced to 
“invent and use machines as substitutes for human skill and muscle.”220 This technological 
enthusiasm and general faith in technological solutions have been successfully adopted by the 
American military culture that started to seek refuge from difficult problems of strategy in 
technology.221 Moreover, America’s geographical position in the world created a drive for 
technological means to project power. While European armies (except for the British) could 
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just march into battle, Americans historically developed and emphasised technologically based 
abilities: first of all, the navy, then the air force and then missile based nuclear power.222       
In the American mind, as already mentioned, war is an unfortunate, but temporary, 
trouble that has to be solved as quickly and decisively, as possible. This approach to war 
combined with the traditional pro-technological orientation created almost an instinctive 
reliance of American strategists on technology.223 Despite the fact that the experience of 
Vietnam created certain scepticism of technological omnipotence, the general techno-craze and 
the trust of technology – a “silver bullet” promising a decisive victory – have never been 
abandoned.224 American military has always been preoccupied by the application of 
technological solutions to strategic problems, thus driven (and usually capable of) to acquire 
exceedingly expensive state-of-the-art technology, often unable to comprehend that technical 
sophistication does not guarantee success in conflicts.225 
The experience of the First Gulf War reinforced the American technological 
romanticism in military affairs putting an end to the scepticism of the Vietnam generation. In 
the wake of the overwhelming victory, the American trust in technology has never been 
stronger creating vast debate whether the world had witnessed a Revolution in Military 
Affairs.226  Mesmerised by their technological triumph, American military signified the 
revolutionary technology itself as a driving change, refusing to understand that operational 
concepts and organisational adaptations are “more important than either new technology or 
getting it fielded in a significant number of systems.”227 
The extended irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, so similar to Vietnam, shook 
the American reliance on advanced technology as a key solution to any military puzzle. It 
seems, however, that despite the desperate battle of the American strategists to argue for true 
RMA, American culture struggles to accept that war is not simply a matter of applying 
technology correctly.228 In the American military mind, the best (if not the only) way to 
improve the performance of the military is by an amelioration of technology, rather than the 
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way it is used, or misused, through overuse. In other words, to put it simply: if the performance 
is poor, it is the fault of the gadget, rather than the way it is used. 
Consequently, this techno-utopia in military affairs leads American military to embrace 
new technologies first, speculating about their revolutionary promises, and think about their 
conceptual and organisational requirements later. The best example is the early-1990s 
information-technology-led transformation that integrated precision-guided munitions, novel 
command and control technologies, and advance reconnaissance capabilities.229 Fascinated by 
the overwhelming success of American technology in the Gulf War, Admiral William A. 
Owens stated in 1995, that “we have decided to build what some of us call the system of 
systems; namely, interactions that will give us dominant battlespace knowledge and the ability 
to take full military advantage of it.”230 Eight years later, the United States, which was “the 
first nation to emerge in the post-revolutionary era” and was “equipped with proficiencies” that 
promised “change the character of warfare as it has been known for centuries,”231 found itself 
in Iraq, realising that many military problems just cannot be solved purely in technical terms.232 
It seems, however, that this disappointment has not changed the American way of thinking 
about technology. For example, a document published in 2013,“Capstone Concept for Joint 
Operations: Joint Force 2020”, providing general guides to future force development and 
transformation, is awash with prudent words on the future security environment; at its core, 
however, lie carefully crafted requirements for the next generation of technological 
capabilities.233    
American military history, undoubtedly, is full of technological marvels. Moreover, the 
American mind considers technology as the lodestone of military success. Americans are easily 
enthralled by novel technologies, but facing operational disappointment, they, similarly, easily 
accept their delusion. Yet, due to their cultural predispositions, when they hit their fingers, 
Americans will always seek to improve the hammer, rather than the way they hold the nail. 
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American Military Thought and NLW 
 As Americans have approached warfare as the regrettable occasional evil, and a war as 
a temporary affair, it is not surprising that scholars report a strong preference of American 
military tradition to value practice rather than theory, and neglect the importance of 
professional military education, required for the constant preparation for a future conflict.234 
Americans traditionally believe in their technological and logistical superiority, and take for 
granted that it will enable them to concentrate enough forces and firepower, achieving what 
they consider as the main objective of war – “the complete overthrow of the enemy, [and] the 
destruction of his military.”235 Consequently, it is not surprising that scholars report that 
historically the U.S. did not develop excellence in strategy and comprehensive military thought 
– it simply did not have to.236 
 The presence and the quality of professional military education have been considered 
by scholars as an important factor in the analysis of the strategic thinking and conceptual 
military thought.237  While the American military has an extensive network of professional 
education institutions intended to tutor officers’ corps at different levels, the view prevails that 
“education is a luxury for the American military rather than a necessity.”238 Professional 
education has never been considered by the American military establishment as a career-
enhancing experience.239 In other words, as Williamson Murray concludes: “[the military] 
failed to enunciate a clear vision of why it believes professional military education to be 
important.”240 
 The American military mind, trapped in the industrial age, tends to reduce strategic 
problems to technical equations and undervalue (if not even scorn) the ability of systematic 
conceptualisation and theorising.241 Moreover, significant cultural differences between 
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different Services (Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marines),242 combined with a strong sense of 
inter-rivalry and the fact that traditionally the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have only advisory 
power243 – all have led to a situation where no single institution in the American military 
possess an integral grasp of the strategic environment enabling the development of all-inclusive 
theoretical concepts. For example, in the 1990s, when different Services had their own 
conceptual understanding of the information-technology-led RMA, and the JCS produced 
concepts that were “lack of any significant intellectual content” with “interminable laundry 
lists of bureaucratic concerns” that were “best suited to insomniacs,”244 the American military 
was just unable to realise the revolutionary implications of the novel technology – 
technological seeds preceded the maturation of the conceptual ones.245    
  Consequently, it is not surprising that an analysis of the American official documents, 
conceptualising development and employment of NLW, shows very similar situation – a 
convoluted nexus of advisory, consultative and coordinating policies unable to produce one 
clear comprehensive concept that will define the required technological capabilities of NLW 
and the conceptually novel ways of their employment.  
For example, according to the Department of Defense NLW policy, NLW have the 
potential to enhance the commander’s ability to:  
(1) Deter, discourage, delay, or prevent hostile and threatening actions; (2) Deny 
access to and move, disable, and suppress individuals; (3) Stop, disable, divert, and 
deny access to vehicles and vessels; (4) Adapt and tailor escalation of force options 
to the operational environment; (5) Employ capabilities that temporarily 
incapacitate personnel and materiel while minimizing the likelihood of casualties 
and damage to critical infrastructure; (6) De-escalate situations to preclude lethal 
force; (7) Precisely engage targets; (8) Enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of 
lethal weapons; (9) Capture or incapacitate high value targets; (10) Protect the 
force. 246 
But, according to the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program (JNLWP), a directorate that 
“stimulates and coordinates” NLW requirements of all U.S. Armed Services, yet is, in fact, 
located under the Commandant of the Marine Corps,247 NLW are supposed to be able to:  
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(1) Deny access into/out of an area to individuals (open/confined) 
(single/few/many); (2) Disable individuals (open/confined) (single/few/many);(3) 
Move individuals through an area (open/confined) (single/few/many); (4) Suppress 
individuals (open/confined) (single/few/many); (5) Stop small vehicle; (6) Stop 
medium vehicle; (7) Stop large vehicle; (8) Disable vehicle/many vehicles; (9) Stop 
small vessel; (10) Stop large vessel; (11) Disable vessel/many vessels; (12) Stop 
fixed-wing aircraft on the ground; (13) Disable aircraft on the ground; (14) Divert 
aircraft in the air; (15) Deny access to facility.248 
While, facing these differences, one can argue that DOD defines more conceptual aspects and 
JNLWP translates them into more technical requirements, the U.S. Army has produced its own 
list, entirely different from these two, according to which NLW should enhance the capability 
of a Joint Force in the accomplishment of the following objectives: 
(1) Discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions; (2) Limit escalation; (3) Take 
military action in situations where the use of lethal force is either not the preferred 
option, or is not permitted under the established Rules of Engagement (ROE); (4) 
Better protect our forces; (5) Disable equipment, facilities, and enemy personnel; 
(6) Engage and control people through civil affairs operations and Psychological 
Operations (PSYOP); (7) Dislodge enemy from positions without causing 
extensive collateral damage; (8) Separate combatants from noncombatants; (9) 
Deny terrain to the enemy. 249 
 It seems that the story of NLW in the U.S. military detrimentally follows the traditional 
narrative of the American military culture – the inability to produce and coordinate 
comprehensive concepts for conceptually new technologies. While JSC argue that “minor 
lapses in conduct or application of fires could seriously damage the international reputation of 
the United Stated”250 and the DOD Defense Science Board claims that “with respect to the 
human toll on innocent civilians, the U.S. strategy is to reduce collateral damage,”251 only the 
U.S. Army successfully addresses this true demand from NLW: to “dislodge enemy from 
positions without causing extensive collateral damage” and “separate combatants from 
noncombatants.”252 Moreover, the Army goes further in its conceptualization, trying to suggest 
a required organisational change that will accommodate NLW:  
The future Modular Force, specifically, must be provided with organic nonlethal 
capabilities to disrupt, dislocate, disorganize, disintegrate, fix, isolate, suppress, 
and destroy enemy functions. Joint force commanders (JFCs), furthermore, must 
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be provided with multifunctional/multirole lethality options in integrated 
multipurpose system configurations … The future Modular Force Soldier must 
have the ability to employ a wide array of lethal and nonlethal munitions based 
upon mission need and force protection.253 
 It seems that the U.S. Army is the one oasis in the desert that is the theoretical 
conceptualisation of NLW.  Nevertheless, it is important to state that similar to the case of the 
information RMA of the 1990s, where academic strategists, such as Andrew Marshall, 
Williamson Murray, Andrew Krepinevich and many others, tried to put the U.S. military on 
the right track, NLW are also not parentless. On the academic forefront of the NLW debate, a 
special place is reserved for Douglas Lovelace Jr. and Steven Metz,254 director and the director 
of research at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, as well as David 
Koplow,255 a professor of law at the Georgetown University, who has held a variety of senior 
defence-related positions in the U.S. government. Since the late 1990s, these scholars theorised 
and anticipated changes that NLW might bring to the way the U.S. military fights its war, 
however, it seems that the military has been able neither to develop an appropriate philosophy, 
nor to find leaders willing to bridge the gap between these theories and practise. 
In the very beginning, following its traditional techno-utopia and tendency to seek for 
a “silver bullet” solution, American military thought embraced NLW as the next big thing.  In 
1998, Lieutenant Colonel James C. Duncan reported: 
General Zinni’s decision to equip the Marines of I Marine Expeditionary Force 
with non-lethal weapons was revolutionary. Without question, his decision has had 
a tremendous impact on all U.S. military forces by providing the stimulus to change 
the perception of non-lethal weapons. In addition, Operation United Shield 
prepared the groundwork for the development of a new concept for the employment 
of nonlethal weapons and moved the U.S. military toward a new age of warfare.256 
 But the first users and main NLW advocators, General Zinni, Colonel Lorenz and 
Lieutenant Colonel Stanton, after their return from Somalia generally labelled NLW as tools 
of “peace operations and armed interventions short of war”257 that “broaden the scope of 
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possible responses to riots and other low-intensity tactical situations.”258 Despite some 
enthusiasts, who tried to promote NLW as systems that “have broad application across the 
entire spectrum of conflict” including armed conflicts, as “battlefields may be shaped through 
operations which employ non-lethal weapons;”259 this vision has never been materialised. Two 
decades after their first employment in Somalia, NLW remain to be considered by the 
American military thought as means for law enforcement activity only – the 2012 Non-Lethal 
Weapons Training and Readiness Manual, published by the Marine Corp, speaks about 
performing riot control formations and deploying civil disturbance units, rather than an 
employment of NLW on the battlefield.260    
 The case of NLW in the U.S. military perfectly demonstrates that, as per usual with the 
American military culture, American military thought struggles to produce and implement a 
comprehensive theoretical and conceptual basis for new technologies. Despite the warning of 
the early NLW users that “Tools are not the problem. The solution […] is not to produce more 
nonlethal technology; it is to set clear policy goals and objectives,”261 due to its cultural 
characteristics, the American military has failed to produce these goals and policies and take 
NLW out of their niche of strictly law enforcement purposes. 
 
Part Five: Conclusions 
Analysing the history of NLW in the U.S., it is important to highlight that the peak of 
American interest in NLW coincided with the employment of other revolutionary technologies 
related to the information-led RMA, in general, and precision-guided munitions, in particular. 
During that time, the mainstream discussion was that the major purpose of these technologies 
was to provide the U.S. military with higher precision, faster reaction and, more importantly, 
higher lethality. Thus, it is not surprising that the role of NLW remained at the periphery of 
American thinking at that time.262  
Moreover, since then, the American military establishment has never felt stressed by its 
political leadership to reduce civilian casualties from the politically acceptable level to the 
                                                          
258 Martin Stanton, ‘What Price Sticky Foam?’, Parameters, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, 1996, pp. 63-68.  
259 James Duncan, ‘A Primer on the Employment…’, p.33; Also see Timothy Lamb, Emerging Non-Lethal 
Weapons Technology and Strategic Policy Implications for 21st Century Warfare, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army 
War College, 1998); Douglas Lovelace, Steven Metz, Nonlethality and American Land Power… 
260 United Stated Marine Corp, Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual, Washington, 
2012. 
261 Martin Stanton, ‘What Price Sticky Foam?’. 
262 Steven Metz, ‘Non-Lethality and the Revolution in Military Affairs…’. 
125 
 
minimum possible – the war in Iraq proved that American political tolerance of the enemy 
civilian casualties is very high. While in Iraq there were no the Second World War-style city 
bombing like in Hamburg, Dresden or Tokyo, or the carpet bombing of the 1960s in 
Vietnam,263 after four years of war, the American public opinion expressed very little concern 
about 200,000 Iraqi civilian deaths.  
While the frontier officially disappeared at the end of the 19th century, it has never 
disappeared from the American military culture that has continued to maintain the myth of the 
“First American Way of War”. Analysing the linguistic and practical discourses of the U.S. 
military in Iraq, anthropologists highlight that on the metaphorical level the “Wild West” is 
very much alive and kicking within the American military.264 During the Iraqi War, statements 
like “Anbar [a province of Iraq] has the savagery, lawlessness and violence of America’s Wild 
West” or “We refer to our base as ‘Fort Apache’ because its right in the middle of Indian 
Country” had become a norm, representing not only an attempt to “recapitulate the presumed 
success of the U.S. military against Native Americans,”265 but also the relevance of the violent 
approach of the “First American Way of War” towards the local “savage and uncivilised” 
population. 
On the international arena, Washington has succeeded to maintain the “good” intentions 
of the U.S. military activity. Shaped by the inherent belief in American destiny as a City upon 
the Hill, American politicians have successfully projected this image onto international arena, 
as President Bush put it in 2004:  
Like generations before us, we have a calling from beyond the stars to stand for 
freedom. This is the everlasting dream of America … we go forward, grateful for 
our freedom, faithful to our cause, and confident in the future of the greatest nation 
on Earth.266 
The “we are good” image of America – as the protector of the free world against a great evil, 
two main narratives of the Cold War era foreign policy – has been successfully utilised to 
minimise the influence of international criticism, as well as to improve the already high 
domestic support. In addition, the strategy of “collations of the willing” (when it was 
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implemented) successfully eliminated American unilateral political responsibility for the 
consequences of U.S. military activity, helping to spread the criticism among as many players 
as possible. 
One of the main reasons for the lack of progress with NLW, is the fact that in the context 
of American culture, the idea of non-lethality sounds like an oxymoron. As discussed, the 
American mind, bred on the violence and the sense of vengeance of the frontier, perceives war 
as a temporary unfortunate phenomenon that has to be resolved as quickly and aggressively as 
possible – this approach leaves very little space for the appreciation of enemy population. 
Furthermore, American military culture, predisposed towards projection of excessive 
firepower, combined with a view that the military activity is temporary, leaves even less room 
for weapons that are not intended to improve the range, accuracy, speed or lethality of the 
forces. Despite the fact that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were anything but short, due to 
the inability of American military culture to deal with prolonged conflicts, these interventions 
were, in fact, “truly long wars fought one year at a time.”267  
While the American military cultural context paid very little respect for the enemy’s 
population, it will be incorrect to claim that the U.S. military did not try to reduce civilian 
casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. Army Lieutenant General Curtis Scapaaotti, the former 
commander of ISAF Joint Command in Afghanistan, stated in his foreword to the handbook 
titled “Afghanistan Civilian Casualties Prevention” that: 
Lethal force is part of war, and we must ensure our soldiers can protect themselves 
at all times. However, we must take measures to mitigate the impact on the civilian 
populace we are protecting. Through deliberate planning, training, tactical 
patience, and effective mission execution, the number of civilian casualty incidents 
can be significantly decreased and these negative effects minimized. 268 
Interestingly enough, neither his address, nor the handbook itself, paid attention to the 
technological way to reduce civil casualties. While the handbook has a very small chapter 
dedicated to NLW that, in fact, is no more than just a list of available weapons, the main 
emphasis of the handbook is on the use of lethal force in a way that will try to reduce civilian 
casualties, by force training, planning considerations and consequence management. 
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 On the one hand, as was discussed above, in the American military mind-set technology 
is a lodestar of military success. On the other hand, facing the problem of civilian casualties, 
the U.S. military decided to adapt the application of lethal forces, rather than utilise NLW – 
the most prompting technological solution. The explanation of this contradictory behaviour is 
simple. A full implementation of the RMA of NLW demands significant political pressure, in 
the case of NLW – political pressure to minimise civilian casualties. Collateral damage, civilian 
casualties and even “small massacres” are considered by American mind as unfortunate, 
accidental, but an inevitable, outcome of war,269 and therefore politically defensible.  It is 
important to note that after a decade of American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. 
military began to understand that “the impact of CIVCAS [civil casualties] has increased to the 
point that single tactical actions can have strategic consequences and limit overall freedom of 
action.”270 Consequently, it will be wrong to claim that there was no political pressure at all, it 
was definitely there, just not powerful enough to demand radical changes that are required for 
the implementation of revolutionary technologies. 
This lack of political pressure, however, was not the only reason for the failure of the 
RMA of NLW in the U.S. Due to traditional military style and culture, American military was 
unable to produce a clear and comprehensive vision of what is required from NLW. Based on 
the early assumption that NLW have merely law enforcement role, due to its cultural, structural 
and historical contexts, American military thought was incapable of developing the conceptual 
basis required for the RMA of NLW. Without clear military concept regarding NLW, and 
without extensive political pressure that will require maximum possible minimisation of 
civilian casualties, NLW are condemned to remain a marginal and oxymoronic phenomenon 
in the history of the technological adventures of the U.S. military.  
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 THE (ABSENCE OF THE) RMA OF NLW IN RUSSIA 
 
Introduction 
The development and use of Non-Lethal Weapons for law enforcement purposes in the 
former U.S.S.R. was more or less similar to the developments in the West.  Different chemical, 
kinetic and acoustical special munitions have been employed by both the Ministry of Interior 
(MVD) Forces and the Russian Ministry of Defence. The MVD has employed NLW at least 
since the 1970s.1 However, it is important to note that until today it uses the term special’nie 
sredstva (special means) that has no generic definition, but represents a list of different means, 
tools, and other equipment, including NLW, which police officers have the right to use in 
specific situations for specific purposes. The list of equipment, as well as when and how it can 
be used, is regulated by Russian Criminal Law.2 The Russian Ministry of Defence, interestingly 
enough, employs a different term – orug’ie neleta’nogo de’stviya (weapon with non-lethal 
action), 3 which is closer to the Western approach. 
The difference between these two terms is not only semantic. While the first is a part 
of federal legislation and represents a very concrete list of means and weapons approved for 
police use, the second one presents a more abstract concept, mainly based on Western 
approaches.4  Despite the fact that the Russian Ministry of Defence made an attempt to 
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formalise the status of NLW in the Russian Military Forces, by publishing in 2009 “The 
Conception to the Development and Employment of Weapons with Non-Lethal Action in the 
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”; it seems that this attempt has not been so successful.5 
Following this introduction, the discussion will be divided into five parts. The first part 
analyses the current situation with NLW in Russia. It discusses the state of technology offered 
by the Russian manufacturers and the level of the actual employment of NLW by Russian 
military forces. The second part focuses on the aspects of Russian foreign policy. As it was 
discussed previously, one of the main aspects, which has a potential to increase the employment 
of NLW, is the international political pressure and criticism that calls for the reduction of 
collateral damage and civilian deaths during military operations. During the Second Chechen 
War (1999-2009) and the Russo-Georgian War (2008) Russian armed forces were vastly 
criticised for harming civilian population and causing intensive collateral damage. For 
example, in 2000, the New York-based Human Rights Watch criticised the large number of 
civilian casualties caused by what it called "the widespread and often indiscriminate bombing 
and shelling by Russian forces" in Grozny and elsewhere.6 In 2008, Amnesty International 
criticised Russian aerial attacks in Georgia, in which “civilians were killed or injured” as the 
attacks “failed to distinguish between military objectives and civilians.”7 In an addition to the 
NGOs, different international actors have constantly criticised Russian armed forces for 
causing civilian casualties Criticism for causing civilian casualties. For example, in 2000, 
American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright criticised Russia for “the persistent, credible 
reports of human rights violations by Russian forces in Chechnya, including extrajudicial 
killings.”8 This part will discuss the “political will” of Russian policy-makers to withstand this 
pressure and the reasons behind their resistance, or compliance. It is important to note that an 
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7 Amnesty International, Georgia-Russia conflict: Protection of civilians and accountability for abuses should be 
a priority for all, Public Statement, 1 October 2008, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20081111011924/http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR04/004/2008/en/3
b540f63-8ef1-11dd-8d03-3f760a3cc4a3/eur040042008en.pdf, [accessed: 14 March 2016]. 
8 U.S. Mission Geneva, U.S. Response to Human Rights Commission Resolution on Chechnya, 26 April 2000, 
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analysis of Russia’s “political will” and Moscow’s attitude toward international pressure in the 
second decade of 21st century has to focus on the Russia’s interpretation of their own political 
history, rather than try to establish an objective understanding of their political decisions. In 
other words, it is important to analyse how Russian political decision-makers interpret their 
current and former foreign policies, how they explain their activity on the international arena 
today and how they cope with international criticism. Consequently, this part will be based 
solely on Russian sources, combining academic articles and books, opinions of Russian 
political analysts, and official speeches or published interviews with Russian politicians. 
The third part concentrates on cultural aspects of Russian society. More specifically, in 
an attempt to explain the existence (or lack of it) of internal political pressure for the wider 
employment of NLW, this part offers insight into the Russian cultural understanding of war 
and the value of human life. The fourth part analyses the attitudes of Russian military cultural 
attitudes toward technological innovations in general, and NLW in particular. It is important to 
note that while this part follows the development of Russian military thought in this field and 
its influence on the employment of NLW, due to the fact that most of the official Russian 
documents on NLW are still classified, this analysis is limited to open source publications. 
The final fifth part integrates the previous four in an attempt to explain the reasons 
behind the failure of the RMA of NLW in Russia. Based on political and cultural aspects, it 
clarifies why despite the range of available NLW and well defined military concepts for their 
employment, Russian military still holds back from using them.           
 
Part One: The Status of Non-Lethal Weapons in Russia 
While, as discussed above, the development and employment of NLW by Soviet and 
later Russian law enforcement agencies were independent but followed similar lines to those 
of the West; the growth of interest toward these weapons in the Russian military has been 
directly influenced9 by the Western (especially American) military attitudes emerged in the 
                                                          
9This influence can be easily traced in the Russian publications about military employment of NLW. See: V. 
Selivanov, ‘Oruzhiye neletal'nogo deystviya…’; S. Savrasov, ‘Kontseptsiya primeneniya oruzhiya neletal'nogo 
deystviya v boyevykh operatsiyakh sukhoputnykh voysk VS SSHA’, [‘The Policy of the U.S. Army's 
Employment of NLWs in Combat Operations’], Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 10, 2009, pp. 37-44; V. 
Antipov, S. Novichkov, ‘K voprosu o razrabotke i primenenii neletal'nykh sredstv porazheniya na khimicheskoy 
osnove’, [‘Regarding the Question about the Development and Employment of Non-Lethal Means Based on 
Chemicals’], Voenaya Misl’, No. 9, 2009, pp. 54-61; V. Vladimirov, G. Chernikh, ‘Sostoyaniye i osnovnyye 
napravleniya razvitiya oruzhiya neletal'nogo deystviya, sredstv i sposobov zashchity ot nego’, [‘The Current 
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mid-1990s.10 The analysis of Western policies and views on the future of NLW brought the 
Russian decision-makers to the understanding of the important potential of these technologies 
for future military operations. This understanding culminated in the second part of the 2000s 
with the publication of two pivotal documents: “The Conception to the Development and 
Employment of Weapons with Non-Lethal Action” (Kontseptsiya sozdaniya i primeneniya 
oruzhiya neletal'nogo deystviya) published by the Military-Industrial Committee of the 
Government of the Russian Federation in 2005, and “The Conception to the Development and 
Employment of Weapons with Non-Lethal Action in the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation” (Kontseptsiya sozdaniya i primeneniya oruzhiya neletal'nogo deystviya v 
Vooruzhennykh Silakh Rossiyskoy Federatsii) approved by the Russian Minister of Defence in 
2009.11  
This apparent enthusiasm emanating from the highest level of political-military 
decision-makers was swiftly accepted by different defence industries. In an attempt to answer 
this new fashion for NLW, main weapon developers and manufacturers directed their efforts 
in two different directions. The first one was the adjustment of the existing lethal ordnance 
with non-lethal (mainly chemical) effects. This led to the development and demonstration of a 
spectrum of non-lethal munition filled with chemical irritant-action pyrotechnic composition, 
such as: 105mm munition for RPG grenade launcher, 120mm mortal projectile, Helicopter 
Container Dispenser, and even 500 kg Air Cluster Bomb.12 The second direction was the 
development of new weapons specifically designed as NLW. Although none of the 
manufacturers has demonstrated functioning prototypes, records in open literature indicate at 
least two main fields of research and development activities: Directed Energy weapons13 and 
Electrical weapons for significant distances.14     
                                                          
Situation and Main Directions for the Development of NLW, the Means and Ways of Protection against Them’], 
Strategiya Grazhdanskoy Zashchity': Problemy i Issledovaniya , Volume 2, No. 1(2), 2012, pp. 13-22.  
10The development of the American military approach in 1990s discussed in Chapter 3. 
11Both documents are still classified, however both of them are wildly discussed in the open publications. 
12The XXI Century Encyclopaedia – Russian Arms and Technologies, Volume XII: Ordnance and Munition, 
(Moscow: Arms and Technologies, 2006), pp. 754-765, (Russian/English). 
13I. Petrov, ‘Oruzhiye nesmertel'nogo deystviya’, [‘Weapons with Non-Lethal Action’], Vecherniaia Moskva, No. 
190, October 08, 2004; D. Zaitsev, A. Kudrjashov, D. Maystruk, et al., ‘Perspektivy primeneniya kompleksov 
oruzhiya neletal'nogo deystviya na osnove KVCH-izlucheniya v spetsial'nykh operatsiyakh po presecheniyu 
masovykh besporyadkov’ [‘The Prospects for the Application of Millimeter-Wave NLW in Operations for the 
Suppression of Mass Riots’], Strategicheskaya Stabil’nost’, No. 2(55), 2011, pp. 54-59.  
14E. Stupitskiy, L. Kuznetsova, ‘Issledovaniye vozmozhnosti sozdaniya sredstv elektroshokovogo neletal'nogo 
vozdeystviya na bioob"yekty na bol'shikh rasstoyaniyakh’, [‘The Research of the Possibility to Create Means 
for Non-Lethal Electroshock Impact on Biological Objects from Significant Distance’], Voenaya Misl’, No. 4, 
2013, pp. 38-46. 
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The military force, chosen to be the test-bed for the employment of NLW, was the 
Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO). This unit, rather than the ordinary contingent from the Russian military, 
was selected due to “its primarily tasks, as well as political-military, economic and social-
demographic conditions, in which these tasks have to be accomplished”.15 In other words, as 
CRRF is intended to operate exclusively on the territory of the CSTO countries,16 within 
friendly population, the reduction of collateral damage and civilian casualties seemed to be 
important. The introduction of NLW to CRRF occurred in 2010 during the large training 
operation “Vzaimodeystviye-2010” (Cooperation-2010) in Russia. During the training, a 
company from the Russian 98th Guards Airborne Division and a unit from the Kyrgyz Special 
Forces "Ilbirs" brigade, with the assistance of NLW, performed three followed missions: (1) 
counteracting an enemy ambush, (2) securing the free movement of military convoys through 
the roadblocks organised by a violent civil population, and (3) liberating a village captured by 
irregular forces.17 While this could be a good start for the military usage of NLW in Russia, 
the reality was completely the opposite. Firstly, this training did not involve any NLW 
developed specifically for military use, but was based on existing weapons currently employed 
by the Russian MVD forces, such as irritant and flash-bang hand grenades, 40mm non-lethal 
munition, multipurpose non-lethal pistols, etc.18 Secondly, despite the positive demonstration 
of the role of NLW in future military operations, their further employment has not been 
initiated.  
The initial enthusiasm has been successfully buried by the Russian bureaucracy 
machine. Without any integrating systematic mechanism that organises, regulates and focuses 
the development and employment of NLW, each main governmental service (i.e. MVD, 
Federal Security Service (FSB), and Armed Forces) has developed its own approach, and any 
attempts to coordinate inter-departmental committees were initially doomed to fail due to 
                                                          
15A. Nagovitsyn, A. Grudzinskii’, A. Sporykhin, ‘Oruzhiye neletal'nogo deystviya i perspektivy yego 
ispol'zovaniya v interesakh sil Organizatsii Dogovora o kollektivnoy bezopasnosti’, [‘Weapons with Non-Lethal 
Action and the Perspectives of Their Employment in the Interest of Collective Security Treaty Organization’], 
Voenaya Misl’, No.3, 2011, pp. 51-59.  
16Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Soglasheniye o Kollektivnykh silakh operativnogo 
reagirovaniya Organizatsii Dogovora o kollektivnoy bezopasnosti, [Agreement on the Collective Rapid 
Response Forces of the Collective Security Treaty], Moscow, 14 June, 2009, Article 2. 
17A. Nagovitsyn, A. Grudzinskii’, A. Sporykhin, ‘Oruzhiye neletal'nogo deystviya …’; A. Nagovitsyn, 
‘Ispol'zovaniye oruzhiya neletal'nogo deystviya kollektivnymi silami ODKB’, [‘The Employment of Weapons 
with Non-Lethal Action by CSTO Forces’], Zashchita i Bezopasnost', No. 3(58), 2011, pp. 2-3. 
18A. Nagovitsyn, A. Grudzinskii’, A. Sporykhin, ‘Oruzhiye neletal'nogo deystviya …’; A. Nagovitsyn, 
‘Ispol'zovaniye oruzhiya neletal'nogo deystviya …’. 
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traditional rivalry between these organisations.19 In light of this bureaucratic uncertainty, it is 
not surprising that NLW projects have suffered from insufficient governmental funding,20 and 
without visible potential contracts, the industries have reduced their investments to the 
minimum. Moreover, it is important to state that despite the fact that CRRF is built, mainly, 
from pure military units, it is designated to operate inside the country – a task that is the 
traditional responsibility of MVD internal armed forces. This contradiction has played an 
additional role in the process of the general stagnation regarding NLW after the optimistic 
training in 2010. On the one hand, MVD forces have already had a satisfying arsenal of NLW 
(for their own purposes),21 hence this military employment was a mere adaptation of the 
existing law enforcement weapons and tactics. On the other hand, due to the domestic nature 
of the CRRF’s operational scenarios, the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces saw no reason 
to expand the experience achieved by CRRF to their regular forces, intended to fight on 
conventional battlefields.     
To summarise the current situation with NLW in Russia it is important to focus on two 
main factors. The first one is the technological status. As noted before, Russian defence 
industries have the required technological potential to supply efficient NLW to the military 
forces. While some of these weapons, apparently, will be based on the existing solutions for 
law enforcement agencies,22 Russian manufacturers have the necessary capabilities to produce 
NLW intended specifically for military use (and already demonstrated that).23  The second 
factor is the actual employment of NLW within Russian Armed Forces. It seems that the CRRF 
experience with NLW was a very limited one-time experiment, rather than a test-bed for the 
possible expansion of NLW future employment. In an addition to CRRF, the only other military 
unit that employs NLW is the Russian Military Police,24 which uses these weapons to fulfil its 
security missions, rather than on the battlefield. 
                                                          
19V. Selivanov, D. Levin, I. Ilyin, ‘Metodicheskiye osnovy ...’. 
20V. Korchak, S. Smirnov, ‘Regulirovaniye normativno-pravovykh otnosheniy pri sozdanii oruzhiya neletal'nogo 
deystviya’, [‘The Legislative Regulation Regarding the Development of Weapons with Non-Lethal Action’], 
Kompetentnost', No. 4-5 (45-46), 2007, pp. 3-10. 
21A. Silnikov, ‘Vidy spetsial'nykh sredstv sostoyashchikh na vooruzhenii OVD, i ikh klassifikatsiya’, [‘Types and 
Classification of Special Equipment Adopted by the Russian Interior Ministry Units’], Vestnik Sankt-
Peterburgskogo universiteta MVD Rossii, No. 3(51), 2011, pp. 66-70. 
22The XXI Century Encyclopaedia – Russian Arms and Technologies, Volume XV: Security and Law Enforcement 
Facilities, (Moscow: Arms and Technologies, 2007), pp. 117-140, (Russian/English). 
23The XXI Century Encyclopaedia – Russian Arms and Technologies, Volume XII…, pp. 754-765. 
24 ‘Voyennaya politsiya VVO poluchila partiyu travmaticheskikh pistoletov “Osa”’, [Military Police Received 
Traumatic Pistols “OSA”’], RiaNovosti, 13 February 2014, 
http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20140213/994703801.html, [accessed: 12 July 2014]. 
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While there are no visible substantial plans to expand this situation to the regular Armed 
Forces, it seems important to understand the nature of the main obstacles that prevent the 
further development of NLW. The following two parts discuss the reasons behind the general 
impotence of political decision-makers to coordinate activity in the field of NLW and provide 
substantial funding.   
 
Part Two: Russian Foreign Policy 
The foundations of Russian foreign policy in the second decade of the 21st century lie 
in Russia’s political and economic transformation processes since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. Russian scholars divide this 25 year period into three main parts, waves or generations: 
“Blind” Westernisation (first part of 1990s), Selective Partnership (from mid-1990s to mid-
2000s), and Revitalization of Russia (since mid-2000s).25 While this research is mainly 
interested in the nature of the last generation of Russian foreign policy, a brief discussion of 
the previous two seems vital as they provide a key to the understanding of the current 
“revitalization” concept and its role in Russian response to international criticism. 
According to Professor Alexei Bogaturov, with the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., Russian 
political decision-makers sincerely believed that the Western community was looking for an 
opportunity for political and economic integration with Russia, similarly to the processes 
started with other post-Soviet countries in East Europe.26 The end of the Cold War symbolised 
the unconditional victory of democracy, and the foreign policy of the new-born democratic 
Russia was based on two main concepts: (1) securing favourable international conditions for 
the building of democracy in Russia, and (2) that the main and universal value is the 
democratization of the World.27 The political notion, in the early 1990s, was that Russian 
domestic and international success had to be based, not only on a Russian attempt to be more 
similar to the West, but, in fact, on the Russian effort to be a part of the West. The best example 
of Russian attempts to be integrated with the West was the 1992 Charter for American-Russian 
                                                          
25A. Bogaturov, ‘Tri pokoleniya vneshnepoliticheskikh doktrin Rossii’, [‘The three generations of the Russian 
Foreign Policy Doctrines’], Mezhdunarodnyye Protsessy, Vol. 5, No. 1(3), 2007, pp. 54-69; N. Rabotyazhev, E. 
Solov'yev, ‘Ot “Vozvrashcheniya v Mirovuyu Tsivilizatsiyu” k “Suverennoy Demokratii”: Evolyutsiya 
vneshnepoliticheskikh kontseptsiy Rossiyskikh “Partiy Vlasti”’, [‘From the “Comeback to the World 
Civilization” to the “Sovereign Democracy”: An Evolution of the Foreign Policy Conceptions of the Russian 
“Parties in Power”’], Politiya, No. 1(68), 2013, pp. 36-54. 
26Interview with K. Kosachev, the Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs, published in 
Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', No. 4, 2010, pp. 4-9, (Russian). 
27A. Bogaturov, ‘Tri pokoleniya …’. 
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Partnership and Friendship. It was the first time in Russian history that an agreement, which 
was signed with another state, defined Russian internal politics, where, from the Russian 
perspective, Moscow accepted the U.S. as an external referee of Russian internal reforms.28 
The Russian leadership of the early 1990s avoided any clear indication of their national 
interests in foreign policy, yet identified these interests with the interests of the democratic 
countries, the so called "global community of democracies". Moscow strongly urged foreign 
partners to recognize that the support of the Western initiatives was, in fact, the main goal of 
Russian foreign policy. The best example of this logic of universal "democratic solidarity" was 
Russian political behaviour in the initial period of the Yugoslavian crisis, when Moscow 
unconditionally supported the creation of new independent states in the territory of the former 
federation. It declared its diplomatic recognition of the new governments of the former 
Yugoslavia at the same time as the European Union, and before the United States. The 
Kremlin’s refusal to support the central government in Belgrade against separatists Croatia and 
Slovenia was a surprise to many Western diplomats and many Russian citizens, as well.29  
Russian political analysts and scholars have claimed that not only this policy of “Blind” 
Westernization had no success, domestically or internationally, but in fact, it was a complete 
failure. Domestically, years of economic crisis and process of political decentralisation almost 
tore Russia apart, delegitimising the Kremlin in the eyes of regional leaders and the general 
population. Internationally, the first part of 1990s was a period of rapid contraction of Russian 
influence. Economic inability to maintain relations, established during the Soviet era, and 
absolute adaptation of Western policies at the expense of the Kremlin’s interests, not only 
stopped Russia from preserving its interests in former socialist European countries, but they 
also led the Kremlin to abandon its partners in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America. The conclusion of Russian political observers was that in less than 5 years, Russian 
political status was reduced from a self-confident Global Power to a politically irrelevant 
appendage of the West.30 This self-effacing policy started to change during the mid-1990s due 
to two main reasons. The first one was domestic. Internal pro-Western decentralisation policies, 
formulated in an attempt to be admired by the West, created economic chaos, notions of 
separatism and danger of additional secession. The second reason was the Western reaction to 
                                                          
28A. Bogaturov, ‘Tri pokoleniya …’. 
29A. Bogaturov, ‘Tri pokoleniya …’. 
30A. Bogaturov, ‘Tri pokoleniya …’; V. Zhurkin, M. Nosov, D. Danilov, ‘Voprosy mezhdunarodnoy 
bezopasnosti’, [‘Questions of International Security’], in N. Shmelev, (ed.), Rossiya v mnogoobrazii tsivilizatsiy, 
[Russia in the Diversity of Civilizations], (Moscow: Ves' Mir, 2011), p. 175.  
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the Russian attempt to westernise itself. The West showed little appreciation for Russian 
solidarity and did not show any desire for integration with an economically struggling, 
politically unstable state that until recently was its number one enemy. As a reaction to these 
developments, the Kremlin started to shift its foreign policy doctrine from unconditional 
compliance to the so called “Selective Partnership”.31  
  While the course of the Russian foreign policy, in the second half of the 1990s, 
generally preserved its pro-Western narratives, the main emphasis of Moscow’s new doctrine 
changed from an unequivocal agreement to political bargaining. Utilising the political 
advantages of being the only successor to the U.S.S.R., i.e., the biggest nuclear power and a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, Moscow started to replace the “romanticism” 
of the early 1990s by a more pragmatic approach.32 According to Bogaturov, the Kremlin 
carefully began to demonstrate and defend its interests. The best example of this transformation 
was Moscow’s reaction to the Kosovo crisis. The Kremlin’s ginger support for NATO-led 
peacekeeping operations in 1995 and 1996 (mainly due to the fact that Russia was a part of the 
solution) was replaced by strong opposition to the NATO intervention in 1999.33   
The Kremlin was very disappointed by the inability of the Western countries to accept 
the idea that Russian historical ambitions to be a leading actor on the geopolitical arena did not 
disappear with the collapse of the U.S.S.R. In 2015, in a famous documentary President, Putin 
recalled: 
I served in the KGB, in foreign intelligence, for almost 20 years, and even I thought 
that with the collapse of this ideological obstacle, in the shape of the Communist 
Party’s monopoly on power, everything will cardinally change. No… it did not 
change in essence, because, as it turned out, … there are geopolitical interests that 
are completely disconnected from any ideology. This is where our partners [the 
West] were required to understand that Russia is a country that has, and it cannot 
be without, its own geopolitical interests. And it is required to respect each other, 
while searching for balances and mutually accepted resolutions.34 
In the beginning of the 21st century, the Russian position in the international arena was very 
selective and non-partisan. On the one hand, the Kremlin finally accepted NATO’s expansion 
into East Europe, and, following the 9/11 events, unconditionally supported the NATO-led 
                                                          
31A. Bogaturov, ‘Tri pokoleniya …’. 
32O. Shishkina, ‘Post-Soviet Foreign Policy Foundations: State Interests vs. Identities’, Moscow State Institute of 
International Relations (MGIMO) Blog - Govoryat Eksperty MGIMO, 9 June 2014, 
http://www.mgimo.ru/news/experts/document253273.phtml, [accessed: 07 August 2014]. 
33A. Bogaturov, ‘Tri pokoleniya …’. 
34 Vladimir Putin in Vladimir Solov'yev, President, (Masterskaya Movie Company, 2015), (Russian). 
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anti-terror coalition, created in 2002.35 On the other hand, Russia signed the 2001 Sino-Russian 
Treaty of Friendship and refused to provide support to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.36     
 Meanwhile the prices of fossil fuels had remained high, and heavily based on their 
export, the Russian economy started to recover. Building on rising oil and gas revenues the 
Russian economic growth of the first part of 2000s was not only substantial; it was 
unprecedentedly high and fast.37 This success has had an immediate influence on domestic 
public opinion that considered Putin as “saviour of the nation”, “restorer of order”, and 
“distributor of the wealth”.38 Consequently, it was not surprising that on the wave of the 
economic success and domestic support, the Kremlin started to revalue its position in global 
affairs.39 The culminating point of this revaluation was the President Putin’s 2006 Speech at 
the Meeting with the Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives of the Russian Federation, 
where, for the first time, Russia clearly formulated its political ambitions. This speech 
symbolised the beginning of a new approach in Russian foreign policy, an approach that stated 
that the Russian role and its influence on global affairs have to be proportioned to and based 
on its geo-political history and growing economic capabilities.40 While this speech was mainly 
aimed at Russian internal audience, its “international twin” was the 2007 President Putin’s 
Speech at the Munich Security Conference: “Russia – [is] a country with more than a thousand 
years of history, and it has almost always exercised the privilege to conduct an independent 
foreign policy. We are not going to change this tradition today.”41 
  Building on its economic success, the Kremlin finally stopped knocking on the firmly 
closed Western door, and sent a clear message to its Western partners that they did not need to 
pretend any more that they liked the “new-style democratic Russia” and believed in “its bright 
future”.42 The combination of economic growth, the Soviet legacy in foreign policy, and the 
international, mainly non-Western, demand for alternative solutions to world crises, 
                                                          
35T. Shakleina, Rossiya i SSHA v mirovoy politike, [Russia and the USA in the World’s Politics], (Moscow: 
Aspekt Press, 2012), pp. 160-161. 
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37Åslund Anders, ‘An Assessment of Putin’s Economic Policy’, CESifo Forum, No. 9 (2), pp. 16-21, 2008. 
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39A. Bogaturov, ‘Tri pokoleniya …’. 
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transformed Russia back into one of the most significant international players.43 It was the 
beginning of a new period in Russian foreign affairs – a period of Russian Revitalisation based 
on segregation from the West (especially the U.S.), allegations of double standards and the 
claim that Western politicised decisions are based on out-dated Cold War prejudices.44  
The “blind” compliance with the West in the 1990s and walking a fine line between 
Western and Russian interests since the mid-2000s have been replaced by an uncompromising 
defence of national interests and an open criticism of the West,45 as President Medvedev put it 
in 2009: 
Russia, remaining one of the leading economies, a nuclear power and a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council, must speak openly and directly about its 
position, defend it at all places. Do not play up and adapt. And in the case of threat 
to its own interests - decisively defend them.46  
The best representation of this transformation can be seen in a comparative analysis of Russian 
self-definition in the sequential Foreign Policy Concepts.47 While the 2000 Concept gingerly 
stated that “The Russian Federation has a real potential for ensuring itself a worthy place in the 
world;”48 the 2008 Concept proclaimed Russia as “the largest Euro-Asian power … one of the 
leading States of the world and a permanent member of the UN Security Council;”49 and the 
2013 Concept concluded this transformation clarifying that “Russia's foreign policy … reflects 
the unique role our country has been playing over centuries as a counterbalance in international 
affairs and the development of global civilisation.”50 
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44Interview with S. Ryabkov, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, published in  
Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', No. 1, 2014, pp. 4-16, (Russian); Vladimir Putin, 2014 Speech at Meeting the 
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Since his comeback to the presidential chair in 2012, Vladimir Putin, surrounded by a 
team of his most loyal politicians, has paid special attention to the implementation of the 
Russian Revitalisation concepts in foreign policy that were first formulated before his leave.51 
It was not an aggressive change of course, but an amplification of several major narratives that 
have underlain Russian foreign policy since the mid-2000s. The first one was the argument that 
“the independence of Russian foreign policy is based on [Russia’s] geographical sizes, unique 
geopolitical position, centuries-old historical tradition, culture and the self-consciousness of 
our nation.”52 After the desperate attempts of the 1990s to define Russia as part of European 
Civilisation (a view that was shared neither by European, nor by most of the Russians 
themselves),53 at the beginning of the 21st century the Kremlin started to present Russia as an 
independent (Slavic/Orthodox) civilisation, highlighting its historical and cultural richness. 
The best examples of this new narrative can be found amongst highest-level politicians, quoting 
Orthodox-patriotic ideas of Aleksandr Solzhenitsy;54 reinforcing their views on foreign policy 
by citing historical figures, such as Alexander Nevsky55 or Alexander III;56 and backing the 
ideas of Ivan Ilyin – the mid-20th-century political philosopher, Slavophile, conservative 
monarchist and defender of Orthodox-Slavic civilisation.57    
This self-identification based on a narrative of independence was a direct answer to the 
1990s’ illusions of Westernisation, which, according to the Russian politicians, was destroyed 
by Western antagonism that was driven by Cold-War perceptions.58 While Putin says “Russian 
foreign policy was, is and will be substantive and independent,”59 the Western attempts to 
intervene in Russian internal affairs, in the early 1990s, were not forgotten even 20 years later: 
“we cannot consider, even hypothetically, an option of a ‘warped’ Russia as a player 
                                                          
51V. Averkov, ‘Prinyatiye vneshnepoliticheskikh resheniy v Rossii’, [‘Foreign Policy Decision-Making in 
Russia’], Mezhdunarodnyye Protsessy, Volume 10, No. 2(29), 2012, pp. 59-70. 
52Sergey Lavrov, ‘Vneshnepoliticheskaya filosofiya Rossii’, [‘Russian Foreign Policy Philosophy’], 
Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', No. 4, 2013, p. 2. 
53V. Zhurkin, M. Nosov, D. Danilov, ‘Voprosy mezhdunarodnoy bezopasnosti’, p. 175.  
54Vladimir Putin, 2012 Address to the Federal Assembly, http://news.kremlin.ru/video/1344, [Accessed: 08 
August 2014], (Russian). 
55Interview with Sergey Lavrov, the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, published in Mezhdunarodnaya 
Zhizn', No. 9, 2012, p. 20, (Russian). 
56Sergey Lavrov, ‘Vneshnepoliticheskaya filosofiya …’, p. 2. 
57For example: in 2005, Vladimir Putin described Ivan Ilyin as great Russian philosopher (see Vladimir Putin, 
2005 The State of Nation Speech, http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2005/04/87049.shtml, [accessed: 18 
August, 2014], (Russian)) and Dmitry Medvedev wrote a foreword to Ivan Ilyin, Puti Rossii, [Russian Ways], 
(Moscow: Vagrius, 2007). 
58Sergey Lavrov, ‘Kak okonchatel'no zavershit …’; T. Shakleina, Rossiya i SSHA …, pp. 134-198. 
59Vladimir Putin, 2012 Speech at Meeting of Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives of the Russian 




manipulated by some other superior player on the international arena.”60 This determination to 
keep the West out of Russian internal affairs, on the one hand, and, the desire, based on Soviet 
legacy, to restore the Russian traditional role as a “counterbalancing factor in international 
affairs,”61 on the other, emphasise the second narrative of modern Russian foreign policy – 
multi-polarity at the expense of Western hegemony.               
On the one hand, the policy of multi-polarity has come to enforce Russian positions by 
supporting different new international organisations (e.g., the Group of Twenty, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation, BRICS and others) and therefore counterbalancing the Western 
traditional union between the U.S. and Europe.62 On the other hand, the Russian promotion of 
multi-polarity in international affairs is intended to cool down American ambitions as “ruler-
of-the-world”, as Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, put it:  
Now it is possible to speak, not of preserving [Western] domination, which is 
impossible under the conditions of the rapidly increasing influence of cultural-
civilisational diversity on the World’s destiny, but of confirming European 
civilisation’s claim for [just another] place among the team of leaders.63             
This opposition to the West dictating the line in global affairs has led to the next Russian 
foreign policy narrative – criticism of the West (mainly the U.S.) of double standards.64  
Building on the tractable nature of the international legal system the Kremlin has continuously 
promoted the idea that its “Western partners, headed by the United States of America, in their 
practical policy, prefer to be guided not by the rule of international law, but by the rule of the 
strongest.”65 This idea is supported by Russian claim of Western illegal behaviour in Kosovo 
in 1999, in Iraq in 2003, in Libya in 2011, and other occasions.66   
                                                          
60Sergey Lavrov, ‘Vneshnepoliticheskaya filosofiya …’, p. 2. 
61Sergey Lavrov, ‘Vneshnepoliticheskaya filosofiya …’, p. 7. This narrative of ‘counterbalancing power’ is based 
on Russian Imperial history (mainly the period between 1815 and 1914), rather than on Soviet legacy, see Ivan 
Ilyin, Natsional'naya Rossiya, nashi zadachi, [National Russia, Our Goals], (Moscow: Eskimo Algoritm, 2011), 
pp. 84-95. 
62V. Baranovskii, ‘Osnovnyye parametry sovremennoy sistemy mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy – chast’ III’, [‘The 
Major Parameters of the Modern System of International Relations – Part III’], Polis: Politicheskii 
Issledovaniya, No. 5, 2012, pp. 148-156; V. Buyanov, ‘Rossiya v globaliziruyushchemsya mire: politicheskiy 
aspekt’, [‘Russia in the Globalizing World: Political Aspect’], in  S. Smul’skii, O. Abramova, V. Buyanov, (ed.), 
Vneshnyaya politika Rossii …, pp. 106-129; Interview with Sergey Lavrov …  
63Sergey Lavrov, ‘Kak okonchatel'no zavershit …’, p. 6. 
64T. Shakleina, Rossiya i SSHA …, p. 174. 
65Vladimir Putin, Speech of the President of the Russian Federation, 18 March 2014, 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603/videos, [accessed: 08 August 2014], (Russian). 
66E. Voronin, ‘Problema legitimnosti vooruzhennogo vmeshatel'stva. Liviyskiy Casus Belli’, [‘The Problem of 
Legitimacy of Armed Intervention. Libyan Casus Belli’], Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', No. 8, 2012, pp. 107-118; 
V. Kotlyar, ‘”Otvetstvennost’ pri zashchite” i “Arabskaya Vesna”’, [‘”The Responsibility to Protect” and the 
“Arab Spring”’], Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', No. 9, 2012, pp. 99-114; S. Chernichenko, ‘Dvoynyye Standarty’, 
[‘Double Standartds’], Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', No. 12, 2008, pp. 63-71; Interview with Sergey Lavrov …; 
Vladimir Putin, Speech of the President of the Russian Federation, 18 March 2014… 
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This leads to the final major narrative of Russian foreign policy – the intensification of 
the UN positions, in general, and the role of the UN Security Council, in particular.67 While 
this narrative generally supports the previously discussed concept of multi-polarity, as, 
according to Sergey Lavrov, the “Charter of the United Nations is ‘programmed’ as a regulator 
of the multi-polar world;” it emphasises the importance of the international legal system in the 
eyes of the Russian leaders. Built on the amendable nature of the international law, the message 
from the Kremlin is that “We can guarantee that we will never violate our international 
obligations.”68       
There is no doubt that all these narratives come first and foremost to defend Russian 
national interests and reinforce its position in the international arena.69 Their understanding, 
however, allows an identification of two major ways in which the Kremlin resists international 
pressure (mainly from the Western community) that criticises Russian political decisions. 
While the first one is framing its activity within the context of international law, the second 
one is the repudiation of Western criticism because “[they] themselves are not perfect in many 
senses.”70   In other words, facing international criticism Russian leaders powerfully dismiss 
it, arguing that their activities comply with international law, at least with the same degree as 
Western actions do. The best examples are two cases in which Russian leadership had to deal 
with intensive Western criticism: the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and 
the accession of Crimea to Russia in 2014. 
On 26 August 2008, after a short military conflict with Georgia, Russia recognised the 
Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia as independent states. 71 Despite the 
immediate wave of criticism from Western governments and accusations of the illegality of 
this move, the Kremlin presented firm legal ground to its decision, claiming that it was “guided 
by the provisions of the UN Charter, the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International 
Law Governing Friendly Relations Between States, the CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and 
                                                          
67A. Gromyko, ‘Mirovoy poryadok i pravoporyadok’, [‘World Order and the Rule of Law’], Mezhdunarodnaya 
Zhizn', No. 3, 2012, pp. 18-31; Interview with Sergey Lavrov … ; Vladimir Putin, 2012 Speech at Meeting of 
Ambassadors … p. 4. 
68 Interview with Sergey Lavrov …, pp. 4, 16. 
69 Interview with S. Ryabkov, The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, published in  
Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', No. 8, 2014, pp. 2-12, (Russian). 
70Press-conference with Sergey Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister, published in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', No. 2, 
2013, p.11, (Russian). 
71The Office of the President of the Russian Federation, Decree N 1260 "About Recognition of the Republic of 
Abkhazia", Moscow, 26 August 2008, (Russian); The Office of the President of the Russian Federation, Decree 
N 1261 "About Recognition of the Republic of North Ossetia", Moscow, 26 August 2008, (Russian). 
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other fundamental international instruments.”72 Furthermore, Moscow’s response also included 
other typical narratives of the Russian modern foreign policy, such as the accusation of double 
standards:73    
[while] Western countries rushed to recognise Kosovo's illegal declaration of 
independence from Serbia. We argued consistently that it would be impossible, 
after that, to tell the Abkhazians and Ossetians … that what was good for Kosovo-
Albanians was not good for them. In international relations, you cannot have one 
rule for some and another rule for others.74 
The second example is the accession of Crimea to Russia following the political crisis 
in Ukraine, in the winter of 2014.  While most of the international community did not recognise 
this move, labelling it an illegal annexation,75 according to the Russian view, every detail of 
the process was in complete compliance with international law.76 Despite the fact that Putin 
acknowledged the deployment of Russian Special Forces to Crimea, according to him, 
everything was legal:  
I did not even have to use the permission of the [Russian] Federal Council to deploy 
Russian troops in Ukraine. And I did not even bend the truth, as under the related 
international treaty, we had the right to have 20,000 men in our base in Crimea, 
even slightly more. But even with the troops that we had added, as I have 
mentioned, we were still under 20,000. As we did not exceed the number of our 
troops in Crimea, strictly speaking, we did nothing wrong.77  
In addition, the election of a new pro-Russian Prime Minister of Crimea, according to Putin, 
was an entirely lawful outcome of the events:   
The Crimea’s Parliament was an absolutely legitimate, fully fledged representative 
body in Crimea that was formed long before any of these difficult and tragic events. 
So these representatives convened a meeting, held a vote and elected a new Prime 
Minister of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov. And de jure President Yanukovich 
approved his appointment. In terms of the Ukrainian law, everything was honoured 
and respected. Of course, it is possible to throw words around and interpret these 
events in a variety of ways. But, if you look from the legal perspective, you cannot 
pick a hole in it.78  
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76A. Moiseev, ‘O nekotorykh mezhdunarodno-pravovykh pozitsiyakh po ukrainskomu voprosu’, [‘About Some 
International Law Positions on the Ukrainian Issue’], Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', No. 5, 2014, pp. 53-65; 
Vladimir Putin, Speech of the President of the Russian Federation, 18 March 2014 … 
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The Kremlin’s figurative response to Western accusations of incompliance with international 
law was best expressed by Sergey Lavrov: “It is good that they [the Western countries] at least 
have recalled the existence of international law. Thanks for nothing! But it is better late than 
never.” Again, Russian reaction to Western pressure was the accurately explained (although 
still unaccepted by the West) foundation of Russian actions in the international legal system, 
and the already discussed comparison to past and present Western actions, which are 
considered by Moscow as illegal, or, at least immoral, in their protecting pure Western political 
interests.79  
While the narratives of Russian foreign policy outlined above offer a general explanation 
of Russian reaction to international pressure and criticism, Russia clearly has a very powerful 
“political will” in the international arena. Building on its status as a nuclear power and 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, its growing economy and broad domestic 
political support, the Kremlin, without any doubt, is able to withstand international criticism 
and accusations of the violations of international law, in general, as well as during military 
operations, in particular. An analysis of the previously discussed case of the Russian 2008 
Operation to Force Georgia to Peace,80 clearly shows how the Kremlin successfully fended off 
the allegations of disproportional use of force.81 Moscow’s reaction followed the general 
pattern of Russian foreign policy: a demonstration of a powerful and independent Russia in the 
multi-polar international environment – a “Russia to be reckoned with;”82 a utilisation of the 
tractable nature of the international legal system – posing the question: “Who did define the 
criteria of the proportionality of the use of force?”;83 and a comparison between Russian actions 
and similar Western activities in favour of the first.84      
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 The main purpose of this chapter is to understand why NLW are not employed by the 
Russian military. As it was discusses before, international political pressure can be one of the 
main drivers behind the increasing employment of NLW in an attempt to decrease civilian 
casualties and thus international criticism. The analysis of the Russian foreign policy presented 
above, and the ways in which the Kremlin fends criticism off clearly show Russian forceful 
(even brawny) reaction to international (mainly Western) pressure. Answering the question 
whether the readiness of Russian nuclear forces during the Crimea crisis was raised to the 
highest alert, Putin replied: 
We were ready to do so. But I was already speaking with my colleagues [Western 
leaders], and I was saying it directly ... and openly that this is our historical territory, 
and Russian people are living there, they came under a threat and we cannot 
abandon them. It was not us who staged the coup [in Ukraine], it was the 
nationalists and people with extreme views. You supported them. But where are 
you? Thousands of kilometres from here! And we are here and this is our land. 
What do you want to fight for? You don’t know? But we know and we are ready 
for it!85     
In light of this effective defensive foreign policy, there is no doubt that Russian decision-
makers feel no need to demand fundamental changes in their military forces in an attempt to 
make them less lethal than their Western counterparts. The lack of this political need is based 
on three main conditions: Russian economic strength; Western military performance, which 
provides comparable cases for Russian criticism (i.e., the lethality of Western military forces); 
and the lack of a domestic opposition that cares about the enemy’s population.  
Interestingly enough, the first condition creates a sort of paradox as economic strength 
is necessary not only for a strong foreign policy but also for military transformation (i.e., 
economic decline will weaken Russian foreign policy, but it will make the military NLW 
transformation economically impossible). The level of lethality of the Western (American – 
the most important in the Russian eyes) military and its attitudes toward NLW were discussed 
in the previous chapter and it does not seem that NLW are going to be employed widely in the 
near future. Consequently, the only remaining influential factor on the political desire to 
decrease lethality on the battlefield (i.e. employ NLW) is domestic public attitude toward 
enemy civilian casualties.     
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Part Three: Russian Culture and Civil Casualties 
In an attempt to understand Russian historical and cultural background it is important 
to remember that “in the national body of Russia, there are islands and oases of Europe and 
Asia as well.”86 In other words, due to Russia’s intermediate geo-political and cultural position 
between the West and the East, “Russian people had to solve problems that demanded a special 
strategy.”87  Russian historical-cultural place between European civilisation in the West and 
Islamic, Confucian and Indus civilisations in the East combined with its geographical and 
climate conditions have played an instrumental role in the designing the Russian character 
throughout the whole of Russian history.88   
In 1944, Ivan Ilyin, one of the greatest authors on Russian political, historical, social 
and spiritual issues, wrote: “Russia, as a nation and culture, still appears to Western Europe as 
a hidden world, as a problem that cannot be understood, a kind of Sphinx ...”89 Consequently, 
analysing Russian cultural context, it seems right to focus, first and foremost, on Russian 
authentic sources and materials, rather than on their existing Western interpretation.90 In other 
words, in an attempt to understand “what Russian people think about war and civilian 
casualties”, this research will focus on the writing of traditional Russian political philosophers 
and anthropologists, such as Ivan Ilyin, Nikolay Lossky, Ivan Solonevich and Nikolai 
Berdyaev.91 Most of these thinkers, who wrote about Russian cultural mind-set in the first part 
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of the 20th century, had to escape or were expelled from the U.S.S.R. due to their anti-Bolshevik 
views and their publications were banned by Soviet censorship. Although the restrictions on 
their work were annulled with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and their books were finally 
published in Russia, their real success came only in the 2000s, when they were widely 
embraced by Russian political leaders. It is not surprising that national conservative views of 
Ivan Ilyin, Ivan Solonevich and others have been heavily used by Vladimir Putin, Dmitry 
Medvedev92 and other leading politicians to enforce their policy of Russian revitalisation:        
The problems of Russia, its history, and the ways for the social and spiritual revival 
of the Motherland have a central place in Ilyin’s thoughts. The search for national 
self-identification and the protection of moral and spiritual values – all these goals 
are actual today no less than in the first part of the previous century.93   
To avoid possible criticism that the validity of these thinkers is outdated and their 
reputation is artificially recreated due to political reasons of the Kremlin’s leaders, this research 
will be complemented by the work of various Russian contemporary scholars, who specialise 
in the identification of Russian mentality and its roots, such as Alexander Panarin, Vladimir 
Pantin, Vladimir Lapkin and Vyacheslav Gubanov.94  
Russian Culture and the Value of Human Life 
Ivan Ilyin famously claimed that “the history of Russia is akin to the history of a 
besieged fortress.”95 While it is hard to imagine a way in which the enormous Russia can be 
besieged, its people have been beleaguered during the entirety of Russian history, surviving in 
extreme climatic conditions and cultivation a barren land, braving repetitive invasions from the 
East and the West and an uncompromising, almost tyrannical, treatment by their own rulers. It, 
indeed, seems accurate to agree with the claim of the Russian philosophers that the history of 
the Russian people reads like the history of a besieged people. 
The extreme Russian climate and boundless territories are seen by Russians as the main 
reasons behind many major aspects of the Russian character, such as: collectivism, absolute 
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conformity with political centralism, and strong emphasis on endurance and patience.96 Owing 
to its agricultural heritage, Russian philosophers define the Russian character in terms of 
communality. Subsequently, and as any other agricultural society, the rural commune in Russia 
was created to allow labour cooperation in the conditions of high-risk farming.  While 
definitely not the only country with extreme seasons and barren land that made cooperation 
vital for survival, Russia was the only one with an unlimited amount of this land. And while in 
other (Western) countries the limitation of sources (land, water, labour, etc.) led to the quest 
for more efficient ways to exploit natural resources, Russia’s way to increase productivity was 
always based on the conquest of additional lands, involving additional resources and additional 
labour. This Western race for better efficiency, which was the core reason for the development 
of individualism and private property, was never a part of Russian culture, where the one’s 
contribution to the collective interest was always prevalent over his private life. 97     
The Russian character and culture, similar to the American experience of the frontier, 
is an outcome of the conquest of the boundless wilderness, though the process of the Russian 
conquest was entirely different from the American one, as was its influence on the Russian 
mind. In both cases it was about “civilising” the wilderness. But, while the conquest of America 
was led by individuals seeking their own destiny and benefits, the conquest of Russia was led 
by the state. In the American frontier experience, the development of villages into towns and 
into cities was set in the hands of the community – in Russian history it was always the 
responsibility of the authorities. While American cities were built by businessmen, who, in the 
pursuit of their own benefits, established themselves as community leaders and propelled small 
towns into large cities, such as William Ogden in Chicago or William Larimer in Denver,98 the 
development and prosperity of Russian Ekaterinburg,99 Samara100 or Novosibirsk101 were the 
outcome of governmental policy. When the frontier concept of “free land” was responsible for 
the American individualism, in the Russian case, the state-led expansions, based on the state’s 
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ownership of the land, concomitantly shaped in the Russian mind the importance of the 
collective.     
The collectivistic characteristics of Russian culture were significantly fuelled by the 
enduring serfdom in the 17th and 18th centuries (the period when in Europe it was already 
abandoned).  The history of serfdom is seen as having obvious and major influences on the 
cultural character of the Russian people.  An increasing oppression of individualism led to the 
lack of feeling of responsibility for land, family and life, which, in turn, led to the absolute 
conformity with the representative of the authorities, as a famous Russian proverb says: ‘[the] 
Master will come – [and the] master will judge us’ (Vot priyedet barin — barin nas rassudit).102 
While the Emancipation Reform of 1861, under the reign of Alexander II of Russia (who was 
also known as Alexander the Liberator), officially liquidated the serfdom, it had a small impact 
on the established cultural environment because, in fact, it gave former serfs neither 
independence, nor full responsibility. After the reform, the peasants remained under the 
supervision of the rural commune that had a power to re-distribute the land among its 
members.103 
This undeveloped sense of personal self-realisation led to one of the most paradoxical 
phenomena in Russian culture: anarchical behaviour on the one hand, and a full political 
submissiveness on the other.104 Interestingly enough, these two characteristics succeeded in 
coexisting, being, in fact, interdepended – understanding their own anarchical predispositions, 
Russian people demanded strong and even ruthless treatment. The best example of this 
characteristic is provided by Nikolay Lossky: 
In St. Petersburg in the spring, when the ice on the Niva River started to melt, the 
ice-crossing of the river became unsafe.   The mayor ordered to place policemen 
on the bank of the river, who will stop the ice-crossers. A peasant, despite warning 
shouts from a policeman, went on the ice, fell and began to drown. The policeman 
saved him from death, but the peasant, instead of being grateful, started to criticise 
him: “Where have you been?” The policeman answered him: “But I shouted out a 
warning” – “Shouted?! You had to sock me in the face!105 
On the one hand, lack of the responsibility for one’s land and life generated a feeling of 
unlimited personal freedom in the Russian cultural environment, creating a strong narrative 
that  probably (avos'), supposedly (nebos') or somehow (kak-nibud') problems would be 
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resolved. On the other hand, it created a strong belief in, even demand for, a powerful authority 
that would guide the people and protect them from their own carelessness.106  While American 
individualism and the cultural predisposition that an American can solve any problem, led the 
American mind to lock down upon bureaucrats and the authorities that they represented, the 
Russian concept of personal freedom from responsibility led to a higher dependency on the 
state.    
Flourishing throughout the Soviet era, this under-developed sense of personal 
responsibility and self-realisation remains relevant in the beginning of the 21st century. In 2009, 
President Medvedev described one of the main social weaknesses of the Russian people as:  
Confidence that all problems should be resolved by the state. By somebody else, 
but not by each one in his place. The desire to "make yourself", to achieve personal 
success, step by step, is not our national habit.107 
When Russian political philosophers emphasised a natural freedom inhered within the 
“Russian Soul”,108 they did not mean the Western understanding of freedom (i.e., human rights 
based on cultural individualism), but an “entirely Russian” interpretation of freedom: “freedom 
from earthly worries.”109 This understanding of freedom explains two very important cultural 
narratives in the Russian character: political submissiveness and a rejection of the idea of 
formal human rights and freedoms. The Russian character underlines the prevalence of 
spirituality over materialism and pragmatism, and therefore the idea of spiritual freedom, rather 
than of a physical-material one, was always at the core of the Russian character – “Our people 
are not materialistic ... they are contented spiritually.”110  The way to achieve this freedom was 
by an utter transfer of political responsibility to an authority (master/monarch/government), 
ultimately accepting powerful, even totalitarian rule as a required precondition to organise a 
stable society. While an American values the material achievements of a person, the Russian 
mind appreciates more the spiritual: “a person achieves his social status according to his 
communion with the prevalent system of ideological values, the Slavic-orthodox values in pre-
revolutionary Russia, or communism in the U.S.S.R..”111  
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Interestingly enough, this narrative of an overwhelming desire for spiritual freedom and 
unwillingness to deal with material problems (because dealing with the material fetters one’s 
spirit), on the one hand; and a long history of ruthless governance, which fully exploited this 
unmaterialistic nature of their people, on the other, led to this general disbelief in the idea of 
formal human rights and freedoms bestowed upon a people by their political authority. 
According to Ivan Ilyin, “a Russian is characterized by internal freedom [and] there are no 
artificially invented bans for him”112 – and therefore there is no need for formal (artificial) 
freedoms.  While for Americans, their material rights and freedoms (e.g., speech, movement, 
security, etc.) are integral parts of their self-determination, for the Russian mind these rights 
are something outlandish and unwarranted by spiritual happiness or earthly existence, 
something unnecessary “that had been awarded by the generous fatherland or a kind master 
and, at any given moment, can be taken away without reasonable explanations.”113    
There is no doubt that political and ideological limitations of the Soviet era did not 
contribute to the development of individuality and a more Western understanding of freedom 
and human rights.  In fact, more than 20 years after the fall of the Soviet Union and hasty 
attempts to democratise (or Westernise) Russia, the Russian masses, in general, continue to 
uphold their historical cultural preferences for strong authority, at the expense of formal human 
rights. For example, several surveys conducted in 2014 show that between 18 different merits, 
Russian people placed “human rights” only at the 5th place, preferring “order”, “security”, 
“peace” and “rule of law”. Placing “private property” (9th) and “democracy” (12th) after such 
merits as “stability” (7th) and “patriotism” (8th) – Russian people had articulated their true 
mentality based on their unique history and experience. 114 
This reliance on authority, which secures peace and the rule of law, combined with the 
traditional sense of collectivism, shaped the Russian cultural appreciation of human life. While 
American culture values human life due to very individualistic, even selfish, reasons, the 
Russian appreciation of the community comes before the individual and, therefore, his life 
should be dedicated to the collective.115 The Russian character, shaped by the idea of collective 
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responsibility and punishment (krugovaya poruka), which was a part of the domestic law until 
the 20th century,116 promotes the responsibility of an individual for the whole collective, and 
vice versa. While this Russian cultural naive readiness to serve the common good was vastly 
exploited by the Russian totalitarian governments,117 it also projected on the Russian cultural 
perspective on war and the readiness of the Russian people to pay unprecedented costs to 
protect their land and state.118   
War and the Russian Character 
One of the most prevalent Russian historical narratives is the traditional assumption 
that Russia has always enjoyed from the access to a massive territory and, as Ivan Ilyin put it, 
that the lack of natural geographical borders, such as seas or mountain massifs, left this 
enormous flatland unprotected and exposed to invasions.119 This geo-political “podium” of 
Russian history had one of the most significant influences on the composition of the Russian 
character. Geographically unprotected and placed between the centres of two different 
civilisations – the Western and the Asian (Mongols and Chinese) – Russia suffered repetitive 
massive invasions through its history: in 1236, the Mongol Empire (Golden Horde) conquered 
most of Kievan Rus’ establishing more than 200 years of Tatar-Mongol Yoke; in 1571, 
the Crimean Khan Devlet I Giray raided the Tsardom of Russia setting capital Moscow on fire; 
in 1610, the Polish King Sigismund III occupied most of the western part of  the Tsardom of 
Russia putting his son Wladyslaw IV Vasa on the Russian throne (although the son never 
actually ruled); in 1812, Napoleon invaded Russia, defeating the Russian army and conquering 
Moscow; and finally, in 1942, German forces occupied most of the European part of the 
U.S.S.R., besieging Leningrad (St. Petersburg), Moscow and Stalingrad (Volgograd).120  
According to Vyacheslav Gubanov, Russian mind-set perceives Russia’s people as the 
defenders of Europe, as an outpost of Western Civilisation that protects it from the barbaric 
East. In return, instead of giving the Russians gratitude and support, European countries took 
advantage of Russian backwardness, the price that the Russian nation had to pay to stop the 
Mongols and allow the Renaissance.121 This ruthless military experience predetermined the 
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Russian mind “to defence without support, to rely only on your own forces, to live on an open 
flatland, to create and wait for the danger of a new invasion or attack that can come at any 
time.”122 
Without any doubt, not all Russian wars were defensive or even were justified as such. 
Since the late 18th century and until the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the Russian Empire was 
“The Gendarme of Europe”, saving Austria in the War of the Second Coalition in 1799-1800, 
helping to defeat Napoleon in 1813-1814 by invading Prussia and going all the way to Paris, 
in the War of the Sixth Coalition, and rescuing the Austrian Empire from the Hungarian 
Revolution in 1849.123 But these were not the wars that influenced Russian mentality, as above 
all, it had been marked by the tragic experience of the Tatar-Mongol Yoke, the Patriotic War 
against the French Invasion in 1812124 and the Great Patriotic War against the Nazi-German 
Invasion in 1941 (the title of “patriotic” was awarded to these wars for a reason). 
While in English the last two were titled as patriotic, their original Russian name is 
otechestvennyye (Fatherland’s). Russian language has two different words for the English term 
‘motherland’ – Rodina (motherland) and Otechestvo (fatherland). These two symbolise the 
female and male characteristics of the Russian character: 
Motherland [and] motherhood are associated with the language, with the folklore, 
with the national character and the undefined, but powerful domain of 
unconsciousness. Fatherland [and] fatherhood – [are associated] with duty and 
citizenship, with the social-political, conscious life.125  
While rodina symbolises a more spiritual connection with zemlya-mat' (earth-mother), 
otechestvo (the land of fathers) is associated with the harsh reality of the real world as “father 
leads the son to the economic and political world: makes him a worker, a citizen, a soldier.”126 
Consequently, a Fatherland’s war is not an ordinary war, it is a war in which every son sees his 
duty and right to participate, defending his Fatherland at any cost. 
In the Russian mind, Russian history is “the history of defence, struggle and sacrifice: 
from the first attacks of nomads on Kiev in 1037 until today.  Accessible from all flanks, 
completely unprotected, Russia was a kind of ‘sweet booty’ for the nomadic East, as well as 
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for the settled West.”127 One of the main outcomes of this reality is the fact that, historically, 
Russian warfare had always been a national affair. Since the first regular units (strel'tsy) 
established by Ivan the Terrible, through more systemised recruiting systems created by Peter 
the Great and up to the truly national armies (first the Imperial and then the  Soviet) of the 20th 
century, the Russian military had always a very national character built on the “obligation of 
every Russian person to protect its Fatherland.”128 Russian military history, unlike the Western 
one, did not know the phenomenon of mercenaries. And despite the fact that during some 
periods, the Russian army recruited foreign officers, the process of their enlistment was similar 
to that of Russian subjects and included taking an oath to protect Russia. While the Western 
term soldier originated from the Old French souled – soldier’s pay that was paid by solidus 
(Latin - golden coin issued in the Late Roman Empire),129 the Russian voin has completely 
different origins.130 The roots of the word vóin are in old-Russian vói – people’s militiaman 
(narodnyy opolchenets) – the major defender of the Fatherland.131 Therefore, voyná (war in 
Russian) is an activity done by vóinami (people’s soldiers) to protect the Fatherland.  
All major wars that shaped the Russian character (the Mongol Yoke, the 1812 Patriotic 
War and the Great Patriotic War) occurred on Russian territory, extensively involving the 
Russian population and encoding in the Russian mind that war is a choice between fighting or 
being destroyed: “to wage a war or be turned into slaves and disappear.”132 Obviously, the 
general Russian reaction to war involves more generic and universal merits, such as protection 
of the nation, religion, state, etc.; but as a result of the historically established belief that war is 
a people’s affair (rather than a state’s), the most fundamental reason of war in Russian mentality 
is the protection of one’s life and one’s family. While a Westerner fights to make world better, 
a Russian fights to survive.133     
While this state of a constant fight for survival has been described by famous Russian 
philosopher Ivan Solonevich as a the major reason behind the Russian cultural predisposition 
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towards strong and decisive authority, rather than democracy,134 an additional outcome of this 
state has been the increased importance of war in Russian mentality: 
The whole history of the Russian state is an extreme struggle for its security against 
external and internal threats, a struggle that has left a recognisable trace on the 
consciousness of the Russian people.135 
Consequently, it is not surprising that this permanent state of war (in an addition to its extreme 
climate and ruthless governance) created in the Russian character a general worship for 
suffering, as Feodor Dostoyevsky put it, “it seems that the Russian people enjoy their suffering” 
as “the most important, the most fundamental spiritual need of the Russian people is a need for 
suffering.”136 
It seems that the narratives of war, permanent struggle and suffering have played 
constructing roles in the Russian cultural context throughout all of its history.   Interestingly 
enough, the history of the 20th century contributed to this phenomenon not less, but, if anything, 
more than any other period in the Russian history. The first reason for this was the ideology 
enforced by Soviet leadership that glorified the idea of class conflict.137 It was, after all, the 
political-ideological environment of the Soviet Union that was responsible for the absence of 
conceptual-philosophical and practical development of the ideas of non-violence and 
peacemaking.138       
The second reason was the Great Patriotic War.  Without any doubt, this war was one 
of the most noteworthy events in Russian history; its contribution to the Russian cultural 
context, however, was significantly increased by the fact that the victory in this war has been, 
in fact, the only positive point of reference in the national self-identification of the late-Soviet 
and then post-Soviet Russian society.139 Even at the beginning of the 21st century, the 
importance of the victory in this war has remained overwhelmingly high for Russian society. 
For example, in 2003, surveys showed that 87% of the Russian people, thinking about the 
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whole of Russian history, believe that the victory in the Great Patriotic War is an event that 
makes them the most proud.140 The notion of war is deep within the Russian character and its 
modern perspective on war is not far away from the Russian traditional explanation of war, 
described above. The Russian historical narrative of war – protecting one’s life and one’s 
family, fighting to survive rather bettering the world – seems to be as concrete as never at the 
beginning of the 21st century. The 2005 surveys about the justification of war showed that 68% 
of the population call a war just when people protect their houses, relatives and family, and 
their country; and only 6% call a war just when it is waged for exalted goals and ideals, 
religious principles or for national honour and glory.141 Most interestingly, these surveys also 
show that only one-fifth of the population actually use ethical or humanitarian aspects in their 
justification of war, and for all the rest – territorial and population protection are justifiable 
factors by themselves.142       
While the American mind perceives war as a temporary and unfortunate phenomenon 
and, therefore, approaches war as apolitical problem that has to be solved as quickly as possible, 
Russians see it as a part of their esse, and waging wars is always a matter of internal politics. 
Moreover, due to the discussed Russian cultural predisposition towards a strong leadership, 
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Russian people justify war only when they are led by powerful leaders. Russians were always 
ready to defend their Fatherland facing a foreign enemy. From the 13th century’s Tatar-Mongol 
Yoke, and through to Napoleon’s and Hitler’s campaigns, Russian people have always 
demonstrated exceptionally high levels of patriotism and readiness to fight the adversary and 
suffer the consequences of protecting their country. Russian history, however, suggests that 
people are ready to suffer war not only because they think it is just, but mostly, because they 
expect their leaders to stand firm and lead them to victory. The Tsarist government during the 
First World War, or the Soviet leaders during the Afghanistan War, did not prove themselves 
as strong leadership that deserve to be followed, and as a proof of that, Nikolas II was the last 
Tsar and Mikhail Gorbachev – the last Soviet leader.143     
Moreover, the readiness of the Russian people to fight war depends more on leadership 
than on the nature of the conflict itself. The best example is the Russian involvement in 
Chechnya in the 1990s. During the first Chechen campaign from 1994 to 1996, Yeltsin’s 
government was associated with a high level of corruption, economic failure and an inability 
to project central power on to the regions.144 In light of this weak leadership, Russians saw this 
war as Boris Yeltsin’s attempt to prove his power, rather than defend Russian land, and the 
Russian public wanted “to get rid of both its hapless president and his Caucasian adventure.”145 
Lacking strong leadership, Russians were not ready to fight: in 1995, the surveys coined out 
that 40% of the population preferred peaceful solution with an additional 24% who rejected 
any military involvement, asking to withdraw forces from Chechnya. Moreover, in June 1995, 
another survey showed that in answering the question “What, in your opinion, is necessary to 
do in relation to Chechnya?” about 38% of the population approved its exit from the Russian 
Federation.146       
This approach to the very same conflict changed entirely in 1999 with the arrival of 
Putin, who was seen as an energetic, decisive and strong leader on his way to power. Putin not 
only took the full responsibility for the war’s prosecution, but also produced an image of a 
determined and capable leader. In 1999, directly after his appointment as Prime Minister, 
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during a briefing with the Russian generals in Chechnya, Putin paid tribute to the fallen 
soldiers, which had a very ordinary beginning: 
I would like, according to Russian tradition, … to raise this glass and drink it for 
the memory of those who have fallen … We have no right to allow ourselves any 
moment of weakness, because if we will, then those, who have fallen, died with no 
reason. 
But, then again, had a completely unexpected end:        
This is why, I suggest, to put this glass away today. We definitely will drink for 
them [fallen soldiers], but we will drink later, when the immediate goals of 
principal character will be solved. This is why, I suggest to have a bite and start 
working.147   
This act, of firmly putting the glass back on the table, symbolises in Russian cultural 
interpretation the decisiveness and power of a leader that deserve to be followed. It is not 
surprising then that under the Putin leadership the readiness of the Russian people to fight 
cardinally changed: in 1999, 70% of the respondents approved the second campaign in 
Chechnya that begun that year, with 62.5% wanting the war to go on to “final victory”.148     
Russian people, led by a strong leader, demonstrate levels of endurance and sacrifice 
that cannot be grasped by the Western mind. But, without powerful leadership, the same 
people, who had successfully defended their Fatherland against the all powerful Napoleon and 
Hitler, managed to bring down their own state twice within a single century: in 1917 and again 
in 1991.149    
This chapter explores the reasons behind the fact that the Russian military does not 
employ NLW. Public opinion can influence decision-makers in favour of these weapons by 
applying domestic political pressure to decrease civilian casualties during military operations. 
The main question, however, is whether the cultural context that lies in the roots of public 
opinion is predisposed towards valuing the lives of the enemy’s population. 
    As discussed above, due to their historical and cultural background, Russians see 
human rights quite differently from their American counterparts. While an American demands 
and protects his rights from his government; a Russian sees no need for that. The nature of the 
Russian people is characterized by a predisposition towards internal-spiritual freedom, and, 
consequently, they do not value formal (artificially created) rights and freedoms given by 
strong (even totalitarian) authority, to which they zealously transfer their materialistic troubles. 
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On the level of the unconscious cultural context, Russian people are ready to suffer and make 
sacrifices to sustain their internal-spiritual freedom. While in the West, the struggle for human 
rights has been translated into an increasing valuing of human life, Russians always have 
preferred to leave these materialistic worries to the authorities. This situation has not differed 
much from the reigns of Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great or Alexander the Liberator through 
the rules of Stalin, Khrushchev or Brezhnev, up to Putin’s regime in the beginning of the 21st 
century.    
The narratives of constant war and eternal struggle are an integrated part of Russian 
mentality. Major General (ret.) Alexander Vladimirov, a Russian contemporary military 
theoretician and author of the imperative monograph titled Fundamentals of General Theory 
of War, argues that “an eternal war – this is what the history of humanity offers instead of 
eternal peace, which philosophers and moralists have dreamt about.”150 Russian people are 
ready to suffer and sacrifice fighting a just (according to their interpretation) war, a war that is 
intended to protect their lands and families, rather than promote an ideology or a high moral 
standard. Moreover, as it was discussed, Russians traditionally support wars when they are led 
by strong and decisive leaders, who, historically, were not only ruthless with Russia’s enemies, 
but also with the Russians themselves. The paradox of the Russian character is that when it 
comes to fighting just wars (i.e. just causes and strong authority), the Russian people are ready 
to pay any price. The best example of their readiness for sacrifice is shown in surveys done 
after the 2002 Nord-Ost siege in Moscow, in an attempt to analyse people’s tolerance of victims 
in counter-terror operation involving hostages. Interestingly enough, the surveys showed that 
more than 40% of the population define an operation’s outcome as a successful one, when 10 
to 20 hostages out of 100 are killed.151 Furthermore, despite the 125 hostages who had died 
during the law enforcement operation in the Nord-Ost crisis, a month after the siege, 23% of 
respondents thought that the operation was successful and 55% approved it as satisfying.152  
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This example perfectly demonstrates the readiness of the Russian people, due to their 
cultural predispositions described above, to suffer and sacrifice in the fight for a just war. And 
if the readiness for such self-victimisation is so high, it, subsequently, leaves no place for the 
concern for enemy civilian casualties. In other words, the suffering (and casualties) of the 
enemy’s population during military operation is generally approved in the Russian cultural 
context, as Russians are ready to suffer themselves. Moreover, the Russian cultural collectivism 
and the idea of collective responsibility is relevant not only for the Russian community, it is 
also projected on the enemy. To the Russian mind, the community is responsible for its 
members’ actions, and therefore the enemy’s population is frequently considered as responsible 
for the actions of its military. For example, in 2002, surveys of Russian public opinion showed 
that 36% of respondents believed that the Chechen population was responsible for its own 
troubles and Chechens got what they deserved, 67% believed that it was impossible to negotiate 
with Chechens as equals as “they understand only the language of force,” and 47% of 
respondents denied the right to be equal citizens of the Russian Federation to the Chechen 
population.153      
Consequently, in light of this cultural context and mentality, it seems right to argue that 
Russian public opinion is far from pressuring politicians and defence decision-makers to 
consider the minimisation of civilian casualties as a decisive factor in their strategies.  
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Part Four: Russian Military Thought and NLW 
Previous research on Russian military thought undoubtedly shows deep 
interconnections between Russian mentality, national cultural context and Russian military 
culture.154 Consequently, many of the arguments presented and discussed in the following part 
will be based on the Russian cultural factors analysed previously.    
According to Russian tradition, a war is an integral part of the human conditions (esse), 
and, therefore, it is not surprising that in analysing Russian military culture, scholars state that 
Soviet and then Russian military thinkers “interpreted each event as a sign signalling a change 
in the whole and … saw problems as interrelated and requiring a generalised frame of reference 
to determine their meaning.” This inherent Russian cultural ability to see the big picture has 
been, undoubtedly, reflected in Russian military theory conceptualisation. In Russian tradition 
“military science is an all-encompassing discipline …that regulates professional practice from 
strategy and doctrine, on the national level, to tactics on the battlefield”.155 While, in American 
tradition, military experience is the predominant ingredient of military professionalism, in 
Russian military culture, it is the ability of systematic military thinking that enjoys the status 
of an essential and highly valued skill. 
Unlike their American counterparts, Russian military thinkers never considered 
advanced technologies as means to fight better with fewer numbers. Russians have never 
denigrated the relevance and importance of technology; when faced with a problem, however, 
they do not instinctively seek a technological solution.156 This might explain how the tendency 
of concentrating on big abstract ideas often led Russian military thinkers to develop state-of-
the-art doctrines and concepts that were incompatible with the material capacity of the Russian 
military establishment. 
This research, however, follows the development of NLW and their conceptualisation 
by Russian military thought. Consequently, as NLW is a military technology, it focuses on the 
relation between Russian military culture and technological developments in general, and 
NLW in particular. 
 
                                                          
154 For example see: Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War, 
(London: Jane’s Information Group, 1988); Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation… 
155 Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation…, pp. 41, 47. 
156 Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner…, pp. 61-65, 125-134. 
-161- 
 
Russian Military Thought and Technology 
 The Industrial revolution – which essentially occurred in Russia during the 20th century 
– with its stressful and strenuous influence on people, was an antithesis of the Russian desire 
for spiritual calmness and freedom. The Russian peasant mistrusted machines that “seemed [to 
him] as something anti-natural, a fruit of worthless thinking, which was invented in Europe 
and is entirely unsuitable for Russians.”157 It is important to note, however, that this 
technological scepticism was based on a cultural predisposition, rather than on the lack of 
technological imagination or skills. Due to their unmaterialistic mind-set, Russian people saw 
technology as something tedious and worthless; however, under the pressure of necessity 
(coming mainly from the authorities), Russian minds were able to produce technological 
wonders. As an old Russian proverb states: “[If you] beat a Russian – [he] would even make 
you a clock” (pokoloti russkogo - on tebe i chasy sdelayet).158 This, generally unfavourable, 
perception of technology in general, and military technology in particular, has been part of the 
Russian military reality since Peter the Great (the first tsar who actively tried to reform the 
Russian military through technological modernisation). Technology has always been the 
Achilles heel of the Russian military, which was usually compensated for by a heavy reliance 
on the enormous human resources. And while it could be seen that the Russian military 
tradition is simple outnumbering the enemies, “first and foremost it was concerned with 
overcoming the enemy qualitatively – morally.” 159 
 Notwithstanding, the major characteristics of the Russian mentality – collectivism, 
endurance and patience – have all lain at the core of the perception of the moral superiority of 
the Russian forces over their counterparts throughout Russian history. While the notion of 
collectivism was translated into mutual help and assistance between soldiers, to a level that 
could barely be understood by their European counterparts; the endurance and patience were 
transformed into a heroic readiness to withstand unbearable conditions and make enormous 
sacrifices.160 Consequently, it is not surprising that Russian military culture considered new 
military technologies an important, but not obligatory, supplements to its military power, which 
was fundamentally based on spiritually superior “flesh”, rather than sophisticated “war 
machines”.161  When an American, hitting his fingers, will seek a way to improve the hammer, 
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a Russian will discuss intangible theories of a better way to strike the nail, but, in practice, is 
able neither to produce a better hammer, nor change the way he holds the nail – he will endure 
the pain and continue striking.   
 In addition to the cultural technological drawback, the Soviet centralised economy and 
authoritarian conservative military tradition shielded the Soviet military from technological 
adventures and from Western tech-euphoria concepts. Building on the cultural fact that faced 
with a problem, the Russian instinct does not immediately seek a technological solution, Soviet 
military decision-makers approved technology that was considered as the minimum required, 
significantly compensating for technological inferiority through operational and conceptual 
creativity. Soviet technological achievements were mainly used for pokazuha (literally – show-
off; a staged event for officials, international observers and also for internal propaganda),162 
rather than for actual employment. Interestingly enough, this tendency has survived the Soviet 
Union’s dissolution, being transferred to contemporary Russian forces. The 2008-2020 Plan 
for the Reorganisation of the Armed Forces of Russia is intended, by its definition, to give “a 
new image” to the Armed Forced, rather than deal with the core problems and defining 
characteristics.163   
Russian Military Thought and NLW 
  The Russian approach to waging wars has always been different from the Western one. 
Built on different cultural predispositions, Russian generals repeatedly produced solutions that 
were considered as not only impossible, but even unthinkable: Suvorov's march across the Alps 
in 1799 or Kutuzov’s decision to abandon Moscow in 1812. Although, directly after the 
Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviets struggled to separate political ideology and military 
professionalism;164 early Soviet military theoreticians commonly believed that “scientifically” 
developed military thought was a required foundation for crafting strategy and executing 
tactics.165   
 Even though it has been more than 20 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
it seems right to argue that contemporary Russian military thought is deeply rooted in the Soviet 
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“scientific” approach, constructed after the Great Patriotic War, and it has preserved the ability 
to produce ideas and concepts “outside the box” that characterised the Soviet military 
“scientific” thinking. Moreover, while observing their Western counterparts and understanding 
their own technological inferiority, Russian military thinkers have always knew to produce 
innovative and creative strategies and tactics.  The main secret of their intellectual success was 
that, due to purely Russian cultural predispositions, Russian military thinkers were never 
deterred by “the gap between the theoretical and feasible.”166  In other words, Russian military 
thought has never been restricted by the framework of feasibility, allowing them to produce 
strategic and tactical concepts, despite their impracticability. 
 As with many other technologies, the story of Russian military thinking about NLW 
began with the observation of emerging technologies and concepts in the West. The first 
Russian publications on pure military implementation of NLW appeared in mid-2000s and 
always began with an analysis of the Western experience as the major point of reference for 
the following discussion.167  These publications cautiously advocated for the possible 
usefulness of NLW for Russian military as “unlike Russia, several NATO members already 
employ or very close to employ such high-technological weapons as NLW.”168 
An examination of Russian military publications on NLW shows that “The Conception 
to the Development and Employment of Weapons with Non-Lethal Action in the Armed Forces 
of the Russian Federation”, approved by the Russian Minister of Defence in 2009, served as an 
important milestone in the process of the conceptualisation of military employment of NLW. 
Since 2009, the Russian major military publication, Voenaia Mysl’ (Military Thought), has 
been flooded with articles theorising and conceptualising the present and the future of NLW 
on the battlefield.169  These articles, in addition to many other published in more professional 
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journals, such as Strategicheskaya Stabil’nost’ (Strategic Stability),170 Zashcita i Bezopatnost’ 
(Protection and Security),171 Voprosi Oboronnoi Tekhniki (Questions of Defence 
Technology)172 and others, systematically discussed the potential strategic and tactic 
implementations of NLW on the battlefield. Similar to the American case, this theoretical 
discussion has been led by military, as well as academic, scholars and thinkers. On the 
academic forefront of the NLW discourse, a special place is reserved for Victor Selivanov, the 
head of the High-Precision Airborne Devices Department at the Bauman Moscow State 
Technical University (BMSTU) and member of the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery 
Sciences, and Denis Levin, an Associate Professor at BMSTU. On the military side of the 
debate, the main contributors are Colonel General Anatoliy Nagovitsyn, Major General Vasilii 
Burenok and Colonels Vladimir Moiseev and Dmitri Zaitsev. All parts of the Russian military-
science apparatus have been actively engaged in the analysis of NLW – from central military 
research institutes to military academies – sorting through NLW and producing a very 
comprehensive vision of the their possible military employment. According to the affiliations 
of the authors, the centres of the military thinking and conceptualisation about NLW have been: 
the 12th Central Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian 
Federation (the 12th CSRI), the 46th Central Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of 
Defence of the Russian Federation (the 46th CSRI), the Combined Arms Academy of the Armed 
Forces of the Russian Federation (CAAAF), and the Military Academy of the General Staff of 
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (MAGS). Interestingly enough, as the first two are 
responsible for the research and development of new military technologies, and the latter two 
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are the centres of military thinking, the combination of the research produced by them has 
covered the whole picture of the NLW possibilities. 
 According to the group of Russian military officers led by Major General Vasilii 
Burenok, head of the 46th CSRI, NLW are characterised by: 
(1) high effectiveness of affecting factors on man-power, equipment and 
infrastructure; (2) ability to incapacitate targets for a period of time, required by 
special forces to accomplish their missions; (3) high level of information-
psychological impact on the enemy; (4) selectiveness in affecting parts of the 
chosen targets; (5) ability to provide the required time before the realisation of the 
chosen affecting factor and the regulation of its impact according to the operational 
and tactical situation; (6) compatibility and feasibility of integration with existent 
and future armament.173 
 The systematic methodology of Russian military science to identify the role of NLW on the 
future battlefield included mathematical simulations of the possible contribution of NLW to 
military success. Analysing the possible implementations of NLW, Colonel Evgeni Efremov 
from the 12th CSRI, an institution that is responsible for the development of the requirements 
from military technologies, reported:  
The experience of local wars and armed conflicts shows that a mathematical 
modulation of combat activity is a required condition for the scientific forecast of 
the process and the outcome of military activity… [and] the development of 
relevant requirements from tactical-technical weapons’ characteristics … including 
Weapons with Non-Lethal Action. 174   
Interestingly enough, one of the main conclusions of these very mathematical simulations is 
that employment of NLW, intended to minimise civilian casualties, thus decreasing the 
enemy’s reinforcement from civilian population, will lead to a decrease of casualties of military 
personnel that employ these NLW.175   
On the conceptual forefront of debate, the Russian military thinkers also delved deeper 
into possible concepts of operations and employment of NLW. As Colonels Vladimir Moiseev 
and Vladimir Orliyanskii reported in their imperative article “Weapons with Non-Lethal Action 
and the Principles of Tactics”: 
Rapid and massive employment of a variety of Weapons with Non-Lethal Action 
can allow the neutralisation of entire enemy units, as they lack the information 
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about the characteristics of these weapons, scales of their employment, damaging 
factors and ways of protection.176   
While similarly to their American counterparts, Russian military thinkers predetermining the 
suitability of NLW more to law enforcement types of military missions (e.g., counter-terror or 
peacekeeping operations), they also delved into the pure tactical role of NLW during these type 
of conflicts suggesting that properly employed NLW can provide  a force with significant 
tactical advantages. The major possible advantage of NLW on the battlefield, according to 
Russian publications, is a tactical surprise that can be achieved “not by the fact of the 
employment of the new weapons, but by skilful ways of their employment and avoiding 
repetitive patterns.”177   
In an attempt to organise the existing knowledge, emerging technologies and the 
experience of their employment, different data bases were created178 and comprehensive plans 
of future development were discussed.179 Economic perceptiveness,180 legal aspects181 and 
even measures to protect friendly civilian population against NLW employed by enemy 
forces182 – all these aspects were extensively discussed in the Russian military literature. 
The most interesting part of their research, however, is their discussions of examples of 
the real events involving Russian Armed Forces in Chechnya and how the employment of 
NLW could have brought a better tactical solution, secure troops on the ground and save 
enemy’s civilian’s lives.183 There are two main conclusions, to which these examinations 
brought Russian researchers. The first is that “arming the troops with different kinds of NLW 
significantly enhances their ability to impact the enemy in the place and time, where and when 
he expects it least.”184 And the second is that: 
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Arming the troops with the most advanced types of NLW, and their decisive and 
extensive employment in combination with lethal weapons – will allow forcing the 
enemy to stop the armed struggle and will create conditions for the peaceful 
resolution of the existent conflict.185  
 Due to different cultural and historical predispositions, technological virtuosity has 
never been the centre of gravity of the Russian military tradition. Same cultural aspects, 
however, have released Russian military thinkers and strategy crafters from the burden of being 
immediately relevant, allowing them to grasp distant, unfeasible and unthinkable concepts.186 
Modelling themselves on the Soviet-built methodology of military science, contemporary 
Russian military researchers have produced analyses of NLW that is significantly more 
comprehensive than the product of their American counterparts. The extensive spectrum of the 
analysis, the different perspectives and assessments, offer a very detailed proposal for the 
military employment of NLW. Interestingly enough, according to the Russian point of view, 
NLW are intended to be employed during law enforcement operations, not because of political 
concerns to avoid civilian casualties, but because, as several Russian military thinkers claimed, 
the massive employment of lethal weapons “will promote the growth of the population’s 
aggressiveness, the destruction of economic and social infrastructures, and ultimately will lead 
to a further escalation of the conflict.”187 This understanding of the initial role of NLW 
corresponds to an even more significant breakthrough of Russian military conceptualising: 
NLW have a potential to complement lethal means on conventional battlefield against 
conventional enemies’ forces. According to Russian military thinkers, non-lethal capabilities 
have to be integrated within conventional lethal weapons, thus increasing their effectiveness: 
Variations of Weapons with Non-Lethal Action have to be compatible with the 
existing ordinary weaponry and compliment its capabilities. It is important that the 
standard existing means of delivery (firearms, artillery, aircrafts, missiles, etc.) are 
used as means of the delivery [of non-lethal effects], and oversized systems are 
mounted on the standard already employed military transport platforms. The 
technical maintenance and resupply of the combat employment of different 
Weapons with Non-Lethal Action have to be a part of the existing system of the 
technical maintenance and resupply of the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation.188 
Subsequently, according to Russian understanding, NLW can “minimise the enemy’s 
capabilities to manoeuvre it reserves and second echelons” as well as “disorganise the 
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coordination of command, control, intelligence and information.”189 This shows that, as per 
usual with the Russian military science, the fact that current NLW are far away from being able 
to fulfil these far-seeing visions does not stop Russian military thinkers from conceptualising 
their potential influence on the future of warfare.      
 
Part Five: Conclusions 
While the peak of Russian enthusiasm for NLW occurred more than a decade after the 
outset of the military revision of these weapons in the U.S. in the early 1990s,  the current 
employment of NLW within the Russian military does not much differ from its American 
counterpart, presented in the previous chapter. It seems that the Russian military concepts 
approved in 2009 served as a trigger for the Russian military community to start engaging the 
topic of NLW, but without a powerful leadership this eagerness rapidly attenuated, burying 
NLW within the Russian bureaucracy machine.  
The history of Russian political and military reforms and modernisations offers a 
logical explanation of the sudden rise and fall of interest in NLW in the Russian political-
military discourse. Historically, all Russian political, economic, and, especially, military 
reforms were inspired by the West. Intuitively Russian strategy decision-makers closely 
observe Western military technological and conceptual developments in an attempt to 
Russianise them.190 Consequently, it is not surprising that after a decade since its development 
in the U.S., the idea of NLW migrated to Russia creating a sudden vast interest to these 
weapons. It is also not surprising that this interest was short-lived. Russian historical and 
cultural predispositions demand a strong personality to lead any reform or modernisation: 
“there’s moderniser – there’s modernisation, there’s no moderniser – do not expect even 
attempts to organise changes.”191 And, as it was discussed, Russian politicians have neither 
international, nor domestic political pressures to reduce the lethality of their Armed Forces and 
demand military reform that will lead to the employment of NLW. 
 Since the mid-2000s, the Kremlin has implemented a very effective defensive foreign 
policy, built on the Russian growing economic status and the revitalisation of the Russian role 
in international affairs, by providing a critical interpretation of Western actions. To the Russian 
                                                          
189V. Moiseev, V. Orlyanskii, ‘Oruzhiye neletal’nogo deystviya …’, p. 32. 
190Vladislav Inosemzev, Poteryannoye desyatiletiye, [The Lost Decade], (Moscow: Moskovskaya shkola 
politicheskih issledovanii, 2013), pp. 553-569; V. Lapkin, V. Pantin, ‘Dinamika obraza Rossii …’. 
191Vladislav Inosemzev, Poteryannoye desyatiletiye …, p. 556. 
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mind, as long as Western militaries provide enough cases of brutal lethality during their 
military activity and do not employ NLW, Russian politicians see no reason to invest resources 
in the development of military operationally-useful NLW. In other words, as long as the 
Kremlin will be able to justify enemy civilian casualties by referring to the level of lethality 
caused during U.S.-led operations, there will be no pressure to decrease the lethality of the 
Russian troops and consequently employ NLW.  Moreover, the Russian cultural attitudes 
towards war and the Russian true belief that the main purpose of war is pure survival of one’s 
own nation, rather than an attempt to defend values or high-moral standards, prevent the 
formation of any domestic political pressure to decrease civilian casualties in conflicts.     
Russian military thought traditionally has tended to concentrate on the big abstract ideas 
that often led Russian military thinkers to develop state-of-the-art doctrines and concepts that 
were incompatible with the material capacity of the Russian military establishment, and NLW 
are not an exception. In 2012, in his famous article “Being strong: National security guarantees 
for Russia”, Vladimir Putin advocated the importance of the development of the so called 
“Weapons Based on New Physical Principles” (oruzhiya na novykh fizicheskikh 
printsipakh).192 While, in the beginning, the meaning of the term was unclear, later, the Russian 
Ministry of Defence clarified that the “Weapons Based on New Physical Principles” (also 
called Non-Traditional Types of Weapons) are “new types of weapons with assaulting factors 
based on processes and phenomena that were not previously used for military purposes” and 
listed six types of these weapons: Directed Energy Weapons, Electromagnetic Weapons, 
Geophysical Weapons, Radiological Weapons, Genetic Weapons, as well as Non-Lethal 
Weapons.193  
This very ambition and abstract concept of a whole set of entirely new weaponry 
demonstrates best the paradoxical gap between the ability of Russian military thought to 
produce sophisticated concepts and the feasibility of their implementation. On the one hand, 
Putin himself advocated these weapons stating in 2012 that: “in the long term … the Weapons 
Based on New Physical Principles …  alongside nuclear weapons, will allow to obtain 
                                                          
192 Vladimir Putin, ‘Byt’ sil’nymi: garantii natsional'noy bezopasnosti dlya Rossii’, [‘Being strong: National 
security guarantees for Russia’], Rossiyskaya gazeta, No. 5708, 17 February 2012. 
193 The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, The Online Version of the Encyclopaedia of the Strategic 
Missile Troops (Entsiklopediya Raketnykh Voysk Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya), 
http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details_rvsn.htm?id=13770@morfDictionary; also The 
Online Version of the Military Encyclopaedic Dictionary (Voyennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar'), 




imperatively new instruments to achieve political and strategic goals,”194 and General 
Lieutenant Stanislav Suvorov, the Head of the Military-Scientific Committee of the Armed 
Forces, stated three years later, during the International Military-Technical Forum “Army 
2015”, that some new developments in this field were demonstrated as “a separate part of the 
exhibition was designated for the Non-Traditional Types of Weapons.”195  On the other hand, 
the definition of these weapons undermines the very feasibility of this new weaponry, clearly 
stating that “many types of these weapons fall under 1978 Environmental Modification 
Convention and other international treaties,”196 and “given the unpredictability of the 
consequences of the use of certain types of these weapons ... the international community is 
trying to prevent their testing or employment.”197      
While, the inability of American military thought to produce a comprehensive 
operational concept for NLW, limited their development and employment, the Russian military 
traditional way developed an overwhelming and unfeasible conception that is just impossible 
to materialise. Consequently, it is not surprising that the employment of NLW was limited to 
the Collective Rapid Reaction Force. The 2010 training operation “Vzaimodeystviye-2010” 
was the best example of Russian pokazuha – a good staged demonstration of technological 
achievement (in this case of NLW) to produce an image of fulfilment and please the high 
command. It seems that this experimentation with NLW was a reaction to the sudden attention 
from the strategy-makers and policy-designers. Once this pressure to present non-lethal 
capabilities satisfied and was consequently debilitated, the military, as well as industries, lost 
their interest. Notwithstanding the loss of official interest, Russian military thought has not 
ceased to exert itself, developing a comprehensive tactic and strategic understanding of the 
possible employment of NLW. Lack of technological feasibility has never stopped Russian 
military thinkers from further conceptualising and theorising.  
While analysing the published products of their activities it is important to highlight 
two main aspects. The first one is an interesting, but not surprising, fact – a full compliance 
with the political course of the complete and firm respect for the international law system. 
While some Western researchers gingerly suggest changes in the modern international 
                                                          
194 Vladimir Putin, ‘Byt’ sil’nymi: …’. 
195 Quoted in ‘Minoborony: Na Forume "Armiya-2015" Pokazhut Netraditsionnyye Vidy Oruzhiya’, [‘Ministry 
of Defence: Non-Traditional Types of Weapons Will be Demonstrated at “Army-2020” Show’],  RiaNovosti, 
21 April, 2015, http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20150421/1059915256.html, [accessed: 4 September 2015]. 
196 The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, The Online Version of the Military Encyclopaedic 
Dictionary. 




LoAC,198 such actions have never been proposed in Russia, neither by military thinkers, nor by 
scholars. In the eyes of Russian specialists, the very conceptualisation of future warfare (with 
or without NLW) has to be legally defensible within the existing system of international laws, 
as the international legal system is one of the major practicalities of the Russian foreign policy 
and Russia has no intention (or power) to change them. 
The second aspect of the Russian NLW theoretical debate that should be highlighted is 
the conceptual idea of the employment of NLW on conventional battlefields. While the general 
discourse in Russian military literature is generally similar to the American appreciation of the 
advantageous characteristics of NLW during law enforcement operations, several Russian 
military theoreticians analyse the tactical usefulness of NLW against a conventional enemy.199 
While neither Russia, nor the U.S., or any other country, have fully developed NLW that can 
suit this theory, it does not stop Russian military thought from developing novel concepts for 
waging future wars.   
Unfortunately, despite very progressive tactical and strategic concepts for the possible 
employment of NLW, and the fact that Russian military thinkers believe that “the creation of 
Weapons with Non-Lethal Action is an extremely important task for Russia,”200 it seems that 
the Russian military is not going to lead in this field in the visible future. A powerful political 
will is required to lift-off an employment of a novel military technology within the context of 
the unmaterialistic Russian military culture, especially if it is not employed by the Western 
military first. As long as NLW do not pass this test of political necessity, they are doomed to 
remain a thought-provoking, yet idle tool in the Russian military arsenal. 
  
                                                          
198For example see: Frederic Merget, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons and the Possibility of Radical New Horizons for the 
Laws of War: Why Kill, Wound and Hurt (Combatants) at All?’, Social Science Research Network, July 1, 2008, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1295348, [accessed: 1/12/2013]; David Fidler, ‘’Non-
Lethal’ Weapons and International Law: Three Perspectives on The Future’, in Nick Lewer (ed.), The Future of 
Non-Lethal Weapons: Technologies, Operations, Ethics and Law, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), pp. 
26-38. 
199For example: V. Moiseev, V. Orlyanskii, ‘Oruzhiye neletal’nogo deystviya …’. 




 THE (ABSENCE OF THE) RMA OF NLW IN ISRAEL 
  
Introduction 
Following the American discourse on NLW, the current academic and professional 
literature on NLW in Israel employs similar terminology, calling NLW neshek al-hereg (non-
killing weapons)1 or neshek pahot katlani (less-lethal weapons).2 Yet the official term used by 
the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) for NLW is emtzaim le-pizur hafganot (crowd dispersal 
means).3  One of the most prominent explanations for this term is the fact that NLW has been 
employed by the IDF as riot control weapons long before the contemporary understanding of 
NLW was formed. 
The first employment of NLW by the Israeli military was during the 1970s, 
encountering disturbances and other forms of civilian violence, generally organised by youths 
and students in towns and cities in the Territories (Judea, Samaria and Gaza). This employment, 
however, was limited in scale and restricted to tear gas and rubber bullets, usually employed 
by the Border Police under the command of IDF officers, rather than military units themselves.4 
The first significant peak of the IDF’s interest in NLW, as a law enforcement tool to deal with 
riots and civilian disobedience, occurred during the First Intifada (December 1987 – September 
1993). The problem of the “gap between verbal warning and deadly force”5 that the U.S. 
military encountered in Somalia in 1995, the IDF had to deal with as early as 1988, when the 
then Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin had stated that “soldiers found themselves in a position 
of either fire or do nothing.”6 In an attempt to bridge this gap, the IDF had to employ a vast 
variety of NLW to fulfil its law enforcement missions in the Territories.7 
The second major peak of interest in NLW occurred during the Second Intifada (Al-
Aqsa Intifada, September 2000 – February 2005). The IDF had found itself, yet again, 
encountering massive riots and the quest for new improved NLW was given high priority.8 
                                                          
1 For example, the Hebrew version of Roi Ben-Horin, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons: Theory, Practice, and what Lies 
Between’, Strategic Assessment, Vol. 2, No. 4, January 2001, pp.21-27 was titled as ‘Neshek Al-Hereg: 
Ha’alaha, Hama’ase ve-mashebenehem’ and published in Idkun Astrategi, Vol. 4, No.1, 2001, pp. 18-24. 
2 For example, see Guy-Zahar Shtultz, ‘Haf’alat koah medureget be’imutim besviva ezrahit’, [The Employment 
of Graduate Force in Conflicts within Civilian Environment], Ma’arachot, Vol. 438, 2011, pp. 8-17. 
3 State Comptroller of Israel, Annual Report 54A for 2003 Year, Jerusalem, 2003, pp.89-90, (Hebrew). 
4 Aryeh Shalev, The Intifada: Causes and Effects, (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post, 1991), pp. 56-62. 
5 F.M. Lorenz, ‘Non-Lethal Force: The Slippery Slope to War?’, Parameters, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, 1996, p. 52. 
6 Interview with Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin, published in  Jerusalem Post, February 16, 1989.   
7 Aryeh Shalev, The Intifada…, pp. 106-111. 
8 State Comptroller of Israel, Annual Report 54A…, pp. 87-88. 
-173- 
 
Since then, the IDF’s interest in NLW dwindled and intensified according to the political 
situation in the West Bank. Consequently, it seems right to argue that the IDF employs NLW 
on a much larger scale and has a much richer experience than its American or Russian 
counterparts due to its intensive involvement in law enforcement missions in the Territories. 
Interestingly enough, despite this vast employment of NLW and the fact that the 
problem of civilian casualties during military operations has been at the core of the IDF’s 
professional discourse for many years,9 the IDF has always thought of NLW as a tool for riot 
and crowd control only, and the idea of their employment on the battlefield has never been 
considered as a viable option. While it is easy to criticise the IDF for its lack of vision,10 it 
seems that the reasons for the very limited employment of NLW in the Israeli military, similar 
to the American and Russian cases, are rooted more in political and cultural contexts, rather 
than in the IDF’s professional misconduct. 
Following this introduction, this chapter consists of five parts. The first part focuses on the 
status of NLW in the IDF and briefly discusses the history of NLW employment in Israel, the 
state of technology offered by Israeli manufacturers and the level of the actual employment of 
NLW by the IDF. The second part focuses on the aspects of Israeli foreign policy and 
international criticism of IDF for harming enemy civilian population. On the one hand, since 
the moment of its establishment, Israel has constantly had to deal with severe international 
criticism. On the other, the IDF’s military operations during the last decade were specifically 
criticised for disproportional use of force. The IDF’s operations in Gaza were followed by 
international investigations that focused on civilian casualties and collateral damage, 
specifically criticising the IDF’s conduct (e.g., the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the 
Gaza Conflict and the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the 2014 Israel–Gaza 
conflict.)11 This part focuses on the different mechanisms and narratives of the Israeli foreign 
policy intended to withstand international political pressure that calls to minimise collateral 
damage and civilian deaths during military operations.  
                                                          
9 See Gidon Avidor, (ed.), Hamashmauyot haben’leumiyot, hamishpatiyot vehamusriyot belehima bekerev 
uh’lusiya ezrahit, [The International, Legal and Moral Consequences of Warfare in Civil Environment] , The 
(Latrun: Zvi Meitar Institute for Land Warfare Studies, 2010). 
10 Guy-Zahar Shultz, ‘Haf’alat koah medureget…’. 
11 UN Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the 
United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 25 September 2009; UN Human Rights Council, 
Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution, 
24 June 2015. 
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The third part concentrates on the cultural aspects of Israeli society, in a more specific 
attempt to explain the existence (or a lack thereof) of internal political pressure to minimise 
civilian casualties (and, therefore, more extensively employ NLW). This part offers an insight 
into Israeli cultural attitudes toward wars in general, and civilian casualties in particular. The 
fourth part analyses the attitudes of Israeli military culture toward technology, it follows the 
development of Israeli military thought and its influence on the ways in which NLW are 
employed. 
The final part integrates the four previous parts in an attempt to explain the reasons 
behind the failure of the RMA of NLW in Israel. Based on political and cultural aspects, it 
clarifies why despite the fact that the IDF employs NLW on an unprecedented scale for riot 
control missions, it still refrains from using them on the battlefield. 
 
Part One: The Status of Non-Lethal Weapons in Israel 
 With the end of the Six-Day War and the establishment of Military Government in the 
Territories, the IDF found itself dealing with local civilian disobedience in the form of stone-
throwing, of tire-burning and of road-blocking. As Major General Shlomo Gazit, the first IDF 
coordinator of government activities in the Territories, noted: “civil disobedience in the West 
Bank broke out at an extremely early stage, within weeks of the cessation of hostilities in the 
Six-Day War.”12 Unlike the Jordanians, who controlled Judea and Samaria before 1967, and 
who did not hesitate using live ammunition against rioters,13 the IDF, dealing with the 
protesters, started to experiment with NLW. These sporadic outbreaks of violence were 
regarded as typical “current security” (Bitachon Shotef, or Batash) problems and were solved 
decisively and by relatively limited measures, as “in the aftermath of the 1967 war, the IDF 
enjoyed a significant deterrent profile in the Territories and the local population … was 
reluctant to take personal risks.”14 When the employment of NLW was required, it was limited 
to rubber bullets and tear gas, and it was mainly executed by the Border Police (Mishmar 
Hagvul, or Magav) under the close supervision of IDF commanders.15 
                                                          
12 Shlomo Gazit, Hamakel vehagezer: hamimshal haisraeli be’yehuda veshomron, [The Stick and the Carrot: The 
Israeli Government in Judea and Samaria], (Tel-Aviv: Zmora-Bitan, 1985), p. 269. 
13 Aryeh Shalev, The Intifada…, p. 56. 
14 Aryeh Shalev, The Intifada…, p. 62. 
15 Aryeh Shalev, The Intifada…, pp. 56-62. 
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The outbreak of the First Intifada in December 1987 created an entirely different 
situation, when “Palestinian residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip attacked any Israeli 
who crossed their path … with rocks, knives, home-made firebombs and, eventually, 
gunfire.”16 The IDF found itself completely unprepared to face civilian violence on a large 
scale, accompanied by massive riots and demonstrations. Ehud Barak, the IDF Deputy Chief 
of Staff at that time, assessed that the new situation left the soldiers “with only two possibilities: 
to run away or to shoot. Both possibilities were bad … We were not technically prepared to 
deal with the violent popular riot on this scale.”17 
This technological gap was bridged by the IDF in two different ways. The first one was 
a vast employment of “off-the-shelf” law enforcement NLW – riot batons, rubber bullets and 
tear gas. The second one was the rapid research and development process to improve the 
effectivity of the existing NLW and introduce new ones according to the new challenges posted 
by rioters. For example, when the existing rubber bullets proved ineffective at a distance of 
more than 20 meters, the IDF quickly introduced an improved version containing a quantity of 
lead.18 When the effectiveness of this improvement also diminished, as the local population 
had learnt how to offset its effects (mainly by maintaining further distance from the forces), 
the IDF introduced plastic bullets. Yitzhak Rabin, then the Defence Minister, explained the 
purpose of this new NLW:19 
It was demonstrated that the use of clubs, tear gas and rubber bullets was 
insufficient when confronting stone-throwers at ranges of 30-50 meters … 
Therefore we added plastic bullets, which are intended to reach the stone throwers, 
organizers and agitators.  
While the newly introduced plastic bullets were intended to be used against point targets (stone 
throwers, organisers, etc.), the IDF was keen to introduce a weapon that would be more 
effective against a big mass of demonstrators. The first such attempt was made when the IDF 
introduced Hatzatzit (from hatzatz – gravel) – a system that produced a torrent of small size 
gravel and was carried by a small truck.20 The second, when the Israeli Air Force, in a very 
                                                          
16 Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East, 3rd edition, revised and updated by 
Shlomo Gazit, (Barnsley: Frontline Books, 2010), pp. 397-398. 
17 Ehud Barak quoted in Ahron Bregman, Jihan El-Tahri, The Fifty Years War: Israel and Arabs, (London: 
Penguin Books & BBC Worldwide, 1998), p.189. 
18 Aryeh Shalev, The Intifada…, pp. 106-111. 
19 Yitzhak Rabin quoted in Ha’araretz, October 5, 1988. 
20 Efraim Lapid, ‘Haintifada harishona, ha’avanim she’banu et heskem Oslo’, [‘The First Intifada, the Stones 






short time, introduced several systems for massive employment of non-lethal means (tear gas 
and smoke grenades, lachrymatory and/or painting liquids, and even gravel) carried and 
dispersed by helicopters.21 
With the end of the First Intifada, and especially after 1994, the same year the Oslo 
Agreements were signed, the IDF’s interest in NLW dwindled. The plastic bullets were 
rejected, as they proved as significantly more lethal than expected – i.e., during the first 18 
months of the Intifada the number of fatalities caused by plastic bullets stood at 82.22 The 
Hatzatzit systems, which were regarded as odd, bizarre and not “sophisticated” enough 
weapons, were completely abandoned. As Deputy Commissioner Alexander (Alik) Ron stated 
during the Or Commission (commission of inquiry into the clashes between law enforcement 
forces and Israeli citizens, in October 2000): “these systems have been rotting somewhere for 
many years, since the Intifada we have not used them.”23 
The IDF’s interest in NLW was reignited in 2000. Despite the experience of the First 
Intifada, the Israeli military found itself unprepared and the quantitative and qualitative lacks 
in NLW were first experienced during the withdrawal from Lebanon, when the IDF found itself 
encountering massive demonstrations led by Hezbollah fighters. This shortage became to be 
more significant with the start of the Second (Al-Aqsa) Intifada and following operation 
Defensive Shield that reinforced the need for more effective NLW.24 
The main reason why the Al-Aqsa Intifada required NLW that were different from the 
previously employed systems is the fact that at that time the Israeli activity in the Territories 
had a military, rather than law enforcement, nature. While Israeli infantry units, tanks, 
armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were deployed to fight terrorists, they frequently found 
themselves encountering stone-throwers and unarmed rioters. Without NLW, the Israeli troops 
faced the difficult choice between shooting the rioters (usually children and youths) and doing 
                                                          
%D7%90%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A1%D7%9B%D7%9D-
%D7%90%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%9C%D7%95, [accessed: 28 September 15]. 
21 Dror Merom, ‘Hamasokim neged hafganot hamoniyot’, [Helicopters against Massive Demonstrations], Bit’aon 
Hel’ Avir, No. 67 (168), 1989, pp. 14-15. 
22 State Comptroller of Israel, Annual Report 54A…, p. 101; Aryeh Shalev, The Intifada…, p. 109. 
23 Alexander (Alik) Ron in ‘Eduto shel’ nitzav Alik Ron bephnei va’adat Or, 3 september 2001, helek shlishi’, 
[‘The Testimony of Major General Alik Ron to the Or Commission, 3 September 2001, Part 6’], Ha’aretz 
Online, 4 September 2001, http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1555776, [accessed: 24 September 2015]. 
24 State Comptroller of Israel, Annual Report 54A…, pp. 88-89. 
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nothing – decisions that several times led to situations when military equipment (including 
machine-guns) was stolen from manned tanks and APCs.25 
Desperate to bridge this gap, the IDF introduced non-lethal flash-bang shells for tanks26 
– the first and, so far, unique NLW intended to be fired from the tank’s main cannon.  Another, 
newly developed NLW, was Bo’esh (Skunk) – a sticky liquid produced from an organic and 
non-toxic blend of baking powder, yeast, and other ingredients, which leaves a powerful odour 
similar to rot or sewage.27 In 2002, during the Siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem 
(2 April – 10 May) and the series of sieges of the Arafat compound in the Mukataa in Ramallah, 
Bo’esh was considered by the IDF, and rejected, as a possible non-lethal tool to resolve the 
siege situations.28 Despite these very innovative technologies, with the end of the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada in 2005, similarly to the end of the First Intifada, the IDF’s interest in NLW dwindled 
again. The non-lethal tanks’ shells were taken out of service,29 and Bo’esh was in the 
development process for three more years and was operationally employed for the first time 
only in 2008, against demonstrators in Na’alin village in the West Bank.30 
Since the end of the Second Intifada, the IDF’s interest in the employment of NLW 
changed according to political developments in the region. On the one hand, due to the frequent 
violent demonstrations and riots organised by Palestinians and Israeli ultra-left movements 
against the Israeli West Bank Wall (“Separation Wall” or “Security Barrier”), most of IDF 
units have been trained to fulfil crowd control missions and went through NLW basic training.31  
                                                          
25 ‘Yaladim palestinim ganvu tziyud tzvai mitank’, [‘Palestinian Children Stole Military Equipment from a Tank’], 
Yedioth Ahronoth, 2 January, 2002, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-1489428,00.html, [accessed: 28 
September 2015]. 
26 Amos Ha’rel, ‘Tzal inase lefazer hafganot hamoniyot bepagazei tankim im k’liey plastik sh’osim rak ra’ash’, 
[‘The IDF Will Try to Disperse Massive Riots with Tanks’ Shells with Plastic Warheads that Make Noise 
Only’], Ha’aretz Online, 28 February, 2005, http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1505848, [accessed: 28 September 
2015]. 
27 Kobi Ben-Simhon, ‘Hatargil hamasriah; hamafginim mi’Na’alin tzrihim liknot deodorant’, [‘A Stinky Hoax; 
The Rioters from Na’alin Have to Buy Deodorant’], Ha’aretz Online, 4 September 2008, 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1347475, [accessed: 28 September 2015]. 
28 Amir Oren, ‘Nishkal shigur “Bo’esh” leknesiyat hamolad’, [‘It was considered to deploy “Skunk” to the Church 
of the Nativity’], Ha’aretz, 12 April 2002, http://news.walla.co.il/item/208321, [accessed: 28 September 2015]. 
29 Amir Rapaport, ‘Metach gavoha’, [‘High Tension’], Israel Defense, 26 April 2011,  
http://www.israeldefense.co.il/he/content/%D7%9E%D7%AA%D7%97-
%D7%92%D7%91%D7%95%D7%94, [accessed: 28 September 2015]. 
30 Efrat Vais, ‘Lerishona: Magav Pizer Mafginei Smol’ betotah sirahon’, [‘For the First Time: The Border Police 
Dispersed Leftist Demonstrators with a Stinky Cannon’], Yedioth Ahronoth, 10 August 2008, 
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3580288,00.html, [accessed: 28 September 2015]. 
31 See Idan Seger, ‘Ei’n makom letauiyot: kah tzal’ metkonen lemehumot’, [‘There Is No Place for Mistakes: This 
Is the Way, in which the IDF Prepares itself for the Riots’], Mako, 20 September 2011, 
http://www.mako.co.il/pzm-magazine/Article-c7ddcfef4e18231006.htm, [accessed: 28 September 2015]; 
Yuval Azulai, ‘Technologiya hal-hereg: haim hayah nitan limnoa hasa’ara be”marmara”?’, [Non-Lethal 
Technology: Whether Was It Possible to Prevent the “Marmara” Storm?’], Globes, 20 September 2011, 
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000683960, [accessed: 28 September 2015]. 
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On the other, facing political-military turbulences, which required other than lethal resolution, 
the IDF found itself unprepared. For example, the lethal outcome of the military operation 
against the Gaza Freedom Flotilla, on 31 May 2010, resulted with vast criticism, reigniting the 
interest in NLW and exposing a detrimental gap in the IDF’s employment of NLW.32 Another 
example was in 2011, when anticipating the Palestinian unilateral declaration of independence 
in the UN, and a possible “Third Intifada” that would come afterwards, the IDF found itself 
desperately searching for new NLW and investing about NIS75 million to purchase mainly off-
the-shelf weapons.33 
Interestingly enough, despite its vast experience and technological novelty, the IDF has 
never formed a persisting professional institution responsible for the development and 
employment of NLW and their operational concepts. During the First Intifada, it was the 
Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Ehud Barak, who was leading the development of NLW 
and their fielding.34 During the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the IDF established a short-lived Forum of 
Brigadier-Generals to define the operational gaps versus the threats. This forum had already 
been disbanded by mid 2001, and the responsibility for NLW was relocated to the Head of the 
IDF Operations Directorate.35 In 2006, after the end of the Second Intifada, the operational and 
conceptual development of NLW was in the hands of a specially established committee, “The 
NLW Forum at the General Officer Commanding Army Headquarters,” which was responsible 
for the evaluation of NLW and writing operational concepts for their employment. While this 
committee was disbanded in 2009, just three years after its establishment, one of its main 
achievements was the establishment of the Department of Riot Control at the main training 
base of the IDF Central Command. This accomplishment, however, was limited, as the 
responsibilities of this department were mainly restricted to the supervision of the riot control 
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training of the IDF units before their deployment in the Territories and did not include the 
development of operational concepts for NLW or their technological requirements.36 
 To summarise the current NLW situation in the IDF, it is important to emphasise two 
main factors. The first one is the technological level of the employed NLW and the scale of 
their employment. On the one hand, the range of the routinely employed NLW within the IDF 
does not differ much from the NLW employed by its American and Russian counterparts, and 
mainly consists of different means to employ tear gas and kinetic rubber bullets.37 On the other, 
during the peaks of civil unrests in the Territories, the IDF introduced several out-of-the-box 
non-lethal technologies, such as Hatzatzit, Bo’esh and non-lethal shells for tanks. Moreover, 
due to the constant deployment of Israeli military units in the Territories as law enforcement 
forces, they have extensive experience in riot control missions, and, thus, the employment of 
NLW. 
The second is the IDF’s conceptual perspective on NLW. Despite the vast employment 
of NLW, and despite significant NLW technological innovations, the IDF has never considered 
their possible employment on the battlefield as a tool to minimise civilian casualties during 
military operations.38  NLW have been continuously considered by the IDF as less prestigious 
weapon systems intended for riot control during Batash missions (“current security” – i.e., law 
enforcement deployment in the Territories and along Israel’s borders), rather than military 
operations. Moreover, NLW were frequently conceptualised as systems that “might harm the 
[IDF’s] ability to prepare for a [future] battle, and even sabotage the ability to achieve victory 
in it.”39 While it seems easy to criticise the IDF for its lack of vision, will or ability to re-
evaluate its assessment of NLW, 40 it seems that the reasons for the IDF’s denial to employ 
NLW during military operations, similar to the American and Russian cases, are rooted more 
in the political and cultural contexts, rather than in the IDF’s professional misconduct. 
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Part Two: Israeli Foreign Policy and International Criticism 
 When the Israeli government appointed in 1968 the freshly retired Lieutenant General 
Yitzhak Rabin as Israel’s ambassador to the U.S., Rabin asked the foreign ministry: “What 
does the government expect Israel’s Ambassador to the United States to achieve?” He was then 
told: “Diplomatic Objectives? We have no idea.”41  This anecdote provides a hint of the Israeli 
approach to its foreign policy, suggesting that either Israel does not care about its foreign affairs 
or the Israeli foreign policy aims are so solid that they are obvious. Indeed, to outsiders, the 
Israeli foreign policy decision-making may seem reactionary and quite irrational. The best 
example of this was the visit of the U.S. Vice-President Joe Baiden to Jerusalem in March 
2010, who in an attempt to re-launch peace negotiations requested to freeze construction in the 
West Bank. When he landed in Tel-Aviv, he was taken aback by Israel’s announcement of 
1,600 new  apartments to be built in east Jerusalem – a move that led to what was reported as 
one of the most serious rows between the two allies in recent decades.42 
Israelis, however, have a clear view of their foreign policy behaviour, which is firmly 
based on their different cultural codes – “existential anxiety; upright defiance; a dugri (frank) 
speech culture and a fear of seeming to be a fraier (sucker).”43 While some of these 
characteristics will be discussed in the second part of this chapter, the main focus here is on 
foreign policy mechanisms that assist Israel’s political leadership to withstand international 
criticism. In other words, how this cultural code has been translated into foreign policy 
narratives intended to fend off international criticism regarding Israel’s military activities and 
their outcomes (especially in terms of civilian casualties). 
There is a general agreement between scholars that Israel’s foreign policy is deeply 
rooted in numerous Jewish traditions, and its analysis has to start, at the very least, from the 
beginning of modern Zionism and the work of Benjamin Ze'ev Herzl.44 This comprehensive 
examination, however, is beyond this research, and it seems reasonable to begin the following 
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examination from 1948, the year of the establishment of the state of Israel, and go back to the 
roots of the pre-state foreign policy narratives when it is required. 
The discussion of the American and Russian foreign policies, presented in the previous 
chapters, primarily focused on the mechanisms intended to fend off international criticism 
followed by the military activity of these states, or, in other words, how these states have 
maintained the legitimacy of their military operations. In the case of Israel, however, this 
question of legitimacy has always been a much more complicated issue. Unlike the U.S. and 
Russia, which have had to defend the legitimacy of their military deployments that were 
criticised for causing civilian casualties and collateral damage, Israel, from its very beginning, 
has had to defend, not only the legitimacy of its military operations, but also its own legitimacy 
as a Jewish state.45 Consequently, in Israeli foreign policy, these two different types of 
legitimacy seem to be highly interconnected, as according to many Israeli scholars and 
politicians “after more than 60 years of the independence of the State of Israel, there are still 
many question marks regarding its sovereignty and its right to be an equal member of the 
international community.”46 
As the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 was an outcome of a UN resolution, 
the initial attitude of Israeli leadership towards the international community was very positive 
and was characterised by a “mutual trust built on mutual expectations and their realisation.”47 
Based on the traditional political Zionism expressed by Chaim Weizmann in 1907 that “[we 
have] to make the Jewish question an international one. It means going to the nations and saying 
to them: We need your help to achieve our aim,”48 the initial foreign policy of Israel was based 
on a “knock on every door” policy.49 For David Ben-Gurion, the first Israeli Prime Minister, 
the crucial basis for Israeli foreign policy was his conclusion that Jews “are the weakest nation 
on earth … we lack any declared friendship anywhere in the world… [and] we must take all 
possible steps to find understanding, if not friendship, anywhere in the world.”50  Many scholars 
define this period as the “Golden Age” of Israel, when it enjoyed the broadest international 
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approval in its history. In addition to the openness of Israel’s leaders towards the world, its 
military victory in the War of Independence was seen by the world as a stand of “the few 
against the many”, as a “David facing Goliath”, and, therefore, Israel was endorsed by the 
majority of countries. Moreover, the successful immigration absorption, the establishment of 
kibbutz communities, the development of the Negev desert, and the creation of an independent 
military industrial complex – all these created vast empathy and support of Israel in the eyes 
of the international community.51 
This period, however, was very short-lived. In an effort not to be seen as taking sides in 
the emerging Cold War conflict, between the two giants, Israeli leaders begun to realise that 
that despite Israel’s non-committed foreign policy “both the United States and the Soviet Union 
tended to judge Israel by its pro-Communist or pro-Western proclivity and pressured Israel to 
define its position much more clearly.”52 Ben-Gurion, who realised that Israel could become a 
hostage of the Soviet-American struggle, had, already in 1952, started to emphasise the 
independence of the Israeli political decision-making process: 
There is no external force – even as most powerful, aggressive and rich as it could 
be imagined – that will define the needs and the values of Israel. The foreign policy 
of Israel is organised according to the values and the basic needs of the Jewish 
nation, and not by any other decision-maker.53 
During the 1950s, two different developments in the global arena forced Israel to harden 
this narrative. The first one was the choice of the U.S.S.R. to support Arab countries against 
Israel. Since 1954, the Soviet bloc countries had ceased their support of Israel, after the Kremlin 
for the first time vetoed the UN Security Council resolution in favour of an Arab country (Syria) 
over Israel. The second development was the decolonisation process that added a significant 
number of new sovereign Arab and Muslim States to the international community, and, 
therefore, to the U.N.54 Following these changes on the international map, and subsequently 
rising criticism of Israel, Israeli leadership adopted a narrative that could be described as: 
“we’re on our own because the world is against us”55 – statement that expressed a fundamental 
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distrust of the goodwill of the international community. This was the time when the “mutual 
trust” between the U.N. and Israel was transformed in one of the most common narratives of 
the Israeli foreign policy – Um Shmum (the U.N. is nothing) – a term coined by David Ben-
Gurion in 1955.56 
The Israeli military victories in the Six-Day War, in 1967, and the October War (the Yom 
Kippur War), in 1973, completely changed the way Israel was perceived by the international 
community. From the small “David”, which barely won its independence in 1948, Israel twice 
thrashed significantly superior Arab militaries, emerging as a regional “Goliath” itself.  
Utilising the bipolar tension of the Cold War, the Arab countries succeeded to recruit 
significant support in the U.N. against Israel, which was expressed in a chain of anti-Israeli 
resolutions. The peak of the Arab states efforts to delegitimise Israel was in 1975 when the UN 
General Assembly passed a resolution that determined that “Zionism is a form of racism and 
racial discrimination.”57  The response of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was simple: 
“The U.N. lost its ethical and political validity and became a battlefield for wrangling and 
harassment that have no connection, what so ever, with the principles and ideals for which it 
was established.”58 
Since then, the general approach of Israeli politicians toward the U.N. was best described 
by the prominent Israeli diplomat Abba Eban: “Any U.N. decision against Israel automatically 
enjoys major support, and if Israel would propose that the Earth is round, the majority in the 
U.N will vote against.”59 In other words, facing criticism from the international community, 
the Israeli political reaction was based on its disdain for what it saw as other powers’ biased 
political action, disconnected from the political or military situation on the ground. 
An additional facet of this Um Shmum narrative was the increasing unilateralism in the 
Israeli foreign policy. The disdain for and mistrust of international organisations led Israeli 
politicians to emphasise the independence of their decisions, as Ben-Gurion famously put it 
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“It’s not important what the gentiles would say; it is important what the Jews would do.”60 
Interestingly enough, this political unilateralism allowed Israel to persist with its actions 
regardless the vast criticism coming, not only from Israel’s natural enemies (i.e., the Arab and 
Muslim world), but also from its allies. For example, despite the fact that the construction of 
the “Separation Wall” was ruled illegal by the International Court of Justice in Hague and was 
highly criticised by the international community (and more cautiously by the U.S.), Israel 
erected the “Security Barrier” as planned.61 As Raanan Gissin, the then Israeli prime minister's 
spokesperson, put it: "I believe that after all the rancour dies, this resolution will find its place 
in the garbage can of history. The court has made an unjust ruling denying Israel its right of 
self-defence."62 
While U.S. foreign policy creates an image of a good protector against a bad evil to 
legitimise American actions, and Russians argue for double standards to fend off international 
criticism, Israelis simply state: “we care nothing for what UN members think or vote” and 
“when it comes to Israel’s survival, we must always remain the masters of our own fate.”63 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to argue that this Israeli traditional chutzpah (insolence or 
audacity), in its attitude toward the international community, is the only factor that enables 
them to withstand criticism of its political-military decisions. After all, Israel’s economic, 
political and military power and independence cannot be compared to those of America or 
Russia. This additional factor, which has been allowing Israel to keep afloat in a rising tide of 
international criticism, was best expressed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in his 
speech to the US Congress, on 10 July 1996: 
You, the people of America, offered the fledgling Jewish state succour and support. 
You stood by us time and time again … The United States has given Israel - how 
can I tell it to this body? The United States has given Israel, apart from political 
and military support, munificent and magnificent assistance in the economic 
sphere. With America's help, Israel has grown to be a powerful, modern state.64 
One of the main foundations of the Zionist movement was a quest for the support of the 
Great Powers. With the end of the Second World War and the surprising support of both of the 
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newly emerging superpowers – the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. – Israel preferred to adopt a political 
line that was defined at that time as “non-identification”. This Israeli attempt to play on both 
sides of the field in the context of the rising tenses of the Cold War proved to be unfeasible for 
two main reasons. The first was the fact that after a short love-affair with the Soviets, during 
the first few years of independence, Israel began to understand that Moscow had too little to 
offer to the newly established state which was facing a massive Arab political-military-
economic boycott. The second was the rising American political, economic, military and 
strategic weight in the world, as well as the Washington’s increasing interest in Middle Eastern 
affairs and its approach toward Israel – all of which were considered by Israel as far more 
beneficial than whatever the Kremlin could offer. Nevertheless, in the months leading up to the 
Sinai Campaign (October 1956), it was clear to all that Israel’s choice, whether due to its own 
initiative, or circumstantial, was made in favour of the West.65 
During the first years after 1948, however, Washington was hesitant in its official support 
of Israel, and the initial American involvement in the 1960s and 1970s in the Middle East, in 
general, and in Israel’s affairs, in particular, was mainly due to its own economic (i.e., Arab 
oil) and strategic (i.e., the Cold War) interests.66 During the following decades, and especially 
after the Yom Kippur War, the American patronage has become one of the most dominant 
narratives of Israel’s foreign policy – “despite the fact that no formal alliance exists between 
the two nations, the United States has evolved into the ultimate guarantor of Israel’s security, 
its principal diplomatically and its foremost economic supporter.”67 This special relationship 
developed between two countries was best emphasised in the Economist as “the mighty edifice 
of support” that Washington provides Israel each time it faces a severe criticism from all 
corners of the globe.68 
On the one hand, many scholars and politicians regard this unconditional American 
support for Israel as a result of the powerful role of the Jewish/Israeli lobby in American 
domestic politics69 – as Ehud Olmert, former Israeli Prime Minister, stated in 2006: “Thank 
God we have AIPAC [the American Israel Public Affairs Committee], the greatest supporter 
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and friend we have in the whole world.”70 On the other hand, there are scholars who reject this 
“theory of everything” (i.e., the Jewish/Israeli control of U.S. foreign policy).71 There are those 
who claim that the U.S. supports Israel due to its own strategic interests and positions in the 
Middle East and “Israel is America’s most reliable ally in the region,”72  and those who simply 
blame American public opinion, which is overwhelmingly on Israel's side.73 Nevertheless, 
regardless of the roots of American diplomatic protection, Israeli political leaders take it for 
granted, even if “sometimes they [themselves, i.e., Israelis] do not act like a [most] loyal ally.”74 
In analysing Israel’s foreign policy, it is important to highlight its almost instinctive 
reliance on U.S. support. After all, between 1972 and 2015, Washington vetoed 43 UN Security 
Council resolutions that were critical of Israel (more than half of all America’s vetoes during 
these years).75 Consequently, this unprecedented protection by the U.S., “the most powerful 
state in the world,”76 combined with the Israeli traditional narrative of Um Shmum (i.e., disdain 
for international criticism), allows Israeli politicians to minimise the influence of international 
pressure on their decision-making process regarding Israel’s military activities. In other words, 
facing international criticism, Israel’s leaders not only explicitly reject it as biased against 
Israel, but also count on American protection against truly meaningful UN Security Council 
decisions. 
While in the previous chapters, the analysis showed how American and Russian foreign 
policies fend off general international criticism regarding their military actions, and then the 
discussed narratives were projected on the criticism of enemy civilian casualties, the case of 
Israel is different.  On the one hand, Israeli politicians have been continuously trying to link 
the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state and the legitimacy of its military actions, even at the 
price of misusing Anti-Semitism terminology and abusing history.77 One of the best examples 
of this abuse was in 2015, when the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argued that 
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Adolf Hitler had only wanted to expel Jews from Europe, and it was the Grand Mufti of 
Jerusalem Haj Amin al-Husseini, who told him to “Burn them”.78 
On the other hand, international criticism of Israel during the last decade has continuously 
focused on the collateral damage and civilian casualties of Israel’s military activity, rather than 
on the legitimacy of the State of Israel. The best examples of this are the international 
investigations of Israel’s repetitive military operations in Gaza in the last decade. Concentrating 
on these military operations, the following analysis offers a better understanding of how the 
Israeli foreign policy narratives described above were used to fend international criticism off 
and allowing Israeli political decision-makers to be relatively relaxed about enemy civilian 
costs during these military operations. 
Since the Israeli unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005 and the subsequent 
Hamas’s rise to power in 2007, Israel launched three major military operations against the 
terrorist organisations there – Operation Cast Lead (December 2008 – January 2009), 
Operation Pillar of Defence (November 2012), and Operation Protective Edge (July – August 
2014). While it is difficult to establish an objective number of Palestinian casualties in each of 
these operations, as this number is highly politicised,79 it seems right to argue that Gaza, and 
its inhabitants, suffered much greater damage than Israel did.  Consequently, the Gaza 
operations had exposed Israel to severe international criticism that was followed by 
international investigations of IDF’s conduct. The two best known of these investigations were: 
The United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (the Goldstone Report)80 and 
The United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict.81 
Analysing the reaction of the Israeli scholars and politicians to the findings of these 
reports, it is possible to point to four main areas that have been perceived by Israelis as 
international criticism of their actions: (1) Israel’s actions were disproportional; (2) Israel did 
not try hard enough to avert enemy civilian casualties; (3) Israel’s use of force was not merely 
a last-resort option; and (4) The Israeli occupation makes all military actions immoral/illegal.82 
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The main argument, however, that is emphasised by these four claims is that “Israel uses 
excessive force and endangers (or kills) too many civilians in its response to Palestinian 
aggression.”83 To fend off this criticism, Israel’s foreign policy concentrates on five major 
narratives. 
The first narrative of Israel’s foreign policy to deal with international criticism is the 
Israeli traditional Um Shmum, i.e., the international community is biased against Israel and, 
therefore, Israel can disdain its criticism. For example, Shimon Peres, the President of Israel at 
the time of Operation Cast Lead, stated that the Goldstone Report "makes a mockery of 
history"84 and Avigdor Lieberman, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, claimed that 
"the Goldstone Report wishes to take the UN back to the dark ages, where it was also 
determined, through the leadership of utilitarian countries, that Zionism is racism."85 
Continuing the narrative that the world is always against Israel, Israel rejected the Goldstone 
Report by claiming that: 
Both the mandate of the Mission and the resolution establishing it prejudged the 
outcome of any investigation and gave legitimacy to the Hamas terrorist 
organization.86     
Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu put it more directly: “this report is tendentious 
and biased, that its end result was determined before it started.  This is a kangaroo court that 
decided to convict Israel in any case.”87 
 The second narrative, as discussed above, is Israel’s reliance on the American 
“generous and unconstrained support”, 88 which is, usually, not long in coming. Less than three 
months after the initial release of the Goldstone Report  the US Congress passed, by 344 votes 
to 36, a condemning resolution stating that the report is “irredeemably biased and unworthy of 
further consideration or legitimacy.”89 Moreover, in 2015, the U.S. was the only country that 
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voted in the Human Rights Council against the Fact Finding Mission on the 2014 Israel–Gaza 
report.90 When Netanyahu’s statement in the US Congress that “Israel is not what is wrong 
about the Middle East; Israel is what's right about the Middle East”91 was cheerfully applauded, 
it seems only right to argue that Israel can rely on its American ally to stand by it and protect 
Israel from what the US Congress defines as “anti-Israel bias at the United Nations.”92 
The third narrative that has developed quite recently within the specific context of the 
conflict in Gaza is a purely legal one. To justify the IDF’s activity, as a part of the emerging 
lawfare (a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realising a military objective)93 
around the hostilities in Gaza, Israel has been very constantly arguing that all its military 
activities were carried out according to International Law. Rejecting the accusations 
emphasised by international investigations, Israel has continuously argued that it was entitled 
to attack Gaza, based on the right of self-defence according to Article 51 of the UN Charter 
and that the IDF took the all precautions required by law to minimise civilian casualties.94 
Specifically referring to these requirements, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that: 
The IDF not only implemented a range of precautions related to targeting and 
munitions, but also used an extensive system of graduated warnings to civilians, 
including both general advance warnings through media broadcasts and 
widespread leafleting, regional warnings to alert civilians to leave specific areas 
before IDF operations commenced, and specific warnings to civilians in or near 
military targets, through telephone calls and warning shots with light weapons.95   
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 This legal argument ultimately leads to the fourth Israeli narrative that helps to 
withstand international criticism – a holier-than-thou approach. Not only that according to 
Israeli leaders all military activities were conducted within the framework of International Law, 
but also that “the IDF is the most moral army in the world.”96 To fend off the accusations of 
disproportional harming civilians, Israel argues that “the Israel Defence Forces demonstrate 
higher military and moral standards,”97 than other military forces, pointing to the fact that the 
IDF harms fewer civilians than other armies do acting in similar conditions.98 
 On the one hand, these foreign policy narratives undoubtedly help Israeli leadership to 
fend off international criticism and feel relatively free to deploy military force as and how it 
deems necessary. On the other, it will be unfair to claim that Israel enjoys the same freedom of 
political manoeuvring on the international arena as the U.S. or Russia do. Following the 
reliance of Israeli foreign policy on American protection, in the Israeli political discourse, 
international pressure is commonly translated as “American pressure to cease hostilities”.99  In 
other words, Israel’s disdainful approach to international political institutions and its 
dependence on the U.S. protection turn Washington into “the only foreign actor whose policies 
constitute a critical input into Israeli decision-making.”100  Israeli leaders, however, understand 
that given the broader American agenda, the opinion of the international community cannot be 
entirely downplayed (even if they want so) and a broader consensus of support among other 
countries would reduce pressure on Washington, thus providing Israel with a greater freedom.  
In an attempt to win the support (of or, at lease, to minimise criticism by) other 
countries, Israel’s foreign policy utilises its fifth narrative. As Israel inherently does not trust 
international organisations, its diplomatic activity to achieve broader international support 
focuses on a direct approach based on a separate bilateral relation with each of its counterpart 
states, support of which Israel is looking for. While in doing so, Israeli leaders many times 
“craft diplomatic scenes that forsake common diplomatic language, manner and ceremony”101 
by bypassing international organisations, it seems that this repudiation serves Israel well. One 
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of the most fruitful examples of this narrative was Israel’s success in obtaining the support of 
the European Union during Operation Cast Lead via the Czech Republic, relations with which 
are often described as “the strongest between Israel and any [other] European country.”102  
At the time of the beginning of operation Cast Lead, the European presidency was held 
by France, and following a meeting of the foreign ministers, held on 30 December 2008, the 
European Union condemned both Israel and Hamas, calling for an “immediate and permanent 
ceasefire” and “an unconditional halt to rocket attacks by Hamas on Israel and an end to Israeli 
military actions.”103 On 3 January 2009, three days after the Czech Republic took over the role 
of the Presidency of the European Union, Jiri Putuznik, spokesman for the new Czech 
presidency, stated that “at the present time and at the light of the events of these last days, we 
estimate that this measure [Israeli military operation] constitutes a defensive action, not 
offensive."104 While this statement attracted vast criticism from many European countries 
forcing the Czechs to apologize for the “misunderstanding,” arguing that “it was a personal 
error,”105 this example demonstrates perfectly the role of bilateral relations within Israeli 
foreign policy.  
Another good example of the value of Israel’s direct approach in foreign policy, at the 
expense of multilateral international organisations, was the reaction of Israeli leaders to the 
Goldstone Report. Mistrusting their ability to influence the decision-making process at the UN 
Human Rights Council, Israel immediately turned to direct approach, separately asking 
different countries “to express disagreement with the report and to oppose any use of it as the 
basis for anti-Israeli resolutions at other international institutions.”106 This approach was best 
emphasised in a Ha’aretz article published on the day the Goldstone Report was released: 
Following the report's release, Netanyahu, Lieberman, President Shimon Peres and 
Defence Minister Ehud Barak will telephone many of their counterparts around the 
world. … Israel's diplomatic efforts will focus on the five permanent members of 
the UN Security Council – the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France – 
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but will also give priority to members of the European Union, because of their 
influence in the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.107 
 Summarising Israel’s foreign policy narratives that have been structured by the Israeli 
leaders in order to fend off the international criticism of its military actions, it is important to 
separate between the political rhetoric and the actual deeds. While, from first impression one 
might assume that Israeli leadership simply ignores international organisations, accusing them 
of being anti-Israel, biased whilst trusting the U.S. to protect Israel against them, the real 
situation is quite different. In fact, Israel wholly understands its weak political position on the 
international arena, on the one hand, and its economic and military dependence on its 
international counterparts, on the other (mainly the U.S., but not only, as the European Union 
is the Israeli biggest trade partner).108 One of the most prominent Israeli strategists, Yehoshafat 
Harkabi, stated in 1979:  
The biggest change that has happened in the world is the creation of the 
international system and the international public opinion that influence the 
behaviour of the states and the decisions of their leaders. The international system 
… can tip the scales and determine success or failure… The international system 
is most important for the small states, as their dependence on the big states has been 
growing and the support of the big states, especially in terms of weapons, becomes 
vital.109    
 Israel is a small state and, therefore, according to many Israeli scholars it “has [always] 
had to take international factors into account in all of its military engagements with its 
neighbours”110 much more seriously than anyone of the previously examined countries. The 
political rhetoric of Um Shmum or the holier-than-thou attitude have been very useful to fend 
off criticism, but definitely not enough to get a free rein for military operations. To manoeuvre 
through the deep waters of international criticism, Israel has adopted two supplementary ways 
to minimise international criticism and provide itself with a limited window of political 
opportunity for its military actions.  
The first of Israel’s ways to create a more supportive atmosphere in the international 
arena is the policy of restraint (i.e., toleration of offensive activities done by Israel’s enemies). 
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According to Israel’s viewpoint, this restraint shows that the Israeli governments are not eager 
for battle and do everything possible to avoid confrontation and, therefore, eases the political 
efforts to explain Israel’s military actions as self-defence.111 The second way is an attempt to 
choose the most convenient timing to achieve as large a margin for manoeuvre, as possible. 
The best example of this was Operation Cast Lead, which: (1) started at the end of the calendar 
year, a period marked by a near-freeze of activity in international diplomacy due to the 
Christmas season; (2) in the interregnum between the Bush and Obama administrations, which 
gave Israel a great deal of freedom;112 and (3) the incoming Czech presidency in the European 
Union, which, as it noted above, promised to ease the pressure from Europe. It is important to 
note that these two ways are highly interconnected, as restraining from action and waiting for 
the right timing in international affairs, Israeli leaders are at risk of losing domestic support, 
especially in such situations where Israeli civilians are threatened by continuous enemy 
bombardments. This dilemma, however, seemed to have been resolved after the successful 
introduction of  the Iron Dome Anti-Missile Shield  as “the public’s sense of protection by Iron 
Dome gives time and space for the government to make [more] calculated decisions on how to 
proceed in response to the rocket fire”113 taking into consideration international, domestic and 
operational factors. 
Israeli politicians and diplomats, undoubtedly, toil much harder than their Russian or 
American counterparts to defend their own state’s military engagements in the international 
arena and they are much more sensitive to international pressure. When it comes to military 
actions, “Israel faces criticism regarding both the decision to react forcibly and the scope of 
force employed”114 and it understands that it acts on borrowed time. Interestingly enough, 
unlike in the cases of Russia or the U.S., most of the criticism of Israel’s military operations 
specifically points to enemy civilian casualties, and Israeli political-military decision-makers 
do indeed pressurise the IDF to minimise the collateral damage of its actions. After all, as the 
former commander of British forces in Afghanistan Colonel Richard Kemp put it: “No army 
in the world acts with as much discretion and great care as the IDF in order to minimize 
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damage. The US and the UK are careful, but not as much as Israel.”115 The main question, 
however, is why this pressure has not pushed for the military employment of NLW. To answer 
this question, a better understanding of Israeli culture and its attitude towards the enemy is 
required.     
 
Part Three: Israeli Culture and Civilian Casualties 
In 1971, Sir Ernest John Barnes, the British ambassador in Israel, provided a significant 
insight into the Israeli character. In his report to the British Foreign Office, he wrote: 
Her [Israel’s] attitudes spring from deeper historical roots too. A people, which has 
been pushed around the world for two thousand years, does not intend to be pushed 
any more. Nor is it only ancient history, which produces the Massada complex of 
total resistance, death rather dishonour. The memories of persecution, and above 
all of Hitler’s holocaust, are much nearer the surface. … Be that as it may, many 
Israelis feel oppression in their bones… 116     
Almost 40 years later, when another Briton, an English student who studied in Israel, was 
asked, as a part of sociological survey, to describe Israeli society, he said: 
No Englishman in London will ever say the sentence that you [Israelis] always say 
– ‘Who knows, may be in one generation, we will not be here at all.’ The possibility 
that London and England will not stand for next generations or for the next hundred 
years does not appear in our minds. But for you, it comes in every second sentence. 
You live in a constant anxiety. Before I came here, I did not understand the depth 
of your trauma.117      
In their observations of the Israeli culture, or Israeliut (Israeliness) as it is often called by the 
scholars,118 these two outsiders, not only accurately pointed at its several characteristics 
(“constant anxiety”, “Masada complex”, etc.), but also suggested that any attempt to 
understand Israel’s culture has to begin with the long Jewish history. In other words, “if you 
want to understand Israelis, you have to start with their past, very distant past.” 119  
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 The significant influence of the distant Jewish historical experience on the Israeli mind-
set, and especially such constitutive events, as the Siege of Masada, the Bar-Kokhba Revolt, 
the Holocaust, etc., has been vastly discussed by many scholars and researchers in the fields of 
sociology, history, politics and strategy.120 Professor Yair Gad, one of the most prominent 
contemporary Israeli sociologist, in his book The Code of Israeliness, identified ten most 
pivotal narratives of the Israeli character: (1) existential anxiety; (2) proud standing and 
deliberate audacity (chutzpah); (3) the feeling of entitlement to and the ownership of the Land 
of Israel (Eretz Yisrael); (4) a give-and-take style contract with the state; (5) a fear of being a 
fraier (somebody who has been taken advantage of); (6) ‘I speak means I exist’; (7) creative 
improvisation (iltur) and lack of seriousness; (8) anti-hierarchy and equality; (9) collectivism 
and meddlesomeness; and (10) intimacy.  In the conclusion to his book, he writes: 
In each and every Jew living in Israel, deep in their minds and stomach, there is a 
shared culture – culture that is based on a shared history and a shared destiny… 
The Israeli culture embeds in us [Israelis] a deep historical consciousness, as well 
as horrific future scenarios… In our every movement, in our every expression and 
reaction, it is possible to find the roots of this epic story.121          
While it seems that the contemporary Israeli mind-set is deeply rooted in the long Jewish 
history, the following analysis does not intend reproduce a complete picture of the Israeli 
culture. It seeks, instead, to understand a much narrower phenomenon – how the Jewish, and 
the more recent Israeli, experience has shaped what Israelis think about war and enemy civilian 
casualties. Those who are interested in a broader picture are advised to focus more on the works 
of the leading Israeli scholars that rest at the core of this analysis. 
Israeli Culture and the Value of Human Life 
Much has been thought and written about Israeli culture. Different scholars have 
discussed it from different perspectives analysing its different aspects, yet, all agree on the fact 
that “Israel is what is known in psychological literature as a post-disaster community.”122 While 
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long Jewish history provides many traumatic experiences, there were the enslavement in Egypt 
and the Babylonian captivity, the Exile after the destruction of the Second Temple by the 
Romans and the Alhambra Decree ordering the expulsion of Jews from Spain; the Holocaust 
is, undoubtedly, the experience that shaped most of the contemporary Israeli character.123 This 
apocalyptic history of attempted annihilation, best represented by the Jewish/Israeli calendar 
that is strewn with related holidays and memorials, lies at the core of one of the most prominent 
characteristics of Israeli national mind-set – the existential anxiety.124 
On the one hand, the initial ideological and political goal of the Yishuv (pre-State Jewish 
settlement in Israel) leadership was, in accordance with the Zionist ideology, to establish a 
“normal” state. In other words, the leading vision was to establish a state that would become a 
“normal” member of the “family of nations” and “that traumatic memories of the helpless state 
of the Jews during World War II would give way to rational considerations.”125 On the other, 
the destruction and persecution did not stop with the establishment of the State of Israel, and, 
in fact, quite the opposite is true. The War of Independence, which immediately followed the 
declaration of independence, and the subsequent repetitive conflicts with the neighbouring 
Arab countries, as well as the Palestinians, have recreated and enforced in the Israeli mind a 
strong sense of continuingly being under existential threat.  As Yair Gad put it: 
In the Israeli head, there is a well-established doctrine of near-annihilation. In the 
Six-Day War we thought that we would have to take a long swim to Cyprus; in the 
Yom Kippur War we already imagined concentration camps; in the First Gulf War, 
in 1990, we saw in our mind a destroyed Tel-Aviv; in preparation for the rerun in 
2003, we saw ourselves burnt by mustard gas; and since the Second Lebanon War 
and operations in Gaza we know that rockets are an existential threat in all parts of 
Israel.126 
The interpretation of any event and political development through the lens of the long Jewish 
history of persecution, the Holocaust and the more contemporary experience of Israeli 
conflicts, ultimately has led the Israelis to think that “all the world is against us.”127 And, while 
one might assume that such a long history of oppression would generate more universal 
sympathy for “all oppressed”, it seems that this is not the case.     
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 The trauma of the Holocaust has been perceived by the Israeli mind as a singular and 
very unique experience. Though the majority of Jewish population in Israel is not direct heirs 
of the survivors of the Holocaust,128 “the self-understanding of individuals in Israel [is] as 
survivors, heirs, and kin to the victims.”129 Consequently, this Israeli collective memory of the 
Holocaust, preoccupied by an all-consuming fear of a repetition of the trauma, shapes the 
Israeli attitude toward others, creating a very distinctive deviation between enemies and 
friends. When it comes to friends, Israelis easily open their hearts and come to their aid, 
however, when it comes to enemies, the Israeli mind is insensible and offensive. For example, 
Israel would easily send a generous rescue team to an Asian country struck by an earthquake; 
yet, Israelis’ hearts are hardened to the suffering of their neighbours in Gaza, who have been 
locked for years in the Gaza Ghetto – “We [Israelis] even will not allow them to call it a 
‘Ghetto’, because ‘Ghetto’ is ours and ours only.”130  
  In analysing this Israeli narrative of existential anxiety within the context of the valuing 
human life, it is important to highlight the relation between the collective and the individual in 
the Israeli culture. While, as discussed in the previous chapters, the American character is 
predisposed toward individualism, and the Russian one towards collectivism; the Israeli mind-
set, based on Jewish traditions, paradoxically comprehends both. On the one hand, due to a 
long history of life in exile, usually in hostile environments, Jewish communities developed a 
very strong sense of collectivism. Community was essential not only for physical survival, but 
also for the survival of Jewish traditions – “for the individual, the collectivity was a community 
of fate – one’s destiny was inseparable from that of the group.”131 Very similar to the Russian 
concept of krugovaya poruka (collective responsibility and punishment), the Jewish 
communities in the diaspora shaped the Jewish mind around an idea that the community is 
responsible for one’s actions and the only prospect for help lay within the community.132 
However, while in the Russian case krugovaya poruka was imposed by law,133 in the Jewish 
communities this collectivism was an inherent part of Talmudic teaching, as Rabbi Hillel said: 
“Do not separate yourself from the community.”134 In other words, Israeli mind based on this 
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Jewish mentality is less oriented on oneself and “tends to be focused more on the pursuit of 
collective goals and well-being of the society.”135    
 On the other hand, simultaneous to the strong sense of collectivism, the Jewish tradition 
also cultivated a very deep respect for the uniqueness of the individual, as Rabbi Hillel also 
said: “If I am not for myself, who will be for me?”136 Within Jewish communities individualism 
was encouraged from an early age and its values were well protected by the Talmudic tradition, 
just as one of the most prominent Jewish maxims states: “To save a single soul out of Israel is 
to save an entire world.” While this combination of appreciation of the community and the 
importance of individuals within it helped Jewish people to survive two thousand years of 
diaspora, it also ultimately left a significant footmark on the Israeli mind shaping the relations 
of Israelis between themselves, and between Israelis and others. 
The Israeli character, bred on the traditional view of the Jewish community, as one 
collective with one shared destiny, tends to understand others in a very straightforward way, 
automatically and very easily labelling others either “friend” or “foe”. Unable to comprehend 
the complexity of “grey” political pattern, Israeli mind-set almost intuitively rush to utilise the 
collective memory of the Jewish history of persecution pointing out its uniqueness: “We are 
the Chosen People, Holy People. There is no nation that is more ethic than us, and everybody 
who claim differently will be forced to realise his mistake.”137 Interestingly enough, in their 
reaction to any attempt to undermine this claim, the Israelis “shoot-down” allegation targeting 
even their friends. Professor Dan Kaspi summarised this predisposition of the Israeli character 
describing the traditional Israeli response to a speech of President Barak Obama that was 
perceived as not sympathetic enough:  
Hussein Obama is a belittler [katan aleinu]! We are Chosen and Enlightened 
People! Without any prejudices towards the skin colour of any one of the United 
States presidents, he just does not know history. Because one who survived 
Pharaoh and Nazis, damn them, will also succeed against a greenhorn president 
with brownish skin.138    
While this predisposition of the Israeli character to react at external threats is based on 
its collectivistic nature, as an old Talmudic maxim says “all of Israel stand surety for one 
another,” the inspiration for their internal affairs Israelis traditionally tend to draw from their 
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inherent individualism. The Jewish religion tradition, unlike many other religions, is far from 
dogmatic; innovative explanations, variant opinions and general independence of thought have 
been highly prized: “no institution or dynasty has a monopoly of authority, let alone truth.”139 
This inborn self-confidence lies at the core of the Israelis’ predisposition to argue and sincerely 
believe that they have the rightest answer to any question: “every Israeli has an opinion, an 
assessment, an evaluation and a decisive conclusion on any given subject: governmental policy, 
military operation, scientific discovery, criminal news item or a singer’s haircut.”140  
The paradoxical relations between the collective and the individual in the Israeli mind-
set also explain best the complex relations between the State of Israel and its citizens. On the 
one hand, Israelis see the state in the traditional terms of one big Jewish community, and 
therefore instinctively rush to contribute to the common good by serving in the IDF, by 
volunteering, donating, etc. On the other, they expect and demand from the state an 
unprecedented individual approach to each one of its citizens, especially in times of distress. 
In the mind of an Israeli, there is an unwritten contract with the state, as Yair Gad demonstrate 
it: 
When I am in distress, it [Israel] will come to rescue me. To dress me up. To give 
me emergency money. To fly me back home, and fast. And why all these? Because 
I contributed. Because I deserve it. Because I am an Israeli. Because it is my 
country, and it is an alternative for God.141 
This expectation from the state, combined with the traditional manner of arguing (or 
demanding), had created another paradox in the Israeli character. On the one hand, externally, 
Israelis are very sensitive to protecting their state expressing high levels of patriotism and 
concern for its image. On the other, internally, they fully exercise the right to criticise it, the 
right that is preserved for them and them alone, because they are Israelis and they contributed 
to the state.142  In other words, Israeli society represents a very close-knit community, when it 
comes to outsiders, but within itself it is an entire opposite. As Ben Gurion observed: 
Many of our inhabitants, including Israeli youth, have not learned how to respect 
their fellow-citizens and treat them with politeness, tolerance and sympathy. 
Elementary decency is lacking among us.143 
Interestingly enough, while Ben Gurion made his observation on an individual level, 
many scholars agree to the fact that the Israeli collective, as a whole, behaves in a similar 
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manner.144   This strong sense of community based on the long history of persecution and 
consequential existential anxiety shaped in the Israeli mind another pivotal cultural narrative: 
never be a passive victim again. Benjamin Netanyahu, expressed it best:  
Nevertheless, today we must ask the question: have the lessons of the Holocaust 
been learned?  I believe that there are three lessons: fortify your strength, teach 
good deeds and fight evil. 
And if somebody was unsure what “good deeds” mean, he clarified: 
Good deeds have a complementary side, and that is the third lesson of the 
Holocaust: fight evil.  It is not enough to simply do good and be tolerant. A free 
society must ask itself what it will do when faced with the destructive forces of evil 
that seek to destroy and trample man and his rights.145 
 While for thousands of years, stateless Jews had to accept the doctrine of submission to 
the powerful, a submission that more than several time almost ended with total annihilation, 
since the establishment of their own state and their own military forces the Israeli mind is not 
ready to accept any type of patronising. Some might argue that this behaviour is a psychological 
compensation for past humiliations,146 or a post-traumatic syndrome.147 Either way, building 
and exercising military strength seems to be the prime lesson learned by Israelis from their 
history.  
 As discussed above, the Israeli mind-set tends to divide the world categorically into 
“friends” and “foes”. Subsequently, it is not surprising that the appreciation of human life in 
the Israeli mind also differentiates between “our lives”, “the lives of our friends” and “the lives 
of our enemies”.  One of the most important influences of the traumatic Jewish history on the 
Israeli culture is the commitment “to ensure the future of the Jewish people.”148 Consequently, 
Israelis appreciate not only their own lives but also the lives of all Jewish people around the 
world. Moreover, when it comes to more a universal value of life, the Israeli memory of 
Holocaust forces the Israeli mind to demonstrate the best side of its character. Moral outrage 
toward bystander nations for their lack of help during the Holocaust created in the Israeli mind 
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“a need to demonstrate that Israelis have higher humanitarian values than other countries,”149 
and generous Israeli rescue teams sent all around the world are proof of that.  
 A closer examination, however, shows that this humanitarian spirit is very limited, and 
the universal appreciation of human life is not as all-inclusive as it seems.  When it comes to 
something or somebody that is perceived as a threat, the Israeli mind-set demonstrates much 
less sensitivity (if any). One of the best examples of this is the way in which Israel deals with 
African refugees in Israel. Unwilling to grant them refugee status, the Israeli authorities simply 
offered them a choice between $3,500 in cash and a one-way ticket home or imprisonment in 
a specially built detention facility.150 Another obvious example is the way in which the Israeli 
mind-set appreciates (or not) the lives of Palestinians. But Palestinians, unlike refugees from 
Sudan, Eritrea, and other African countries, are perceived by the Israeli mind as enemies, at 
least as far as the conflict is unsolved, and, therefore, they are treated according to the Israeli 
perception as an enemy in wartime. 
War and the Israeli Character 
While Americans perceive war as a temporary interruption, and Russians understand it 
as an integral part of the human condition, it seems right to argue that the Israeli perception of 
military confrontation presents a type of hybrid of these two. In an attempt to understand this 
Israeli characteristic, it is important to differentiate between a “state of war” and a “state of 
conflict” in the Israeli historical-cultural context. Baruch Kimmerling, one of the most 
prominent Israeli sociologists, who tended to question the official narrative of Israel's creation, 
defines the “state of war” as a period of active combat between Israel and its one, or more, 
enemies. All other periods, during which active combat is dormant, can be defined as a “state 
of conflict”, since Israel’s enemies carry on warfare by other means (economic, political, terror, 
etc.).151  
On the one hand, Israeli mentality, similar to the Russian character, perceives conflict 
as a permanent condition or destiny of society, as Moshe Dayan put it: 
We are a generation of settlers; without a helmet or a gun we will be unable to plant 
a tree or build a house… This is the destiny of our generation. The only choice we 
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have is to be armed, strong and resolute, else the sword will fall from our hands 
and the thread of our lives will be severed.152   
On the other, war, similar to the American view, is perceived by Israelis as a temporary 
interruption. In contrast to the Americans, however, the Israeli mind-set, brewed on the 
traditional existential anxiety, intuitively assumes that the only possible predominant goal of 
war is “to ensure the very existence of society” and it might be achieved “only through optimal 
mobilisation of virtually all available human and material resources of the system”.153 
Consequently, as waging wars demands such an enormous mobilisation of society, wars have 
to be waged as decisively as possible and be concluded as fast as possible. 
 Due to the Israeli history of confrontations, the “state of conflict” has become a routine, 
something that military specialists call “current security” (Bitachon Shotef, or Batash), 
punctuated by “states of war”, i.e., Israeli-Arab wars (Six-Day Way, Yom Kippur War, etc.) or 
large military operations in Gaza and the Western Bank (Operation Defensive Shield, 
Operation Cast Lead, Operation Protective Edge, etc.). Since the focus of this research is on 
the latter, it is important to understand three main pillars of the Israeli cultural approach towards 
wars: harta’a (deterrence), hatra’a (early warning) and hachra’a (humiliation on the 
battlefield).154 While the first pillar is intended to deter the enemy from attacking by 
maintaining considerable military power, and the purpose of the second one is to alert Israeli 
leadership when the first fails, the third, “humiliation on the battlefield”, is the most crucial, as 
it intends not only to bring an ultimate victory, but also to restore deterrence. In the Israeli mind 
the main objective of war is not a terminal knockdown of the enemy, as it seems impossible in 
light of the imbalance of resources vis-a-vis the Arab states and international political 
pressures. For Israelis, the major strategic goal of war is deterring the enemy from attacking 
Israel again for as long period, as possible.155   
 According to the Israeli understanding, “all of Israel’s wars and military campaigns … 
were fought because the deterrence Israel had hoped to establish by prior threats or actions 
broke down,”156 and therefore, once deterrence failed and war began, the enemy has to be 
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punished so severely that it will be deterred from doing it again. This idea of deterrence by 
punishment was formulated best by Moshe Dayan in 1959: 
We cannot guard every water pipeline from explosion and every tree from 
uprooting. We cannot prevent every murder of a worker in an orchard [or] a family 
in their beds. But it is in our power to set a high price on our blood, a price that will 
be too high to pay for the Arab community, the Arab army, or the Arab 
government.157 
While one might have thought that this sort of “massive retaliation” during military operations 
belongs to the past, the opposite is true. One of the best examples was during the Second 
Lebanon War, when Prime Minister Ehud Olmert requested to determine “such a price tag, that 
nobody will wish to trouble us again,”158 the Defence minister Amir Peretz claimed that “the 
central goal is to cause Hezbollah to feel bitten [and] persecuted …”159  and the Chief of Staff 
Dan Halutz stated the need to “turn back the clock in Lebanon by 20 years.”160 
 Consequently, it is not surprising that many scholars describe the Israeli way of war as 
a matter of emotional revenge.161 As Niccolo Petrelli concluded:  
Mainstream Yishuv thinking stressed the importance and effectiveness of offensive 
retaliatory actions for the purposes of taking revenge, exacting punishment and, 
most of all, deter Arab violence.162 
The perception of military operations as an act of revenge is deeply rooted in the Israeli culture 
as retaliatory raids against Arab villages, and the destruction of their fields or herds was a part 
of Israeli official policy during the 1950s.163 Moreover, in the Israeli mind, short periods of war 
that punctuate long periods of “state of conflict” are intended not only to restore the failed 
deterrence, but also are seen as an opportunity to lishbor kelim (to break the rules) of havlaga 
(self-restraint) that usually precedes war. The way in which Israelis measure the success of war 
demonstrates best this traditional desire for revenge. During the early days of the Second 
Lebanon War, support among Jewish public reached 82 percent, however, by the end of the 
                                                          
157 Moshe Dayan, ‘Peulot Tzvayiot be’yemei shalom’, [‘Military Operations in Peacetime’], Ma’arachot, Vol. 
119, 1959, p. 56.   
158 Ehud Olmert quoted in State of Israel, The Partial Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events of 
Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006, April 2007, (Hebrew), p. 81. 
159 Amir Peretz, quoted in State of Israel, The Partial Report of the Commission of Inquiry…, p. 71. 
160 Dan Halutz quoted in William Arkin, Divining Victory Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, (Maxwell: 
Air University Press, 2007), p. 152. 
161 See Oded Lowenheim,  Gadi Heimann, ‘Revenge in International Politics’, Security Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, 
pp. 685-724; Gil Muciano, ‘A Matter of Honour: A Review of Israeli Decision Making during the Second 
Lebanon War’, The Atkin Paper Series, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political 
Violence, March 2011. 
162 Niccolo Petrelli, ‘Israel’s Struggle Against Hamas’, (PhD Dissertation, Roma Tre University, 2014), p. 63. 
163 Raanan Kuperman, ‘The impact of Internal Politics on Israel's Reprisal Policy During the 1950s’, Journal of 
Strategic Studies, Vol. 24, No.1, pp. 1-28; Niccolo Petrelli, ‘Israel’s Struggle..’, pp. 24-89. 
-204- 
 
war polls reflected a dramatic turnaround and polls taken on 10 August, 4 days before the end, 
found that only 20 percent of the overall Israeli sample felt that “Israel had won the war.” 
According to the analysts, one of the main explanation for such a dramatic change was the 
Israeli public refusal to accept the fact that “after thirty-three days of air and ground warfare, 
the IDF was unable to make even a dent in Hezbollah’s capacity to attack Israel.”164 Despite 
the fact that as an outcome of this war, the Israeli northern border has been enjoying the longest 
period of peace in Israel’s history, this war has been perceived as a failure, mainly because “the 
best military in the Middle East” was humiliated by a “para-military organisation with several 
thousand fighters”, and the IDF was not able to humiliate it in turn.165 In other words, as an 
Israeli proverb states: “Arabs understand only force” (Aravim mevinim rak koah), and the 
Israeli mind-set feels obligated to forcefully retaliate back, each time it gets the opportunity.   
While Israel’s retaliation and revenge is aimed directly against military enemies, such 
as Hamas or Hezbollah; indirectly, it obviously harms enemy population. Moreover, there are 
three main arguments that suggest that the Israeli public has very little objection to it.  The first 
argument is the long and constitutive history of retaliatory raids and “collective punishment” 
from the Israel’s past. Interestingly enough, while in the mid-1950s the Israeli Prime Ministers 
developed doubts about the utility of retaliation as a method for deterring Arab infiltrators, or 
compelling the Arab governments to prevent infiltration, they still tended to authorise reprisals 
to calm the Israeli public outrage that demanded violent reactions.166  
The second argument is the Jewish traditional collectivism that perceives community 
as responsible for one’s actions. For example, in the context of the Palestinian conflict, Israeli 
collectivistic culture projects its narratives onto Palestinian society considering all Palestinians 
as responsible for the actions of Hamas. In 1994, despite the vast support of the peace 
negotiations, the majority of the Jewish population in Israel (between 54 to 71 percent) believed 
that if the Palestinians had a chance they would annihilate Israel. In 2000, with the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada at the background, 68% of the Jewish population in Israel perceived all Palestinians as 
violent. A year into the intifada, 23% believed that all Palestinians support terror, 32.7% 
believed that the majority of Palestinians support terror, and 17.3% believed that half of the 
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Palestinians supported terror (i.e., only 27% did not blame Palestinian people for the terror 
actions done by terror organisations).167              
This leads to the third argument – an assumption that the enemy population is 
responsible for the action of its military, and, once it suffers, it will force its military fractions 
to halt activity against Israel. According to the Israeli military culture of retaliation, the purpose 
of “extensive damage on the civilian infrastructure of Hezbollah in Beirut and southern 
Lebanon”168 is to retaliate against Hezbollah and deter it from further actions, and the IDF 
violent response in Gaza “would lead to destruction and [assumedly] increased domestic 
pressure on the organization’s leadership” (assumedly, because it did not).169 Israeli public 
understands that such a retaliation will come with a significant toll of enemy civilian casualties, 
however, Israelis have little problem with that as (1) Hezbollah’s and Hamas’s rockets cover 
all parts of Israel endangering all of Israel’s population; and (2) in the Israeli mind, to repeat, 
the enemy population is responsible in any case. 
 It is impossible to discuss any military culture without mentioning its founding myths. 
While Russians have their Patriotic wars and Americans have their War of Independence, the 
Civil War and World War Two, the Israeli military culture is undoubtedly brewed on the 
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mythical narratives of the Siege of Masada (73 – 74 A.D.)170 and the Bar-Kokhba Revolt (132 
–135 A.D.).171 Interestingly enough, these two not-so-successful (if not to say the least 
successful) events in Jewish history, which had very little appeal to Jewish communities in 
exile, were reconstructed by the Zionism movement, making Masada as “a symbol of military 
valour and national commitment”172 and turning Bar-Kokhba into “a national hero.”173   
The Siege of Masada was the final defeat of a much bigger Jewish uprising (the Great 
Jewish Revolt against Rome, between the years 66-73 A.D.) that ended in a catastrophic 
disaster and the violent oppression of the Jews. According to the Israeli myth, which does not 
necessarily represent the true course of events,174 at the end of the Great Revolt Jewish rebels 
found themselves trapped on the top of Masada fortress, and as they realised that there was no 
more hope of holding against the Roman army, they chose to kill themselves rather than 
surrender and become slaves.175 As the only available written source on the battle of Masada 
is Josephus’s The Jewish War, for many centuries it was almost unknown outside the Christian 
Church, in general and by the Jewish community, in particular.176 In the late 19th century, 
however, when the Zionism’s founders were re-examining Jewish Antiquity in an attempt to 
establish a basis for the emerging national Hebrew culture, the Masada story “came to represent 
a resolute commitment to national freedom.”177 Since then, the Siege of Masada has 
represented, within Israeli Culture, a narrative of determination to survive or die, a symbolic 
equivalent to the American Alamo, but with multiplied influences on the national character. 
Like the besieged and desperate defenders of Masada, contemporary Israelis see themselves 
surrounded by hostile and numerically superior forces.178 Concurringly, a verse from a popular 
poem, by Hebrew poet Yitzhak Lamdan – “Never again shall Masada fall!” – has become a 
national slogan and a patriotic vow that shaped generations of soldiers in the IDF.179 Moreover, 
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the preference to die rather than be captured, especially as it was represented in the myth of 
Masada, explains best the IDF’s combat procedures in the case of kidnapping (Noal’ Khanibal) 
that orders soldiers to prevent kidnapping by any costs, including killing the hostage.180 
 The Bar-Kokhba Revolt, the last Jewish uprising was also mythicised by the Zionism’s 
leaders at the same time as was the Masada myth and for the same reasons. While previously 
Jewish memory tended to consider this revolt as one of the most traumatic disasters in Jewish 
history, and Bar-Kokhba himself was mythicised as a bold, but arrogant and short-tempered 
leader who led his people to doom and exile,181 the emerging Hebrew nationalism saw it 
otherwise. The glorification of Bar-Kokhba by Zionism stemmed from the conviction that he 
represents a spirit of heroism that was suppressed during centuries of Jewish exile, and the 
rebellion became a model for “breaking the yoke of foreign rule.”182 Moreover, the main 
narrative of the Bar-Kokhba Rebellion in Zionism’s interpretation, which has become 
embedded in the Israeli culture, is that it represents “the Jewish people’s capacity for survival, 
in spite of all hardship it has endured” and that Jewish existence cannot be taken for granted, 
but has to be taken by force.183    
 In the conclusion of this discussion, about the Israeli cultural character, it is difficult to 
disagree with ones who title Israel as "a nation in arms" or a "nation in uniform", that lives in 
a situation that can been labelled a "dormant war."184 The Israeli mind – shaped by an 
existential anxiety, brewed on the myths of prerequisite of “fight for survival” (i.e., the Bar-
Kokhba Rebellion), and a readiness to sacrifice in a cul-de-sac situation (i.e., the Siege of 
Masada) – is predisposed to see the enemy society and its military as one whole and has very 
little sympathy for the enemy population. Despite the vast theoretical discourse led by Jewish 
and Israeli, secular and religious, philosophers on the ethical and moral problems of enemy 
civilian causalities, this debate always ended with the question of legality.185 Probably because, 
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as J. David Bleich, a Jewish orthodox scholar who is considered an authority on Jewish law 
and ethics, controversially concluded:  
There exists no discussion in classical rabbinic sources that takes cognizance of the 
likelihood of causing civilian casualties in the course of hostilities legitimately 
undertaken as posing a halakhic or moral problem.186 
Consequently, when civilians are killed during legitimately undertaken hostilities, their deaths 
are not just, but they are justifiable in the circumstances of war, i.e. “when the damage isn’t 
disproportionate to the probable benefits of attacking the target” and “when this damage is the 
unintended side-effect of a legitimate military operation.”187  And it seems that in the Israeli 
culture, the IDF’s military operations are always legitimate, because, after all, Never again 
shall Masada fall! 
 
Part Four: Israeli Military Culture and NLW 
One of the most popular Israeli slogans regarding the relation between the Israelis and 
their military is am bone tzava bone am (the nation builds the military builds the nation). While 
the degree to which this slogan reflects the real nature of socio-military relations in Israel is 
debatable,188 it definitely points to complex and intense relations between Israel’s culture and 
its military. Already in 1974, a British Brigadier Nigel Bagnall (later Field Marshal and the 
Chief of the General Staff Sir Nigel Thomas Bagnall) in his analysis of the IDF’s performance 
during the Six-Day War pointed to a strong connection between the Jewish history, the 
emerging Israeli culture, Israel’s geopolitical situation and the IDF’s way of war.189 The same 
arguments have been supported by many Israeli and foreigner scholars and military thinkers.190   
The main interest of this research is the failure of the IDF to employ NLW during its 
military operations, and, therefore, a broad discussion of Israeli military culture is beyond its 
scope. As NLW is a military technology, the following analysis will narrow its focus on the 
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role of technology in Israeli military culture in general and what Israeli military thought has to 
say about NLW, in particular. 
Israeli Military Culture and Technology 
Since the very beginning of Israel, the idea of “qualitative edge” (itaron echuti) has 
been one of the foundation stones of Israeli military culture. Realising that the IDF would never 
be able to counterbalance the numerical superiority of its adversaries, creating and maintaining 
this edge became a lodestar of Israeli military thinking and build-up in terms of material and 
human factors.191 As Major General Israel Tal, one of the prominent Israeli military strategists, 
put it: 
Israel has to turn to all of its national resources in wartime, and to rely on the quality 
of its society in all areas… The qualitative difference between Israel and Arabs 
must be one not of degree but of kind192 
The role of technology in the Israeli military culture expanded gradually. In the early 
years after achieving independence, Israel experienced political difficulties with procuring 
advanced foreign weaponry and the IDF had to rely mostly on pre-war and World War Two 
technologies. Consequently, analysing this early period of the IDF’s relationship with 
technology, researchers argue that “the IDF had little understanding of technology”193 and “in 
Israeli opinion, many complex items of Western inventiveness offer little advantage over the 
simpler equipments they are designed to replace.”194  However, driven by a fundamental sense 
of insecurity and anxiety, Israel strove to improve, not only its general technological edge, but 
to attain autonomy in weapon production. 195 Therefore, about the time of the Six-Day War, 
and especially in 1970s, when the various political obstacles that prevented Israel from 
purchasing foreign weaponry were significantly relieved, Israel already had developed its own 
defence industry. By 1982 and the First Lebanon War, the IDF internally developed and fielded 
technology with “ultra-sophisticated” capabilities.196  While during the 1950s and 1960s “the 
IDF sought to achieve technological superiority where possible,” and during the 1970s and 
1980s “technology had come to occupy an ever more important role in the IDF’s self-
understanding”, by the late 1990s, the IDF had not only “excellent equipment, much of it of 
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indigenous manufacture” but also succeeded “to field military capabilities in advance even of 
the United States.”197        
Since the 1970s, the IDF has been considering the advanced technology as a lodestar 
for military successes,198 as a panacea not only for minimising costs and duration of wars,199 
but also casualties among Israeli civilian population and military personnel. While “offensive 
romanticism”, which is deeply integrated in the Israeli military culture and operational mind-
set,200 led, for example, to the development of the sophisticated Merkava tank or attacking 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),201 defence technologies have “become a crucial element 
of Israel’s approach in defending the country,”202 with Arrow Anti-Missile System and the Iron 
Dome Anti-Missile Shield as good examples. Moreover, since the number of casualties among 
IDF’s soldiers determines the level of the IDF’s success in the eyes of the Israeli public,203 
technologies for military personnel’s protection have also been enjoying a high priority. The 
number of casualties in the IDF Armour Corp during the Second Lebanon War created vast 
public criticism of the “penetrability” of the Merkava tanks.204 While this criticism was not 
supported by facts as, in comparison to the Yom Kippur War, the percentage of penetrated 
tanks (by anti-tank missiles) was significantly lower (86% in 1973 vs. 47% in 2006) and the 
average number of killed soldiers in each penetrated tank was halved (from two to one),205 the 
IDF rushed to introduce the Meil’ Ruach (windbreaker) Active Protection System for 
Vehicles.206 Interestingly enough, while the main criticism was against the poor training of the 
crews before the war and the ill employment of the tanks during the war,207 the IDF preferred 
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to invest in a technological solution, rather than improving the quality of training and 
operational concepts.   
Analysing the contemporary IDF approach to technology, Avi Kober pointed to the 
rising “cult of technology” stating that “in the recent years technology started overshadowing 
the non-material aspects of Israeli strategy and tactics, becoming the main factor in military 
build-up and operations.”208 He stresses the fact that the IDF has become heavily 
technologically-oriented, identifying military quality with high-technological capabilities, 
explaining this shift in the Israeli military culture as over-exposure to American military 
thinking. While his argument that the American fascination with technology “has been received 
in the IDF enthusiastically with little scepticism, and has affected IDF commanders’ thinking 
and modus operandi”209 points at a change in the Israeli military way of thinking, it seems that 
very little has changed in the IDF’s culture of development of the technology itself. 
Describing the way in which the IDF develops its operational concepts, Eliot Cohen, 
Michael Eisentstadt and Andrew Bachevich stated that: “Israeli operational concepts resemble 
keys carefully crafted to fit particular locks, rather than a general approach to the problem of 
opening doors.”210 This description, however, also describes best the IDF’s attitude towards 
the development of new weaponry. Despite the warning of the former director of the Research 
and Development (R&D) Directorate at the Ministry of Defence, Major General Yitzhak Ben-
Israel, that the IDF’s approach to R&D processes has to be based on “relative edge” (itaron 
yahasi), rather than “bridging the gaps” (sgirat pa’arim), this is not the case in the IDF, as he 
concluded himself that the IDF’s disproportional investment in the Air Force was of the first, 
rather than the latter.211 Having no resources for great technological leaps in all of the military 
realm, the IDF has always preferred to invest in specific technologies to bridge certain gaps, at 
the huge expense of others. In 2014, during Operation Protective Edge, the oversophisticated 
Merkava IV tanks with the state-of-the-art Meil’ Ruach Active Protection Systems were 
followed by the M113 armoured personnel carriers built in the 1970s,212 and Puma armoured 
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engineering vehicles that are based on the hulls of the British Centurion tanks built in the late 
1950s.213 This technological mishmash matches well the Israeli approach to military strategy, 
which is often described as “a conceptual salad, marked by a lack of vision.”214  
Despite IDF commanders’ fascination with the American techno-mania, the IDF’s 
budget is a fraction of its American counterpart, and, therefore, unlike the U.S. military, the 
IDF is “wringing the last iota of usefulness” out of any technology.215 The Merkava  project, 
the IDF Air Force, the Anti-Missile defence systems are the outcomes of specified prioritising  
and heavy investment.216 In all other cases, technological advance rests on the Israeli cultural 
belief that “small technological advantages – marginal edges in range, accuracy, or 
manoeuvrability – can yield large differentials of combat power.”217 In other words, the IDF’s 
fiscal constrains combined with the IDF’s popular slogan ze ma yesh, ve’im ze nenatzeah (this 
is what we have, and with this we will win) has led to the situation that the advancement of 
technologies, which are not in the main focus, is based on small and steady adaptations and 
upgrades that answer specific deficiencies discovered during cumulative combat experience. 
When hitting his fingers, an American will seek a way to improve the hammer and a Russian 
will endure the pain, an Israeli, having neither American economic privileges, nor Russian 
readiness to endure, will invent a small and cheap gadget that will hold the nail while striking. 
Israeli Military Thought and NLW 
Much has been written on the lack of intellectual tradition in the Israeli military culture, 
the IDF’s “anti-intellectualism”,218or  even “false intellectualism”.219 The existent research 
proposes three main cultural explanations for this phenomenon. The first one is the 
incompetence of Jewish thought on war, driven from the central historical fact of the Jewish 
stateless condition, as “Jews had no ‘high’ politics, no politics of war and peace, from the time 
of Bar-Kokhba (135 A.D.) to the time of Ben-Gurion (1948).”220 The second explanation is the 
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fact that the Israeli military culture is rooted in the partisan-like culture of the Palmach (the 
striking companies of the Jewish military force during the British mandate) that favoured heroic 
practitioners over theoreticians, leading the IDF to promote “heroic and charismatic generals 
[who] exhibited little intellectual curiosity in studying military science.”221  The third one is 
the previously discussed “cult of technology” that led to the preference of the Israeli generals 
“to think in terms of technological force multipliers, such as smart weapons, than to create 
force multipliers based on smart doctrines.”222   
Traditionally, the IDF’s culture cultivated “doers”, rather than “talkers” or “thinkers”. 
The lack of intellectual vigour, however, has always been compensated by Israeli cultural 
emphasis on iltur (improvisation), when an officers’ abilities “to orient, to think, and to bounce 
ideas quickly,” finding a better, “not-by-the-book” solution, are considered a hallmark of 
military performance.223 On the one hand, this prominence for iltur in the IDF has often been 
connected to the lack of military professionalism.224 One of the most recent criticisms was 
raised by the Winograd Commission (the Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military 
Engagement in Lebanon 2006) that highlighted “the connection between cultural organisation 
of improvisation and the lack of professionalism at the level of soldiers, as well as 
commanders.”225 On the other, creative improvisation frequently compensates for anti-
intellectualism and deficit of professionalism, as “improvisers” are also “problem solvers” and, 
as the military is constantly busy with fighting, there is never time to “sit and learn”.226    
The IDF, lacking Russian cultural predisposition towards abstract thinking or the 
American extensive military education system that forces them to think (to a certain 
success),227 has never become a “bookish military”.  Consequently, while the IDF has always 
been good in fielding innovative technologies, “Israeli military thought lacked the ability to 
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analyse, envision, and assess future [technological] developments and to generate knowledge 
in that concept.”228     
It is not surprising then that the theoretical discourse about possible usefulness of NLW 
in Israel is very limited (if, indeed, less than a dozen articles can be considered a discourse).229 
While the theoretical and conceptual milieu that surrounds NLW in the IDF generally suits the 
intellectual desert described above, a title of “oasis” might be bestowed on the work of 
Lieutenant Colonel Guy-Zahar Shtultz, who was responsible for the field of NLW and riot 
control at the IDF Infantry and Paratroopers Forces Headquarters. After a very comprehensive 
theoretical analysis of the political-military situation in which the IDF has been acting in Gaza 
and the West Bank, Shtultz produced a very concrete and practical list of recommendations 
concluding that:  
A deployment of effective NLW by the [IDF’s] fighting forces is a requirement of 
reality. A proficient employment of NLW will increase the legitimacy of our 
forces’ activity in civilian environments, in general, and in Gaza and the West 
Bank, in particular, thus, providing the IDF with an advantage, which will 
frequently be of a strategic value. An effective employment of NLW will also 
provide our forces with a clear tactical advantage, as it will expand the range of the 
available means and solutions during operations in civilian environments, where 
the employment of usual lethal weapons is not optimal.230          
Shtultz’s wise analysis, however, fell on deaf ears, as the lack of enthusiasm for NLW 
in the IDF is based on two paramount factors. The first one is the IDF’s principal differentiation 
between Bitachon Shotef (batash, “current security”, “state of conflict”) and Bitachon Yisodi 
(“state of war”, large military operations). On the one hand, Israeli forces have to prepare for 
war, or, at least, for a large military operation that is waged as a war. On the other, they 
constantly perform law enforcement missions in the West Bank, or routine patrolling of Israel’s 
non-peaceful borders. As “an appointment of continuous batash missions on military units that 
were built to fight war disturbs their operational logic and harms their readiness for war,”231 
the IDF generals has cultivated an understanding that the accumulated experience in batash is 
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not relevant for the IDF’s preparations for war.232 After the Second Lebanon War, the sense of 
‘what is good for batash is not necessary good for war’ was sharpened even more, due to the 
criticism that the IDF’s poor performance was an outcome of the IDF’s inability to switch from 
the mode of batash to the mode of war.233 As it was discussed at the beginning of this chapter, 
NLW are primary considered by the Israeli military as weapons for batash, and, therefore, their 
employment during a war is intuitively regarded as something that is unthinkable. When, as 
Brigadier General Oren Abman stated, the transition from batash to war “must be expressed in 
terms of aggressiveness and offensiveness, meaning the employment of all firepower that is 
available to the unit”234 there is, understandably, no place for something that is not intended to 
kill (i.e., NLW). 
The second reason, for the lack of the IDF’s conceptual interest in the employment of 
NLW on the battlefield, is the fact that the reduction of enemy civilian population casualties 
has been treated by Israeli military culture as a purely legal issue. It will be unfair to claim that 
the IDF does not try to reduce casualties among the enemy civilian population as even foreign 
military specialists assess the IDF’s attempts to avert unnecessary harm to the local populace 
as one of (if not the) best in the Western world.235 It seems, however, that the main leading 
factor behind these attempts is the IDF’s obsessiveness (some would even argue over-
obsessiveness)236 with legitimacy, as Israeli generals understand that “every time, when the 
IDF finishes an operation, the UN Human Rights Council establishes an inquiry into the war 
crimes supposedly commited by Israel.”237 While this aspect of “lawfare” is relatively new to 
the Israeli military culture, there is a traceable rising influence of the IDF International Law 
Department (known by its Hebrew acronym DABLA) on the strategic, operational and tactic 
decision-making process.238 In other words, instead of developing concepts of how to employ 
weapons that are intended to minimise civilian casualties (i.e., NLW) the Israeli military 
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struggles to improve the compliance of the IDF with International Humanitarian Law, and, 
most importantly, the collection process of evidences for this compliance.239  
One of the outcomes of this approach to reducing enemy civilian casualties was the 
introduction of Population-during-Warfare Officers (ktzin uchlisiya be lehima). As one of the 
lessons of Operation Cast Lead (and probably the results of the following Goldston Report), 
these officers have been attached to each deployed battalion and their duty is “to promote the 
balance between military necessity and the humanitarian need of the local populace,” as well 
as to record the enemy’s abuses of international law.240 Interestingly enough, Lieutenant 
Colonel Guy-Zahar Shtultz, one who so arguably promoted the possible usefulness of NLW to 
reduce enemy civilian casualties, was promoted to be the Head of the Department of Civilian 
Affairs during Fighting (rosh anaf ha’markiv ha’ezrachi be lehima) – the department, which 
is responsible for the development of training and operational procedures for Civilian-
Population-during-Warfare Officers.241 A promotion that reflects best that the IDF’s thinking 
of the problem of enemy civilian casualties is more inclined towards the legal aspects of this 
issue, rather than towards a search for a technological solution (i.e., NLW).   
 
Part Five: Conclusions 
In summarising the history of NLW in Israel it is important to highlight the fact that 
compared with the American and Russian militaries (and probably any other in the world), the 
IDF seems to be the most experienced. The long history of deployment as law enforcement 
forces during routine batash operations forced the IDF to develop and employ NLW at an 
unprecedented scale. Moreover, the combination of the Israeli iltur culture combined with 
traditional out-of-the-box thinking and tendency to look for simple and cheap technological 
solutions allowed the IDF to develop and successfully employ such extraordinary NLW as 
Hatzatzit, Bo’esh or non-lethal shells for tanks. The IDF, however, is “a dynamic and agile 
military,” and its culture tends to believe that “the wars of the past are irrelevant (or almost 
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irrelevant) for the wars of the future.”242 It is not surprising then that once the immediate 
operational need for NLW dwindled, Hatzatzit was forgotten,243 non-lethal shells for tanks 
were abandoned,244 and, in fact, even the Civilian-Population-during-Warfare Officer was a 
forgotten lesson of the Al-Aqsa Intifada that was relearnt after the Operation Cast Lead.245  
On the one hand, as it was discussed previously, the international criticism of Israeli 
military operations specifically focuses on enemy civilian casualties burdening the Israeli 
political-military decision-making process. Despite its traditional foreign policy narratives of 
Um Shmum, the world is always against us, the chutzpah attitude to the international 
community, and the traditional reliance on American protection, Israel is, undoubtedly, most 
vulnerable to external criticism, especially compared with the U.S. or Russia. Therefore, it 
could be assumed that the Israeli political-military decision-makers will do more than their 
counterparts in Washington or Moscow to pressure their military to look for less lethal 
technologies in an attempt to reduce this international pressure. 
On the other hand, the cultural existential anxiety embedded in the Israeli society, 
combined with the readiness to make sacrifices (the Masada myth) and a belief that Israel’s 
existence cannot be taken for granted, but has to be taken by force regardless the price (the 
Bar-Kokhba Syndrome), contradicts the very idea of reducing the punishment of a society that 
dares to aim a blow at Israel. While the traditional Jewish individualism increases the value of 
Jewish life and the Holocaust experience explains Israeli concern about the suffering of others, 
the cultural collectivism shaped by two thousand years of persecution pays little respect to the 
lives of Israel’s enemies and their societies. In 1983, in his criticism of Israeli culture, 
Yehoshafat Harkabi said that “to admire the Bar-Kokhba Rebellion is to admire rebelliousness 
and heroism detached of responsibility for their consequences.”246 It seems that 30 years later, 
very little has changed, as in 2015, surveys showed that a majority (53%) of the Jewish 
population in Israel agreed with the statement that “any Palestinian who has perpetrated a terror 
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attack against Jews should be killed on the spot, even if he has been apprehended and no longer 
poses a threat.”247 
 Israeli inherent predisposition towards violent solutions, regardless of the 
consequences, and their tendency to see a whole society as responsible for the actions of its 
individuals, leaves very little space (if any) for the appreciation of enemy civilian population, 
and, therefore, in the Israeli mind-set anything less than the employment of lethal force is just 
unthinkable. After all, in their evaluation of the IDF’s performance during Operation Protective 
Edge “only 6% of the entire Jewish public saw the IDF as having used too much firepower.”248  
 
                                                          
247 The Israel Democracy Institute, The Peace Index: October 2015, 5 October 2015, 
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It seems right to argue that manoeuvring between these two almost opposite political 
vectors, the Israeli leadership pressured it military to deal with both of the problems by 
overemphasising the legal issues surrounding its military operations. In other words, the IDF 
has been forced not only to pretend to be holier-than-thou, but to actually try and be one. To 
improve the IDF’s compliance with International Humanitarian Law, the IDF introduced 
DABLA that provides “operational legal advice” to the scale that “a military lawyer had to be 
present for every approval of targeting killing.”249 Moreover, the purpose of the mentioned 
above Population-during-Warfare Officers is to improve this compliance on the ground. 
According to many Israeli generals and military scholars, the IDF has become obsessed with 
the legitimacy and legality of its actions. Each time when there is a suspicion of misconduct or 
overuse of firepower, the IDF does not hesitate to open its own investigations.250 In other 
words, averting enemy civilian casualties, in the IDF’s eyes, is a problem that has to be solved 
by an increased compliance with the law, rather than more suitable weaponry that will minimise 
civilian casualties and collateral damage (i.e., NLW). 
The conceptual perception that NLW belong to batash and, therefore, they do not have 
a place on the battlefield reduces even more the chances for the RMA of NLW in Israel. Once 
a non-lethal effect is required, the IDF prefers to use lethal weapons in a non-lethal way, firing 
in the air or close to the target. The Israeli Air Force procedure hakesh-be-gag (knock-on-the-
roof), is the best example of this, when a first missile is shot to disperse civilians from the roof 
of a target, and then the second one (usually deadlier than the first) is shot to destroy the 
target.251  As long as this perception stays prevalent, and as far as  the political leadership does 
not pressure to look for technological solutions, rather than legal, to reduce enemy civilian 
casualties during Israeli military operation, NLW are doomed to play an important, yet very 
limited role during routine Batash deployments.
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 CIVILIAN CASUALTIES – DO WE REALLY CARE? 
 
This research addressed the puzzling story of military employment of NLW in the U.S., 
Russian and Israel in an attempt to understand why the RMA of NLW did not occur. As noted 
in Chapter 1, to speak about a Political-Military System is merely a novel conceptualisation of 
the assumption that political decisions are the main driving forces behind the military 
adaptation of revolutionary technologies. While American, Russian and Israeli military 
organisations have approached NLW in different ways, it seems that minimising enemy civilian 
casualties has never been defined by their political leaders as a significant challenge demanding 
a fundamental change in the conduct of war. Consequently, the conclusions of this research 
will be divided into three main parts. First, to establish why, contrary to expectations, there was 
no RMA of NLW, it is important to resolve three main questions regarding the American, 
Russian and Israeli cases:  
(a) to what extent does international political pressure to minimise enemy civilian casualties 
influence the political-military decision-making processes?  
(b) Why is there no domestic political pressure to minimise enemy civilian casualties?  
(c) If the challenge of minimising civilian casualties has never been handed to military 
organisations, then, why is there still an interest in NLW?  
 
Secondly, based on the example of the analysis outlined throughout this research it is 
important to highlight the significance of the concept of the Political-Military System as 
suitable not only for the analysis of the failed RMA of NLW, but also for the examination of 
military transformations in general.  
And finally, in an attempt to take these conclusions beyond the American-Russian-
Israeli case studies and produce a broader argument, it seems important to resolve an additional 
question: What does the absence of the RMA of NLW teach about the decline in violence in 
the 21st century? 
 
International Criticism and Enemy Civilian Casualties 
 Causing civilian casualties during military operations has become a much politicised 
topic in international relations since the Second World War. While countries, as well as non-
state actors, use this argument to criticise their political adversaries in the international arena, 
the American, Russian and Israeli governments are well prepared and politically equipped to 
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fend off this criticism. Interestingly enough, each one of them has created its own foreign policy 
mechanisms to withstand international pressure, so that they feel relatively free to employ their 
military forces regardless of the extensive collateral damage and enemy civilian casualties. 
Moreover, it seems that their success in countering international criticism is rooted much more 
in their general political, economic and military power than in their attempts to minimise the 
undesired outcome of their military activities.  Consequently, it is not surprising that American 
politicians are much more successful in minimising the outcome of international criticism than 
their Russian counterparts, and that the Israeli foreign policy is the most vulnerable of the three. 
 While Russians and Israelis are struggling to fend off the international criticism of their 
military actions, Washington adopts an entirely different strategy based on the prevention of 
the criticism, rather than a reaction to it. This strategy of prevention is based on two main 
narratives of the America’s foreign policy in terms of its military operations. The first one is 
based on the Cold War heritage that bestows on the U.S. the position of the great protector of 
the free world against a great evil. As far as Washington enjoys this status (and the American 
leadership puts a great effort in its preservation), the U.S. military activity would be relatively 
free from international criticism, regardless the undesired collateral damage and civilian 
casualties. When “small massacres” (or “big mistakes”), committed by the U.S. military, create 
an international outrage, such as in the case of the Kunduz hospital airstrike on 3 October 2015,1 
America “expresses its condolences” stating that it "goes to great lengths to limit the loss of 
life.”2 However, as the history of the past few decades illustrates, the international outrage 
fades away very quickly and these events have very little (if any) effect on the Washington 
political-military decision-making process; after all, the U.S. military protects the free world 
against the great evil. The second mechanism of U.S. foreign policy to prevent international 
criticism is the American tradition to create the “coalitions of willing”. Based on its political 
and economic power, Washington builds on the self-interests of other states, “recruiting” them 
to participate in U.S.-led military activities. On the one hand, this practice helps Washington 
to preserve its freedom of decision-making, as in most of the cases the actual military 
contribution of the coalition’s members is very limited. On the other, the fact that many states 
raise their flags in support of U.S. military operations (i.e., provide political support) prevent 
                                                          
1 Tim Craig, Missy Ryan, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, ‘By Evening, a Hospital. By Morning, a War Zone’, Washington 
Post, 10 October 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/story-of-how-a-kunduz-
hospital-was-shelled-by-us-gunship-in-question/2015/10/10/1c8affe2-6ebc-11e5-b31c-
d80d62b53e28_story.html, [accessed: 22 November 2015]. 
2 ‘Obama Apologises to MSF President for Kunduz Bombing’, BBCNews, 7 October 2015, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-34467631, [accessed: 22 November 2015]. 
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them from openly criticising American actions, simultaneously, making it more difficult for 
third states to criticise the whole coalition. 
 Unlike Washington, the Kremlin bases its political freedom of military actions on a 
much more defensive strategy. While the U.S. prevents international criticism by maintaining 
the “good” intentions of its military activity, Russia fends the criticism off, by claiming that it 
applies “double standards”. During the last decade and a half the Kremlin has invested much 
effort rehabilitating not only its economic and military power, which were lost after the collapse 
of the U.S.S.R., but also its role on the international arena. Building on its status as the biggest 
nuclear power, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, its rehabilitated economy and 
unprecedented domestic support, the Kremlin feels free to disdain international criticism as a 
political manipulation that is intended, according to President Putin, “to accuse Russia of 
growing ambitions ... as though those who say that, have no ambitions [of their own].”3  When 
Moscow decides to employ its military, it feels few constrants concerning possible undesired 
collateral damage and civilian casualties, at least as far as the levels of damage and lethality 
caused by Western operations would not be minimised significantly. Interestingly enough, the 
American techno-utopia in military affairs led Washington to base its criticism of the Russian 
intervention in the Syrian conflict in 2015 on Russian technology, rather than on the outcome 
of Russian activity. Thus, Americans claim that, while Western attacks “are the most precise 
in the history of warfare” and so “the amount of care that we [the U.S.] have taken to preserve 
civilian life, to preserve civilian infrastructure, is unprecedented;” Russian’s munitions “lag so 
far behind those of Western militaries” that they “inadvertently kill innocent men, women and 
children.”4 It did not take long for the Kremlin to answer this narrowly technical criticism. Just 
5 days later, it launched 26 guided missiles from a distance of 1500 km,5 signalling to the U.S. 
not only the technological sophistication of Russian military, but also the fact that Moscow 
uses the same technology as the U.S. and, therefore, “takes care” to avert civilian casualties at 
least on the same level as the U.S. does.  In other words, Russian political leadership is powerful 
and confident enough to shrug off international criticism of its military activities and their 
undesired outcomes. 
                                                          
3 Vladimir Putin, Speech at the UN General Assembly, 28 September 2015, https://russian.rt.com/article/119712, 
[accessed: 22 November 2015]. 
4 ‘Russia’s Unguided Weapons in Syria Could Ricochet on Moscow’, Time, 2 October 2015, 
http://time.com/4059442/russia-bombing-syria-isis-assad/, [accessed: 22 November 2015]. 
5 Elizabeth Foht, ‘Rossiyskiye korabli v Kaspiyskom more nanesli udary po pozitsiyam IG v Sirii’, [‘Russian 
Ships in the Caspian Sea Attacked the Positions of ISIS in Syria’], RBC, 7 October 2015, 
http://www.rbc.ru/politics/07/10/2015/561502039a7947add1998f52, [accessed: 22 November 2015]. 
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 In comparison to the powerful positions of America and Russia in the international 
arena, which allow them to pay very little regard to the criticism of their military actions, Israel 
seems to be the most sensitive and vulnerable. To deal with international criticism, Israeli 
foreign policy combines both: the Russian defensive approach and the American strategy of 
prevention.  On the one hand, Israeli foreign policy, shaped by the narrative of Um Shmum and 
the traditional reliance on American protection, easily cold-shoulders international criticism. 
Taking into consideration the scale of the criticism produced by international organisations, 
Israeli politicians seem to be much more effective in ignoring it compared with their Russian 
counterparts. The tendency of Israelis, as already observed in 1971 by Sir Ernest John Barnes, 
“to air their views so loudly and so frequently on anything that happens … [and] blow [the UN 
resolutions] up into international tragedies”6 seems to be a useful strategy, because, after all, 
Israel is not as isolated as it is in its self-image.7 When the Kremlin tried to fend off the 
international outrage regarding the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014, it had to deal with 
economic sanctions detrimental to the Russian economy. In contrast, Israel has been, so far, 
relatively successful in withstanding the international criticism of its seizure of the West Bank 
– despite the fact that the European Union is one of the biggest critics of Israel, it is also Israel’s 
biggest trading partner.8 
 On the other hand, considering Israeli foreign policy in the context of international 
criticism, it is also important to point out the preventive tactics intended to minimise 
international outrage. While Washington “recruits” other states to support its actions by 
American political and economic power, Israel does it by self-restraint. To open a window for 
international political support for its actions, Israeli political leadership tolerates enemy attacks 
to an unprecedented scale, manoeuvring between the danger of being accused of indecisiveness 
by the Israeli public and the attempt to minimise international accusations that Israel is 
bellicose. 
 In conclusion, it seems right to argue that the international criticism of the American, 
Russian and Israeli military activities is not as effective in minimising collateral damage and 
civilian casualties, as one might think. The political leaderships of these countries have very 
                                                          
6 John Barnes, ‘The Intransigent Israeli?’, British Embassy, Tel-Aviv, 18 November 1971, republished in 
Shmuel Bar, ‘The Intransigent Israeli? – A document from the Archives of the British Foreign Office (FCO/17 
1554)’, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2010, pp. 103-113. 
7 Efraim Inbar, Israel eina mevudedet, [Israel Is not Isolated], (Tel-Aviv: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic 
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8 Israel’s State Bureau of Statistics,  Israel’s Foreign Trade in Goods, by Country - September 2015, Jerusalem, 
25 October, 2015, http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template_eng.html?hodaa=201516283, 
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little reason to press their militaries to perform fundamental changes in their weaponry or 
concepts of operations because of enemy civilian casualties. It is important to highlight, 
however, that the general ineffectiveness of international criticism is rooted not only in the 
successful foreign policy mechanisms, developed by these countries to withstand this criticism, 
but also in the general framework of the International Humanitarian Law, in context of which 
this criticism is articulated. And while the first was already intensively examined throughout 
this research, the latter will be discussed in more details in following parts of this chapter. 
 
Domestic Politics and Enemy Civilian Casualties 
As was discussed throughout this research, each of the examined countries has 
experienced significant domestic political pressure to reduce the casualties of their own 
military personnel, e.g., the U.S. in Vietnam, Russia in Afghanistan and then in Chechnya, and 
Israel in the Second Lebanon War. While the presence of this domestic political pressure is 
undeniable, it seems that the societies of these countries have expressed much less (if any) 
political outrage when it comes to enemy civilian casualties. To understand this absence of 
domestic political pressure, this research addressed the cultural-historical narratives of each 
national character, finding that while the American, Russian and Israeli national heritages are 
very different, all of them show very little concern about the enemy, in general, and enemy 
civilian casualties, in particular. Throughout the analysis of the American, Russian and Israeli 
national characters, this research focused on their respective position on the individualistic-
versus-collectivistic continuum. While the American mind-set is characterised by its extreme 
individualism and the Russian one by its predisposition towards collectivism, the Israeli 
combination of these two places the Israeli character somewhere in the middle. Interestingly 
enough, all three have developed a strong differentiation between “us and them” that prevents 
them from projecting their appreciation of their own lives onto the lives of their enemies. 
American, Russian and Israeli national characters are, undoubtedly, products of the 
unique historical experience of each one of these nations. Most interesting, however, is the fact 
that despite their differences, all of three pay very little regard to foreigners’ lives. The 
American mind-set, shaped by the violent experience of the frontier, perceives war as an act of 
vengeance or as a rightful act intended to “free” or “protect” local population. Throughout their 
history, Americans considered wars as temporary and unfortunate events that disturb their 
“American Dream” and, therefore, have to be concluded as fast and decisively as possible. The 
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combination of this approach towards war with the traditional inclination towards violence has 
left very little time and place for valuing enemy civilian population. After the Vietnam War, 
Americans have become very sensitive to their own casualties, however, as their latest 
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan proved, American society generally failed to project its 
rising appreciation of human life onto the enemy civilian population. From the early violent 
clashes on the frontier to this day and age, wars have been interpreted by the American mind-
set, as a fight of “brave American soldiers” against a “brutish enemy”, who understands only 
violence and, therefore, has to be treated accordingly.  
Unlike the American mind-set, the Russian national character perceives war as an 
integral part of the human condition. Russian history, rich with conflicts and suffering, 
cultivated the narratives of permanent struggle and readiness to sacrifice for the common good. 
Bred on the heritage of the Great Patriotic Wars, Russians perceive military operations as a 
matter of survival, rather than a way to make their lives better or safer. This narrative is so 
important in the Russian cultural context that leaders who failed to address it, paid an enormous 
political price – Nicolas II during the First World War, Michail Gorbachev during the war in 
Afghanistan and Boris Yeltsin during the First Chechen campaign. It is not surprising then that 
Putin, having learnt these lessons, described Russian intervention in Syria as a matter of 
Russia’s survival, because: 
More than 2,000 fighters from Russia and Ex-Soviet Republics are in the territory 
of Syria [fighting for ISIS]. There is a threat of their return to us. So, instead of 
waiting for their return, we are better off helping Assad fight them on Syrian 
territory.9 
When a war is a matter of survival, when people are ready to suffer to protect their homes and 
families, when they are led by a strong leader, the Russian people demonstrate unprecedented 
levels of endurance and sacrifice. However, while this readiness to endure saved Russians from 
Napoleon and Hitler, and had helped them to survive extreme totalitarian regimes, it also 
shaped their little concern for enemy civilian casualties. In other words, the casualties of an 
enemy population during military operation are generally tolerated in the Russian cultural 
context, because a war, as Major General Alexander Vladimirov put it, “is an integral part of 
human existence,”10 and Russians are ready to sacrifice themselves to win this war. 
                                                          
9 Vladimir Putin in an interview to CBS News, 27 September 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/vladimir-
putin-russian-president-60-minutes-charlie-rose/, [accessed: 23 November 2015]. 
10 Alexander Vladimirov, Osnovy Obshchey Teorii Voyny, [Fundamentals of the General Theory of War], 
(Moscow: Moskovskiy Finansovo-Promyshlennyy Universitet “Sinergiya,” 2013), Volume 1, p.160. 
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 Interestingly enough, it seems right to argue that the Israeli understanding of the 
phenomenon of war combines, to a certain degree, the Russian traditional perception of 
permanent struggle with the American fast-cut-and-aggressive approach to war. On the one 
hand, the Israeli character shaped by a combination of the political-military reality of the 
Middle East and the national cultivation of the myth of Masada, is predisposed to believe 
(similar to Russian culture that perceives Russia as a besieged fortress) that the whole world is 
against Israel. The very simple fact that Masada’s defenders were arguably more alike bandits 
and outlaws (who preferred to kill themselves, rather than be killed by the Romans) than “brave 
defenders” (who sacrificed themselves instead of being enslaved), is percieved by the 
contemporary Israeli culture as an all-too detailed  interpretation intended just for historians, 
rather than for schools.11 The heritage of the long Jewish history of persecution shaped, not 
only the Israeli cultural existential anxiety, but also the very clear distinction between Israel 
and everybody else who, ultimately has to have an – either open or hidden – anti-Semitic 
agenda. Consequently, as Israelis see it, Israel has permanently and continuously to defend 
itself against Palestinians, Arab countries, Anti-Semitic Western countries and the whole 
world, as Israel is the only safe place for Jews. 
On the other hand, the economic and political constraints shaped the Israeli approach 
to war as something that has to be carried out as fast and decisivelly as possible. Having neither 
resources, nor international political approval for prolonged wars, the Israeli mind-set is 
predisposed towards aggressive peaks of fighting that will only provide relative peace for a 
certain period, rather than an overwhelming victory. As the Jews’ struggle is perceived as an 
eternal phenomenon, and conclusive victory as an unachievable outcome, Israelis fight not to 
defeat their enemies irrefutably, but to deter them from future hostilities for a certain period. 
After each war, Israelis ask themselves: “Will deterrence be achieved and will there be quiet? 
For how long?”12 If the meaning of victory is, as Amos Yadlin put it, “postponing the next 
conflict for as long as possible by depriving the enemy of capabilities and influencing its 
intentions,”13 then the conduct of war has to be fast-cut-and-aggressive, and this approach 
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leaves little space for the appreciation of enemy civilian lives. While Americans disregard the 
lives of their enemies because of American traditional imprudence and inclination toward 
violence, and the Russians because of their collectivistic characteristic that tends to keep 
societies as responsible for the action of individuals; Israelis combine both. Though American, 
Russian and Israeli political leaderships have been pressed by their people to minimise the 
casualties of their own military personnel, a similar pressure regarding enemy civilian 
casualties simply does not exist. And, while under domestic political pressure to minimise 
friendly casualties, politicians forced their militaries to develop and employ technologies 
accordingly, there has been no political reason to invest in the development of NLW.   
 To conclude the discussion about domestic politics and the absence of the RMA of 
NLW, it is important to discuss an additional factor that was not covered by this research, but 
is identified by the existent literature as influential in the domestic politics of military 
armament: the military-industrial complex.  Since the end of the Second World War, and 
especially after President Eisenhower's famous farewell address in 1961, which warned the 
American people against an extension of the influence of the U.S. military-industrial complex 
on political-military decision-making,14 scholars have continuously pointed to the significant 
role of the military-industrial complex in promoting novel military technologies.15 While it is 
difficult to disagree with the fact that military organisations employ certain novel technologies 
due to the powerful political lobby of the military-industrial complex, this is not the case of 
NLW. As it was discussed in the empirical chapters of this research, American, Russian and 
Israeli military-industrial complexes are able to produce effective NLW when they are 
specifically tasked by their military. Without this specific demand, however, it seems that big 
manufactures are not very interested in promoting NLW, because, as one Israeli defence analyst 
put it: 
The defence industries have no economic motivation to develop enhanced NLW. 
On the one hand, the headache is enormous (for example, lawyers can spend 
months discussing whether the system answers the legal definition of non-
lethality). On the other, the profits are diminutive. One lethal and sophisticated 
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system, which can be sold after [being sold to] the IDF to the whole world, will 
bring more profits than all NLW together.16       
Moreover, as big industries are not interested in NLW, most of the American, Russian and 
Israeli (and, in fact, all around the world) companies that produce them are small and medium 
sized manufactures17 that are short of the required economic and political power to support an 
effective lobbing of NLW. In other words, American, Russian and Israeli political-military 
decision-makers do not press their military organisations to employ NLW not only because the 
domestic public opinion tolerates enemy civilian casualties, but also because the military-
industrial complex shows very little interest in promoting these weapons.    
 
Military Interest in NLW 
The analysis of different political and cultural factors, as appeared throughout this 
research, depicted the indifference of the American, Russian and Israeli political leadership 
towards enemy civilian casualties and the following lack of political pressure to employ less 
lethal armament. The question is, however, why the military organisations of these countries 
still express an interest in NLW. Interestingly enough, despite the fact that each military has its 
own reasons to believe in the potential usefulness of NLW, their interests in these weapons are 
highly interconnected. 
As was discussed in chapter 3, the idea of the military employment of NLW is the fruit 
of American military thought. After the end of the Cold War, the American military was 
struggling to find a new great evil to fight against. The political atmosphere in the U.S. in the 
beginning of the 1990s was best described by Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the 
Last Man, where he argued for the unchallengeable triumph of liberal democracy that would 
eventually end the bloody wars of the 20th century.18 It is not surprising then that the U.S. 
military assessed the upcoming 21st century as “a century of shared understanding through 
information technology – a new era of relative peace”19 and, therefore, it was assumed that the 
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main future role of U.S. military forces would be to police the Pax Americana. While this 
understanding dominated and drove the American military attraction for NLW during the 
1990s, the 9/11 attacks and the following declaration of Global War on Terror propelled 
American military into interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, which were anything but a 
peacekeeping activity, as it had been assumed during the 1990s. On the one hand, without 
political support and no real military necessity, the interest in NLW ultimately dwindled. From 
1997 to 2009, the overall investment in the research and development of NLW in the U.S. 
military was no more than $386 million20 – a diminutive fraction of the U.S. defence budget 
that did not leave a chance for the development of the revolutionary technologies promised 
during the 1990s. On the other, two different cultural factors prevented the American military 
from abandoning the idea of NLW completely. The first one is the American traditional techno-
utopia in military affairs, and the fact that NLW provide a technological solution for something 
that the U.S. military had defined as a problem. The fact that this problem has not been seen 
significant enough does not mean that the interest in the potential of this technology should be 
abandoned. The second factor is the inability of American military thought, shaped by the 
traditional rivalry between different Services, to produce a coherent understanding of the 
strategic environment and future technologies that answer future military challenges. As 
different Services within the American military are incapable of reaching an agreement on the 
future of NLW, they also are unable to disregard them completely. 
   In contrast to the American military, Russians have never considered technology as a 
“magic bullet” that solves problems on the battlefield. Moreover, the Russian military-
industrial complex has traditionally been suffering from technological inferiority in 
comparison to the West and rarely produced revolutionary novel military technologies. 
Consequently, Russian observation of Western technologies in general, and American in 
particular, has always been one of the main drives behind not only Russian defence production, 
but also the Russian military thought. While, as it was discussed in chapter 4, Russian military 
thinkers succeeded in developing more comprehensive concepts for a possible employment of 
NLW, however, it was the American fascination with this technology that drove their interest. 
Moreover, as Western technological achievements frequently force Russian political-military 
decision-makers to urge their industries to develop similar capabilities, the American failure to 
develop operationally effective NLW reduced Russian interest and enthusiasm to press for 
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further development and employment. Interestingly enough, it has not stopped Russian military 
thinkers (who have never been deterred by the gap between theory and practice) to continue 
developing concepts and theories for the possible employment of NLW. While the American 
interest in NLW has been kept alive by the American traditional fascination with technologies 
and inability to coherently conceptualise their future implementations, Russians are still 
interested in NLW because of their traditional inclination toward abstract thinking and their 
belief that solutions lie not in technology, but rather in a sophisticated conceptual military 
theory. 
  As it was discussed in chapter 5, it seems right to argue that the IDF has more 
operational experience with NLW than both the American and Russian militaries together. Due 
to the routine deployment of military units in the Territories as law enforcement forces the 
Israeli military has not only mastered typical NLW as tools for riot control, but also introduced 
several very innovative technologies. The success of NLW during batash missions, however, 
has also been a vital factor that denied the transition of NLW to large-scale military operations, 
as in the Israeli military tenet what is good for batash is not suitable for war. The IDF’s cultural 
predisposition to admire “doers”, rather than “thinkers”, explains not only the absence of a 
broader conceptual approach towards NLW, but also the technological setback between the 
peaks of civilian unrest in the Territories – the technologies of the First Intifada were forgotten 
before the Second one, and technologies developed during the Second were abandoned after it 
ended. While the IDF’s interest in NLW has been driven solely due to the requirements of the 
batash realities, it is important to highlight the Israelis’ increasing American-style quest for 
technological solutions for military challenges. The Israeli military, lacking its own resources 
for technological adventures that are not supported by a clear military necessity, closely 
observes American technological achievements and, as history of the latest Information-
Technology RMA of precision-guided munitions teaches, Israelis are able to employ novel 
technologies, developed in the U.S., without having a conceptual framework for using it.21 The 
IDF does not employ NLW during its military operations not only because the conceptual 
denial of NLW as batash weaponry, but also because American military has not introduced 
NLW that are operationally employable on the battlefield.  
The main reason why the American, Russian and Israeli military organisation still 
discuss the potential of NLW, despite the noticeable absence of political pressure to minimise 
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enemy civilian casualties to a technologically possible minimum, is the American unfading 
interest in these weapons. Since the Second World War, the U.S. military has been a 
technological leader in military affairs and NLW are not an exception. As long as Americans 
will show interest in NLW, it will inspire Russians to develop theories for their possible 
employment and Israelis to look at American manufactures for possible acquisitions. 
 
The Concept of the Political-Military System and the Failed RMA of NLW 
As was introduced in chapter 1, the Political-Military System consists of three main 
elements – political entity, military and political-military challenge. On the one hand, as long 
as these three succeed in maintaining their mutual balance, the system will slowly evolve 
gradually transforming each one of the elements. On the other, a rapid and fundamental change 
of one of the elements will ultimately upset the whole system, and, as an outcome of this 
imbalance, an RMA might occur. As proposed in chapter 1, an RMA occurs when a political 
leadership, shaped by certain socio-cultural circumstances, defines to its military a challenge 
that military culture interprets as unmet; and when dealing with it requires a fundamental 
change that combines novel – but already available technology – operational concept and 
organisation. Moreover, the political leadership supports its military through the required 
transformation. According to this proposition, an analysis of an RMA had to follow the 
following questions:    
(1) Does the political leadership define this a particular state of affairs as a military challenge? 
If not, then what is the socio-cultural context that influences the political-military leadership in 
its decision-making process?  
(2) If the challenge is defined, how does the military, shaped by its military culture, interpret 
this challenge? If it is interpreted as a challenge that the military can deal with, then what is the 
military cultural context that influences the military leadership in its decision-making process? 
(3) If the challenge is defined by the military as unmet, does the political leadership support its 
military through the transformation? And if it does not, what is the socio-cultural context that 
prevents the political leadership from supporting it military?  
 
While these three questions were paraphrased at the end of chapter 2, to fit the specifics of the 
RMA of NLW and the political-military challenge of the minimisation of enemy civilian 
casualties; to conclude the significance of the concept of the Political-Military System, as is 
represented by these questions, it seems right to try and address these questions more directly. 
 As it was demonstrated throughout this research, the problem of harming enemy 
civilian population during military operations is an inherent part of the rhetoric of the 
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American, Russian and Israeli political leaderships. The need to avert enemy civilian casualties 
has indeed been defined as a military challenge that has to be met, it seems, however, that the 
tangible reactions to this challenge are not as significant as it is presented by the politicians’ 
rhetoric. As the analyses of the American, Russian and Israeli cases reveal, the political 
leaderships of these countries have very little external or domestic reasons to meet this 
challenge through fundamental-revolutionary change in their conduct of war. In other words, 
the socio-cultural and political contexts that have influenced the American, Russian and Israeli 
political-military leadership in their decision-making processes, regarding enemy civilian 
population, have necessitated giving the impression of minimising enemy civilian casualties, 
rather than their actual minimisation.  
 While the challenge of minimising civilian casualties has been identified and defined 
as such, military organisations see it as of secondary importance. As the political leadership 
has not called for fundamental changes in the conduct of war have, the military has been 
satisfied by the mere adaptation of existing capabilities accompanied by quite modest 
innovativeness. Due to their different cultural predispositions, the American, Russian and 
Israeli military establishments have been engaging with the challenge of averting enemy 
civilian casualties differently – Americans by emphasising the “humane” role of precision 
weapons; Russians by conceptualising intangible military theories intended to minimise enemy 
civilian casualties; and the Israelis by emphasising the “lawfare” and increased compliance 
with International Humanitarian Law as a way to avert collateral damage and unnecessary 
civilian casualties. In other words, none of the analysed military organisations have defined the 
minimisation of enemy civilian casualties as an unmet military challenge that requires a 
revolution in the form of innovative technological solutions combined with novel operational 
and organisational concepts. The RMA of NLW in the U.S., Russia and Israel has (so far) failed 
to materialise because the political leadership has asked the militaries to reduce the casualties 
to a politically acceptable level, rather than to the technologically possible minimum; in the 
socio-cultural context of each country, support for the former appears to be significantly higher 
than for the latter.  
 Throughout this research, the concept of the Political-Military System proved to be very 
useful to discover not only the reasons for the failure of the RMA of NLW, but also to identify 
a broader socio-political-cultural context that sustains the level of enemy civilian casualties on 
the battlefields in the beginning of 21st century at a significantly higher level than is 
technologically possible. Consequently, this analytical approach can help to understand and 
clarify different aspects of other military transformations. On the one hand, historians might 
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find this concept useful to explain the inter-connection between society and the military, in 
analysing the events of the past. On the other, and more importantly, strategists and 
practitioners might find it useful in an attempt to understand current military transformations 
that sometimes seem puzzling and counterintuitive. For example, a methodical application of 
the concept of the Political-Military System might improve our ability to understand the factors 
that drive (or restrain) military transformations in the field of robotics or cyber – two 
technologies that have recently attracted significant scholarly attentions.22 A systematic 
examination of the political-military challenges that these transformations are intended to 
bridge, and socio-cultural environments that shape political-military decision-making 
processes in these fields, could significantly improve the ability to explore, explain and 
anticipate the directions these transformations might take.   
 
The Absence of the RMA of NLW and the “Declining Violence” of Human Nature  
 The contemporary research that discusses the role and the place of violence in 21st 
century society can be generally divided into two schools of thought, and while both agree that 
violence is declining, their explanation of this trend is different. The most notable advocate of 
the first school is psychologist Steven Pinker. In his The Better Angels of Our Nature he 
suggests that “today we may be living in the most peaceable era in our species’ existence” 
because the contemporary society has become more empathic, self-controlling, moral and 
reasonable and has developed “a commitment that other living things, no matter how distant or 
dissimilar, be safe from harm and exploitation.”23 While Pinker generally argues that 
contemporary societies show more respect for human life than they used to in the past, and, 
therefore, inter-human violence is declining, some scholars suggest an alternative explanation 
of this phenomenon. The main supporter of this second school of scholars is the U.S.-based 
British classicist and archaeologist Ian Morris. While in his War – What Is Good For? he agrees 
with Pinker’s observation of the trend, stating that “today’s world [is] safer and richer than ever 
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before,”24 his explanation is entirely different. In contrast to the Pinker’s “tale of six trends, 
five inner demons, four better angels, and five historical forces,”25 which was shaped by his 
background in psychology, Morris’s analytical examination of “the whole ten-thousand-year-
long story of war since the end of the last ice age” led him to conclude that, in fact, it is “war 
[that] has made the world safer” as “war made governments, and governments made peace.”26 
While the failure of the RMA of NLW, as it was shown in this research, has been shaped by 
general public tolerance of enemy civilian casualties during military operations, it seems 
important to test these two explanations of the “Declining Violence” in the 21st century in the 
light of the present research findings.   
 Pinker’s main argument is that different historical social circumstances have forced 
humans to “reframe violence as a problem to be solved rather than a contest to be won”. 
According to him, there are five historical developments that have led to this conclusion: (1) 
the development of a stronger state and judiciary with a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force; (2) the international commerce that allows the exchange of goods and ideas over longer 
distances making other people become more valuable alive than dead; (3) the feminisation 
process that have empowered women and decreased cultural inclination towards violence that 
characterise largely a male pastime; (4) the globalisation and cosmopolitanism that have 
prompted societies to understand other people and embrace them, rather than fight them; (5) 
the increasing reasonability in human affairs that have been forcing people to recognise the 
futility of violence. These five historical developments, according to Pinker, have led people 
to favour their internal peaceable motives – Better Angels – Empathy, Self-Control, Moral 
Sense and Reason, and to reject their inner drives toward aggression and violence – Inner 
Demons – Instrumental Violence, Dominance, Revenge, Sadism and Ideology.27 While it was 
not the aim of this research to criticise Pinker’s theory directly, the analysis of the American, 
Russian and Israeli attitudes to enemy civilian casualties offered a much more selfish 
perception of human life that is based more on revenge and dominance, than on universal 
empathy, moral sense and reason – and the resultant failure of military organisations to develop 
and employ weapons that would minimise unnecessary violence (i.e., NLW) is a clear evidence 
of that. It is difficult to disagree with Pinker on the fact that the traceable decreasing violence 
within Western societies has been caused by Better Angels, however, when it comes to the 
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contemporary ways of war, it seems right to suggest that the only Angel that restrains the 
violence is International Humanitarian Law. Though one may argue that this Angel is a by-side 
product of human internal peaceable motives and liberal values, which have forced 
international community to restrict the level of violence during military clashes, Chris Jochnick 
and Roger Normand, who critically analysed the history of the laws of war, claim the opposite, 
stating that:   
[The] Examination of the historical development of these laws reveals that despite 
noble rhetoric to the contrary, the laws of war have been formulated deliberately to 
privilege military necessity at the cost of humanitarian values. As a result, the laws 
of war have facilitated rather than restrained wartime violence. Through law, 
violence has been legitimated.28 
As it was discussed in chapter 2, the International Humanitarian Law is a double-sided sword 
that intends to restrict the violence, on the one hand, but, on the other, create situations when, 
as Donald Rumsfeld stated, “our forces are allowed to shoot somebody and kill them, but 
they’re not allowed to use a non-lethal riot control agent [i.e., NLW].”29 The International 
Humanitarian Law is a much politicised topic that facilitates the harming enemy civilians, 
rather asks their minimisation. And NLW are not an exception, as, for example, analysing the 
regulatory history of the small arms munitions, Paul Cornish stated that: 
When a society feels under threat, from war, terrorism or violent crime, almost any 
effective weapon is likely to be seen as legitimate – regardless of the damage it can 
cause to the human body.30 
His analysis points to the politicisation of the International Arms Control Regimes and the 
cynical exploitation of international institutions for political reasons. His best example is the 
attempt of the Swedish experts in 1974 to ban the American 5.56mm cartridge under the 
auspices of the Red Cross due to “humanitarian concerns” and promote their own 7.62mm 
calibre, which, in fact, was capable of delivering even worse wounds.31 In other words, in his 
quite technical analysis, he points out the fact that the international legal system is controlled 
more by political self-interests covered by the rhetoric of “humanitarian concerns”, rather by 
our Better Angels – Moral Sense and Reason. Following Pinker’s terminology, the RMA of 
NLW failed because, despite the fact that Better Angels overcame Inner Demons within internal 
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human affairs of Western societies, these societies failed in doing so in their relation with their 
enemies – and this, eventually, quite weakens the very argument of The Better Angels of Our 
Nature. 
 Unlike Pinker, who structures his arguments on the increasing morality of human 
beings, Ian Morris tries to produce a more pragmatic explanation of the “Declining Violence” 
in human affairs. While emphasising only one of Pinker’s historical social developments – a 
stronger state and judiciary with a monopoly on legitimate use of force – Morris argues that 
throughout history violence has always been declining in big societies (Ancient Empires, Early 
Modern Empires or the contemporary Pax Americana) because: 
The only way to make these large societies work was for their rulers to develop 
stronger governments, and one of the first things these governments had to do, if 
they wanted to stay in power, was suppress violence within the society.32      
In other words, it is not that humans have become “better souls” at the end of the 20th century, 
but they repeatedly had been forced to disown violence by their own collective request for a 
wealthier life. As Morris argues: “the men who ran these governments hardly ever perused 
policies of peacemaking purely out of the goodness of their hearts. They cracked down on 
killing because well-behaved subjects were easier to govern and tax.” Analysing human 
history, Morris concludes that “governments have made us safer and the war is pretty much the 
only way we have discovered to make governments” and as “the winners of wars incorporate 
the looser into larger societies … with the passage of time – maybe decades, maybe centuries 
– the creation of bigger society tends to make everyone, the descendant of victors and 
vanquished alike, better-off.” In other words, wars create bigger societies and bigger societies 
create peace within these societies. In his analysis of human history, Morris distinguished 
between two types of war. While the first one – “the productive way of war” – when a winner 
successfully incorporates the loser creating bigger societies and making life safer and 
wealthier; the second one – “the counterproductive way of war” – when a stronger actor fails 
to incorporate the weaker rivals, which ultimately breaks down large societies, impoverishing 
people and making their lives more dangerous. He claims that after the “counterproductive” 
wars ruined Ancient Empires and engendered the Dark Ages, Early Modern Europe reinvented 
the “productive” way of war, discovering that:  
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The wealth of nations could be increased most not by plundering or even taxing 
downtrodden subjects, but by using state power to make as many people, as 
possible, as free, as possible to trade in bigger and bigger markets. 33      
The “Decreasing Violence” and relative peace within the Western Hemisphere (in its political, 
rather than geographical borders), according to Morris, is not an outcome of humans’ better 
nature, but a result of 500 years of “productive” wars that were fought between the nations that 
inhabit this global, yet in many aspects limited, society. Interestingly enough, while Morris 
comes to a paradoxical conclusion that it is the process of waging (“productive”) wars that 
make life safer, he does not claim that these wars must be accompanied by high levels of 
violence. In other words, according to his theory, the most important characteristic of war is its 
“productiveness” (i.e., the inclusion of the loser’s society into the society of the winner), and, 
as far as a war has “productive” ends, any level of violence (the highest possible or the lowest 
required) is acceptable. In the final chapter of his book, Morris analyses the latest American 
Global War on Terror, suggesting that the way the West has been fighting this war is, in fact, 
“counterproductive”, as the West has failed to incorporate rival societies (i.e., Afghani and 
Iraqi). Fighting terror, according to Morris, is reminiscent of the Roman Emperor Domitian’s 
dilemma, who in 85 A.D. drew a radical conclusion that “Rome no longer had much to gain 
from productive war.”34  
Morris states that “we kill because the grim logic of the game of death rewards it … 
[and] that is why we cannot just decide to end the war.” However, what if does “killing” itself 
make wars “counterproductive”? After all, the “productive” aim of war in the 21st century is to 
make as many people, as possible, as free, as possible and to win their hearts and minds, rather 
than killing them. The proposition that “killing” makes wars “counterproductive” makes 
Morris’s paradoxical conclusion that “productive war” makes peace even more puzzling, as it 
contradicts not only the logical perception of the consequences of war (i.e., destruction), but 
also shakes the very understanding of war as a peak of human violence. While this seemingly 
controversial argument will be discussed in more details in the last part of this chapter, it seems 
right to conclude that following Morris’s theory, the RMA of NLW failed because 500 years 
of “productive” wars, which have made the contemporary world the safest since the Stone Age, 
were also always accompanied by extreme violence. The long-term history suggests that “the 
logic of the game of death” has been rewarding, however, as Morris himself claims: “all the 
running we have done in the last ten thousand years has transformed our society, changing the 
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payoffs in the game.”35 Unfortunately, as it was discussed throughout this research, the social 
requirement to minimise enemy civilian casualties during this game has not been one of these 
transformations. 
  To conclude this discussion on the absence of the RMA of NLW and the “Declining 
Violence” it is important to answer the question in the title of this research – do we really care 
about enemy civilian casualties? On the one hand, Pinker’s appeal for increasing empathy and 
morality that human beings express to one another within their societies proved itself as 
incomplete in reflecting the way of war in the beginning of the 21st century. This chapter was 
written just several days after 13 November 2015 Paris attacks, a series of coordinated terrorist 
assaults that occurred in the French capital taking 130 lives. Two days after the attacks, French 
President Francois Hollande stated that "France will be merciless towards these barbarians," 
ordering the biggest French air raid on ISIS’s targets that has taken place in Syria so far, a 
"massive" attack as described by the French defence ministry spokesman.36 On 21 November 
2015, 8 days after the attacks, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2249 (2015) that 
called upon Member States to take “all necessary measures” to prevent and suppress terrorist 
acts on territory under the control of ISIS in Syria and Iraq,37 proving that our Inner Demons 
are very much alive and kicking. While in its call, the UN Security Council insisted that 
Member States have to act “in compliance with international law, in particular with the United 
Nations Charter, as well as international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law;”38 it is 
important to remember, that, as it was noted above, none of these “laws” explicitly demands 
the minimising of enemy civilian casualties. When it comes to waging wars against foreign 
societies, it is difficult not to concur with Ralph Peters’s already cited observation that:  
The citizenry of the United States, in fact, will tolerate the killing of enormous 
numbers of foreigners, so long as that killing does not take too long, victory is 
clear-cut, friendly casualties are comparatively low, and the enemy dead do not 
have names, faces, and families.39   
While Peters focused primarily on American society, his conclusion seems to be generalisable 
and it depicts well the minor part played by Better Angels in minimising the harming of enemy 
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civilians. In other words, from a moral perspective, due to the historical cultural predispositions 
shaped by the long history of bloody wars and violence, we just do not care about civilian 
population of a society that raised people who have dared to aim a blow at us, as long as the 
war is fast, decisive, with no painful costs (human, as well as financial) and the terrible 
consequences of our fighting are hidden from our eyes and minds.  
 On the other hand, according to Ian Morris, there is a more pragmatic explanation of 
the relationship between war and violence, and, in fact, violence during war is just a tool, rather 
than a goal, of war. The success of a war, according to Morris, is measured by its level of 
“productiveness” (i.e., the winner’s ability to absorb the loser, thus, creating a larger society), 
rather than the level of applied violence. Following this logic, it is possible to assume that the 
level of violence in contemporary conflicts is no more than a cultural relic of the long-term 
tradition of making war.  According to this theory, we do not care about enemy civilian 
casualties because our history tells us not only that war makes us safer and wealthier, but also 
that war ultimately means unprecedented (thought regulated) violence, as General William 
Tecumseh Sherman put it in 1864: “War is cruelty and you cannot refine it.”40 The question is, 
however, if this much enrooted historical cultural narrative makes wars in the 21st century 
“counterproductive” – would we care more for enemy civilians? – if not for moral reasons, 
then, at least, for pragmatic selfishness, because, if Morris is right, fighting 
“counterproductive” wars ultimately leads to the collapse of the society. Interestingly enough, 
the analysis of America’s failure to fight “productive” wars in Iraq and Afghanistan offers a 
small ray of optimism.  
 
A Ray of Optimism?  
Analysing the historical examples of technologies that failed to ignite an RMA, Lieutenant 
Colonel Gregory Wilmoth differentiate between two different results to which the military 
employment of initially failing technologies might lead. The first one is an absolute rejection 
due to technological unfeasibility. According to Wilmoth, the best example of such technology 
was the glider, which after a very short operational success in the Second World War became 
obsolete due to its technological inferiority and more successful alternative technologies (i.e., 
air-assault aircraft and helicopter). The second pathway describes a technology, which initially 
failed due to different technological disadvantages and lacking conceptualisation, but which, 
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after a period of time, makes a come-back when the operational needs require so. The best 
example, according to Wilmoth, is the technology of in-flight refuelling. Pioneered in the 1920s 
to extend the range of wooden biplanes, the idea of in-flight refuelling was generally abandoned 
due to many technological obstacles and general lack of operational need, as aircraft range and 
endurance improved during the 1930s. In the late 1940s, however, in-flight refuelling got a 
second chance to extend the range of strategic bombers in the context of the Cold War. During 
the following decades, the technology quickly spread throughout different services to extend 
the range of the tactical strike aircrafts. As Wilmoth concluded: “What was once a stun and 
then a niche technology blossomed into a widespread innovation.”41  
Keeping in mind these two possible results of a failed RMA, and the analysis of the 
military employment of NLW discussed throughout this research it seems right to argue that 
the story of NLW is more similar to the technology of in-flight refuelling, than that of gliders. 
In other words, as NLW have not been rejected by military for more than a quarter of century 
and, so far, mainly due to lacking conceptualisation of operational needs, they have been a 
niche technology intended for law enforcement capabilities. It could well be that, similar to the 
technology of in-flight refuelling, a clearly defined military necessity could turn NLW into a 
widespread innovation. As discussed in chapter 1, the military necessity for an RMA comes 
only when there is a military challenge that requires a development of novel organisational and 
operational concepts for the employment of innovative technologies. While it impossible to 
foreseen the future of NLW, the analysis of the military experience during in the first decade 
of the 21st century offers a ray of optimism. 
One of the most distinctive characteristics of warfare in the first decade of the 21st 
century was the great confidence that military organisations felt regarding the Information-
Technology RMA that occurred during the 1990s. The advocates of this RMA believed that a 
combination of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; advanced command, control, 
communications, computers and information; and precision-strike weapons offers a rapid and 
decisive victory with low friendly casualties and limited collateral damage.42 Focused on the 
prevalence of the air power, the proponents of this RMA believed that it could save “enemy 
lives through the use of precision to minimise non-combatant fatalities, and friendly lives by 
the substitution of technology for manpower and the creation of battlefield conditions in which 
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land elements … can do their job without significant resistance.”43 While, in theory, this RMA 
was promised to provide an overwhelming victory, the practice proved the opposite. The 
American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan,44 as well as the IDF’s encounter with Hezbollah 
in Lebanon in 2006,45 proved that this RMA has very little to offer, as Colin Gray put it: “it is 
not unreasonable to ask why it has been that our ever-improving battle space knowledge has 
been compatible with so troubled a course of events in the 2000s in Iraq and Afghanistan.”46   
The interesting fact is that the failure of this RMA can be easily explained by an 
examination of its roots – the Information-Technology RMA was developed in the context of 
the Cold War, when the U.S. military was looking for new operational concepts and new 
technologies to meet the challenge of the deep-echeloned Soviet rear.47 In other words, the 
unmet military challenge that had been bridged by this RMA was “the orderly advance of their 
[Soviet] follow-on echelons”48 during symmetrical conflict against traditional military. It is not 
surprising then that this RMA was very helpful in defeating the Iraqi military (twice, in 1991 
and in 2003) but failed to provide satisfactory results against insurgencies and terror 
organisation. This failure, however, is rooted not in technological sophistication of the enemy, 
but in the different nature of the conflict. While the Information-Technology RMA was 
intended to defeat conventional military, “insurgencies are defeated not by killing insurgents, 
but by winning the support of the population and thus denying the insurgents both refuge and 
recruits.”49 In other words, as many scholars already pointed out, counter-insurgency and 
counter-terrorism are about winning “hearts and mind”, rather than a bold fighting against 
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“invisible” enemy.50 And, from that perspective, the Information-Technology RMA has had, 
indeed, very little to offer.    
 It seems, however, that the American military has been learning lessons from its failure 
in Iraq and Afghanistan and the understanding that in fighting counter-insurgency the “priority 
should be given to securing the civilian population, not hunting down insurgents”51 has begun 
to spread through the circles of the U.S. military decision-makers. In 2015, commenting on the 
American air-strikes of ISIL in Syria, Lieutenant General Bob Otto, the U.S. Air Force’s deputy 
chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, stated that: 
We believe if you inadvertently kill innocent men, women and children, then 
there’s a backlash from that … we might kill three and create 10 terrorists. It really 
goes back to the question of are we killing more than were making?52 
In other words, the American military has begun to understand that causing civilian casualties 
is pragmatically counterproductive in fighting insurgencies and terrorist organisations. 
Changing military doctrine, however, as Alvin and Heidi Toffler claim, is “like trying to stop 
a tank armour by throwing marshmallows at it. The military, like any huge modern 
bureaucracy, resists innovation – especially if the change implies the downgrading of certain 
units and the need to learn new skills and to transcend service rivalries.”53 And, therefore, it is 
not surprising that the U.S. military intuitively looks for a solution in an existent technology, 
as Colonel Steve Warren, a spokesman for the anti-ISIL campaign, stated “the amount of care 
that we have taken to preserve civilian life, to preserve civilian infrastructure, is 
unprecedented” because the air-strikes of the U.S. and its allies “are the most precise in the 
history of warfare.”54 The NATO-led Libya campaign in 2011, however, already showed that 
neither precision weapons, nor the strict rules of engagement do not make war “productive”. 
Despite the fact that “advanced munitions, particularly low-collateral, inert and fused weapons 
such as Hellfire, Dual Mode Seeker Brimstone and Paveway IV were highly prized” and the 
campaign “was conducted throughout with very restrictive rules of engagement, with a 
mandate to protect the population and minimise collateral damage to the infrastructure in order 
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to help the country back on its feet after the cessation of violence”55 – the violence in Libya 
has not ceased, and it seems that a more fundamental transformation has to occur to make 
contemporary conter-insurgency wars more “productive”. 
Christopher Coker in his Humane Warfare, The Future of War and most recent Warrior 
Geeks, proposes an idea that by exploiting different novel technologies the killing in war may 
become redundant.56 While he explores the radical idea that war might be “technicized” to a 
level that “we may be able to pass beyond the ‘death barrier’,”57 this military transformation 
will require not only technological maturity, but also the socio-political environment that will 
facilitate these fundamental changes. In other words, before Coker’s technologies (e.g., genetic 
engineering of warriors, robots controlled by artificial intelligence, cyborgs, etc.) will 
fundamentally change the conduct of war, they have to pass the test of political-military 
necessity, i.e., there has to be a clearly defined political-military challenge that these 
technologies are intended to bridge, and the political leadership has to have a socio-political 
reason to cope with this challenge. 
The RMA of NLW, as any fundamental military transformation, is no different. 
However, as discussed above, the future of NLW will be determined by the U.S. military and 
there are two reasons why the observation given by Lieutenant General Bob Otto offers a ray 
for optimism. The first is the fact that the U.S. political-military decision-makers have come to 
the understanding that counter-insurgency presents an unmet challenge that has to be bridged 
by a combination of novel operational and organisational concepts and innovative 
technologies.58 Only time will show whether NLW will be a part of the required military 
transformation, but, as Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff put it, “whereas previously the focus had 
been on destroying targets,” today “it may be sufficient or indeed preferable to disable 
targets,”59 and NLW are intended to do exactly that. The second reason for optimism regarding 
the future of NLW is, according to Ian Morris’s theory, the “counterproductiveness” (i.e., the 
inability of winners to incorporate losers into a larger society) of contemporary ways of war 
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against insurgencies and terrorism.  The US-led West failed to make Iraqi, Afghani (as well as 
Libyan, Yemeni, Syrian, etc.) people as free as possible to trade in bigger and bigger markets. 
To make counter-insurgency “productive”, its success or failure has to be measured not by 
body counts or a footage of “liberated” territory, but according to the public opinion of the 
local population. As the maximum possible minimisation of enemy civilian casualties is 
essential in achieving this, NLW are, again, intended to do exactly that.  
The opponents of military employment of NLW might claim that these weapons 
suitable for police officers, rather than war-fighters. According to Ian Morris, however, the 
U.S. is the “globocop” of the early 21st century, and, it seems that it begins to understand that 
in conducting wars against insurgencies, “policing” (i.e., disabling, incapacitating, minimising 
collateral damage, etc.) may be more effective than “war-fighting” (i.e., destroying and killing). 
The RMA of NLW may eventually occur, not because of moral or political costs of causing 
enemy civilian casualties, but due to the potential effectiveness of these weapons in counter-
insurgency. As the history of military innovations suggests, however, without a clear and 
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